Sadrist–Khomeinist conflict

The Sadrist–Khomeinist conflict refer to the rivalry between the Sadrist Movement and Iran-backed Shia militias in Iraq.

History During their opposition to Saddam Hussein, Iraqi Shia militias were united and had Iranian support. The conflict emerged during the Iraqi civil war, when Iraqi Shia militias disagreed over Iran and its interference in Iraqi affairs. Muqtada al-Sadr was the son of Mohammed al-Sadr, who founded the nationalist Sadrist Movement in the 1980s. After Mohammed al-Sadr was assassinated in 1999, Muqtada al-Sadr succeeded him as the leader of the Sadrist Movement and became one of the most powerful and respected Shia clerics.Roggio, Bill, "Mugniyah Behind Establishment of Mahdi Army." The Long War Journal, 23 February 2008. Web. 10 July 2010. Following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Muqtada al-Sadr founded the Mahdi Army, with the goal of expelling American troops from Iraq and establishing an Iraqi Shia government.Cochrane, Marisa. “Iraq Report 12: The Fragmentation of the Sadrist Movement.” Institute for the Study of War, June 2009. 18 July 2014Roggio, Bill, "Mugniyah Behind Establishment of Mahdi Army." The Long War Journal, 23 February 2008. Web. 10 July 2010.

Although the Mahdi Army was focused on expelling American troops from Iraq, the political Sadrists joined a coalition with the Islamic Dawa Party and SCIRI. The Sadrists were the kingmakers in the success of the coalition which resulted in the election of Nouri al-Maliki.“Iraq’s most powerful coalitions.” AlJazeera, 4 March 2010. Web. 21 July 2015. However, al-Sadr and Maliki were at odds over the topic of Iran, and the disagreements led to the Mahdi Army fighting against the pro-Iran government of Maliki by 2006.”Profile: Moqtada Sadr.” BBC NEWS, 19 Jan. 2012. Web. 9 July 2015. Despite its initial popularity as a Shia resistance group, the Mahdi Army provoked a series of clashes in early 2007 which caused even some of its staunchest supporters to criticise it. In August 2007, following violent clashes in Karbala between the Mahdi Army and the Iran-backed Badr Brigades, in which 50 Shia pilgrims were killed, there was much pressure on the Mahdi Army.Rahimi, Babak. “The Return of Moqtada al-Sadr and the Revival of the Mahdi Army.” The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 3 June 2010. Web. 18 July 2014Cochrane, Marisa. “Iraq Report 12: The Fragmentation of the Sadrist Movement.” Institute for the Study of War, June 2009. 18 July 2014.

The Mahdi Army was accused of provoking the clashes, and al-Sadr ordered his supporters to disarm. However, not all Mahdi Army members followed the order.Wong, Edward, et al. “'shiite Cleric Wields Violence and Popularity to Increase Power in Iraq." The New York Times, 29 November 2005. Web. 10 July 2010. This was when the Special Groups emerged, which was a term for Mahdi Army members who continued to fight.Roggio, Bill. "Mahdi Army Cell Leader Behind Deadly Baghdad Bombing." The Long War Journal, 18 June 2008. Web. 10 July 2010. Roggio, Bill. "Attacking Sadr's Mahdi Army." The Long War Journal, 26 May 2007. Web. 8 July 2010. In 2006, Qais al-Khazali founded Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH). AAH became a prominent Shia militia in Iraq and was tied with the Quds Force, which gave it the majority of its funding.Wyer, Sam. “Middle East Security Report 7: The Resurgence of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq.” The Institute for the Study of War, December 2012. Web. 6 August 2014 In late 2007, al-Sadr went into exile in Qom, Iran, where he continued his religious studies while continuing to lead the Mahdi Army.Rahimi, Babak. “The Return of Moqtada al-Sadr and the Revival of the Mahdi Army.” The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 3 June 2010. 18 July 2014.Cochrane, Marisa. “Iraq Report 12: The Fragmentation of the Sadrist Movement.” Institute for the Study of War, June 2009. 18 July 2014. In February 2008, al-Sadr ordered the Mahdi Army to resumed military activities, provoking the 2008 Iraq spring fighting. Following the ceasefire, al-Sadr fully disarmed the Mahdi Army.Cochrane, Marisa. “Iraq Report 12: The Fragmentation of the Sadrist Movement.” Institute for the Study of War, June 2009. 18 July 2014.

The Mahdi Army began to focus on social services for impoverished Shia communities in Iraq. Although the majority of the Mahdi Army was disarmed, al-Sadr retained his elite fighters and formed the Promised Day Brigades. The PDB were prohibited from fighting Iraqi troops, and only focused on American forces until they withdrew in 2011.Porter, Gareth, "What is Sadr's Game on Future U.S. Troop Presence?" IPS News, 14 July 2011. Web. 12 June 2012. Despite running in elections against Maliki, Iranian intervention probed al-Sadr to agree to enter a coalition with Maliki. Rowdy welcome in Najaf for Shia cleric Moqtada Sadr.” The BBC, 6 January 2011. Web. 22 July 2014.BBC. “Main Iraq Shia coalition nominates Nouri Maliki for PM.” The BBC, 1 October 2010. Web. 22 July 2014. The Sadrist support for Maliki ensured him a second term, and the Sadrists had 8 out of 32 seats in the new government. Despite having a share in the Maliki government, by September 2011, al-Sadr began holding anti-Maliki rallies, as he became frustrated with what he viewed as the Iran-backed tyranny of Maliki. In December 2011, al-Sadr again openly opposed the Maliki government and called for new elections.Schmidt, Michael S.; Healy, Jack. “In Blow to Government, Sadr Followers Call For New Elections.” New York Times, 26 December 2011. Web. 23 July 2014.

On August 6, 2013, al-Sadr announced his retirement from politics and dissolution of the Mahdi Army. However, its members continued to follow al-Sadr and the Sadrist Movement remained in Iraqi politics.Sadah, Ali Abel. “Sadr Reconsiders Political Role, Mahdi Army.” Al-Monitor (trans. Sahar Ghoussoub), 28 August 2013. Web. 18 July 2014. After the fall of Mosul, al-Sadr formed the Peace Brigades. The Peace Brigades aimed to defeat the Islamic State and to end Iranian involvement in Iraqi affairs, as well as the resignation of Nouri al-Maliki. “Iraq’s Sadr calls for emergency government: leader of powerful Shia group Mahdi army says “new faces” needed to tackle ISIL-led Sunni rebellion in country’s north.” Al Jazeera,27 June 2014. Web. 18 July 2014. In 2014, Maliki was replaced with Haider al-Abadi. Hayder al-Abadi was much less reliant on Iran, and al-Sadr quickly pledged his support. Since al-Abadi became Prime Minister, the Peace Companies worked closely with the Iraqi Army in the fight against the Islamic State. Morris, Loveday & Salim, Mustafa. “Iraqi Shiite cleric recalls militiamen in fight against Islamic State.” The Washington Post, 17 Feb. 2015. Web. 7 July 2015. Although the Peace Companies were allied with the new Iraqi government in the fight against the Islamic State, they rejected assistance from the United States and threatened to fight American troops if they came to Iraq. Mamoun, Abdelhak. “URGENT: al-Sadr threatens to target American troops if they return to Iraq.” IraqiNews, 15 Sept. 2014. Web. 7 July 2015”Top Shia cleric threatens US troops if they entered Iraq.” MEMO: Middle East Monitor, 16 Sept. 2014. Web. 7 July 2015. In January 2016, al-Sadr called on al-Abadi to reform his government. When the deadline passed in March 2016, al-Sadr himself entered the Green Zone, declaring that he was ready to die for the demands. Sly, Liz. “Firebrand cleric Muqtada al-Sadr returns to centre stage of Iraqi politics.” The Sydney Morning Herald, 1 April 2016. Web. 4 April 2016. He set up a tent in the middle of the Green Zone where he remained for five days until his requests were partially met. Although al-Sadr has studied in Iranian seminaries, and was exiled in Iran, his relationship with Iran was strained.Rahimi, Babak, "The Future of Moqtada Al-Sadr’s New Jaysh Al-Mahdi." Combating Terrorism Center, 15 Jan. 2009. Web. 8 July 2015.Krohley, Nicholas. “Moqtada al-Sadr’s Difficult Relationship with Iran.” Hurst Publishing, 7 August 2014. Web. 8 July 2015.

Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Kata'ib Hezbollah, and the Badr Brigades were financed and influenced by Iran, although to different extents, while the Sadrists were more nationalist and largely rejected Iranian interference in Iraq.”Iraq’s Sadr Slams Iran-Backed Militias.” NOW, 29 April 2015. Web. 8 July 2015.Krohley, Nicholas. “Moqtada al-Sadr’s Difficult Relationship with Iran.” Hurst Publishing, 7 August 2014. Web. 8 July 2015. The Mahdi Army had occasionally accepted Iranian aid. The Mahdi Army believed that Iraqi Shia Arabs, rather than "Persian interlopers", were the leaders of the Iraqi Shia community, and asserted that the Iraqi government should put the interests of Iraqi Shias first, regardless of what Iran thinks about it. Arango, Tim. “'sadr's Path Could Determine How Iraq Turns." The New York Times, 21 September  2011. 16 October 2011.

After the arrest of Qais al-Khazali, Akram al-Kabi temporarily assumed leadership of AAH until the release of al-Khazali in early 2010. Cochrane, Marisa. “Asaib Ahl al-Haq and the Khazali Special Groups Network.” Institute for the Study of War, 13 Jan. 2008. Web. 31 July 2015.Chulov, Martin. “Cleric freed in move expected to prompt handover of kidnapped Briton's body” The Guardian, January 3, 2010. In 2008, Muqtada al-Sadr demanded that al-Kabi reunite AAH with the Mahdi Army, but Kabi refused. Cochrane, Marisa. “Asaib Ahl al-Haq and the Khazali Special Groups Network.” Institute for the Study of War, 13 Jan. 2008. Web. 31 July 2015. AAH continued to clash with the Mahdi Army. Jawad al-Tamimi, Aymenn. “Iraq: Who are Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq Islamists.” Islamist Gate, 6 March 2014. Web. 20 July 2015.

During the Iraqi political crisis, Iranian control over the Shia militias weakened. In 2021, Iran-backed militias stormed Baghdad, angry at the success of Muqtada al-Sadr in the 2021 Iraq parliamentary election. In 2022, Sadrists who were angry about Iranian influence in Iraq, stormed the Iraqi parliament, later dispersing. On 31 August, a huge battle broke out between the Sadrists and several Iran-backed militias, which quickly spread to southern Iraq. Sadrist militiamen shut down AAH and Badr headquarters in many areas. Muqtada al-Sadr later called for an end to the attacks. The Peace Companies and AAH clashed in Basra in September 2022, resulting in 4 dead. In April 2023, in Baghdad, after a period of extreme tension between Kata'ib Hezbollah and the Peace Companies, both sides were ready to fight until the Iraqi government intervened and prevented clashes.

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