Debates over U.S. Supreme Court reform center on the tension between its powerful unelected role and democratic accountability. The Constitution leaves Congress broad authority to shape the Court’s structure—fueling recurring political and scholarly proposals to alter its size, tenure, and jurisdiction. As the only unelected branch of the federal government of the United States, the Supreme Court is the subject of heavy contention in public debate and has been since before the U.S. Constitution's drafting. The Supreme Court holds high importance in the American system as the final judicial check on both legislative and executive power.

The debates around reform hinge on the counter-majoritarian difficulty, a feature identified by legal scholar Alexander Bickel, of the U.S. governmental system in which one branch (the judiciary) can overrule the democratically implemented will of the majority. The Supreme Court's composition and structure is extremely fluid in nature. As laid out in Article Three of the U.S. Constitution, the only clear explanation of the Supreme Court is that "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court". With this vague description of power, the U.S. Congress remains on charge of all specifics of the Court and its operation, with discretion over jurisdiction, number of justices, tenure of justices, etc. Congressional power over the Court warrants debate, as politicians often promise reform when running for office. The debate over Supreme Court reform is commented on in academic, judicial, executive, and legislative circles in the United States.

Background

Section 1 of Article III of the U.S. Constitution, which establishes the judicial branch of the federal government, reads as follows:The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services a Compensation which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.The section outlines only the existence of the Supreme Court of the United States, leaving open all substantive aspects of the Court's composition. It sets no qualifications for the justices besides "good Behaviour," no recommendation for a number of justices, no description of term-length or tenure, no outline of jurisdiction (original or appellate), and no specifics about the appointment process. The section's ambiguity leaves ample room for Congress to operate in administering the Court, and the legislature has historically vacillated in how it sets up the body. The ability to reform the Court has become fodder for politicians during times of heavy scrutiny on the Court.

The Constitution outlays the counter-majoritarian difficulty as a feature of the governmental system, allowing a small, unelected body to temper the popular will. When operating perfectly, the antidemocratic Supreme Court should keep the democratic process on the right track against fleeting popular passions. Many scholars argue that this phenomenon is antithetical to the American democratic ethos on which the nation was founded. The difficulty creates a balancing test in administration of the court between the majority and the Constitution.

Reform options and arguments

Presidents from many parties have campaigned on reforming the Supreme Court through structural and ideological means, including more recent presidents taking aim at judicial activism. Andrew Jackson looked to curtail judicial overreach in opposition to big government, Abraham Lincoln wanted to ensure anti-slavery principles, Franklin D. Roosevelt attempted to push through New Deal legislation by means of SCOTUS reform, Ronald Reagan appointed justices like Robert Bork to inject specific ideological constitutional interpretation, and Joe Biden created the commission (PCSCOTUS) to explore reform.

A few proposals, examined in depth by the Supreme Court commission, have repeatedly reappeared in public discourse as ways to amend the operation of the Supreme Court. An important factor in determining the validity of these reforms is to identify the political context in which they originate. Oftentimes, presidents and politicians recommend altering the Court as a response to unfavorable decisions. It’s politically motivated proposals that draw the ire of the general public, however, politicians rarely float reforms to solve structural problems of the Court like efficiency or workload.

Expansion

One proposed reform is expanding the size of the Court, meaning the number of justices on the bench.

In the 117th, 118th, and 119th Congresses, bills were introduced to expand the Court in the Senate by Senator Edward Markey (D-MA) and in the House by Representatives Hank Johnson (D-GA-4) and Al Green (D-TX-9).

Senator Elizabeth Warren endorsed expanding the Court in 2021, and in July 2026, former vice president Kamala Harris called for increasing it to 13 justices.

Supporters argue that expansion could correct a perceived political imbalance on the Court. Opponents argue that changing the Court’s size for political purposes could weaken judicial independence, increase perceptions that the judiciary is partisan, and lead to retaliatory expansions by future congressional majorities. Supporters counter that the Court is already politicized and that structural changes could improve its legitimacy.

The Constitution does not set the Court’s size. After establishing the original six-member Court in 1789, Congress changed its authorized size multiple times during the 19th century, most recently setting it at nine justices in 1869—one for each of the nine judicial circuits then in existence.

Term limits A proposal that is generally much more politically favorable in a bipartisan context is introducing term limits for the justices. Ironically, these term limits are the most constitutionally dubious of all reforms, for one of the few specifications of Article III Section 1 is that justices shall serve during good behavior.

Proponents of this practice note the singularity of lifetime tenure on the United States Supreme Court. In other countries and in most of the United States, supreme court justices do not have the luxury of lifetime tenure. As noted in the Supreme Court commission's report, the United States is the only constitutional democracy in the world to allow lifetime appointments. The lifetime tenure system introduces arbitrary roadblocks that influence the appointment process. Justices die (or on rare occasions retire) at various, random intervals that allow presidents varying numbers of appointments based on random chance.

Often recommended to be made 18 years long and non-renewable, term limits would accomplish two main goals. One, they would make sure that presidents get to appoint at least two justices, four if the president wins reelection, making the nomination process more predictable and closer in line with electoral outcomes. This would make the judiciary as a whole responsive to the American public. Two, it would maintain the independence that justices currently hold on the bench, potentially decreasing their responsiveness to political pressure by eliminating the need for strategic retirements.

Opponents of this system argue that these term limits could be constitutionally dubious. Additionally, they note that this particular reform makes justices act more like representatives of political parties than they currently are. Since presidents would "get" two appointments, the process could become more politicized, worsening a current problem of the appointment process. This reform would likely necessitate a constitutional amendment.

Jurisdiction stripping Jurisdiction stripping, or limiting the types of issues on which the Court may rule, could take some politically volatile issues out of the justices’ hands, abortion rights being a prime example. Addressed in Article III, Congress has the power to make exceptions to the Court’s jurisdiction. The reform can be seen through multiple lenses. The argument can be made that some of these sensitive political issues should stay within the bounds of the political bodies, Congress and the president. On the other side of the coin, proponents often recommend this reform for more partisan purposes: to eliminate the possibility of the Court ruling against partisan legislation. The details of this proposal, which the Supreme Court commission dissected in depth, can become very complex. Constitutional scholars disagree over how exactly this process would work, its downstream effects, and its specific constitutionality.

Supermajority rules This reform would make a supermajority vote required when the Court is addressing the conduct or legislation of the other two branches of government. It can, at times, also institute a deferential requirement on constitutional questions. The crux of the reform is making it more difficult for the unelected Supreme Court to invalidate the actions of the elected branches of the federal government. Many state and federal courts follow this supermajority system; this often manifests in three-judge-panels that must vote 2:1 to come to a decision.

Proponents of this system argue that the reform would provide additional deference to the elected branches of government, legislative and executive. By deferring to these branches, the Court would preserve more of the popular will in their decision making because it would be more difficult to overturn actions of democratically elected branches. Proponents point to recent 5–4 decisions on important constitutional questions as examples of a judiciary that decides on too slim margins, not exhibiting enough consensus. They also say that this reform would incentivize consensus-building among judges. Opponents identify that this proposal could cut against one of the key roles of the Supreme Court, resisting majoritarian overreach as an antidemocratic body. By raising the bar of overturning constitutionality, the Court would have a much more difficult time doing its job.

Congressional override

The final, often-discussed reform to the Supreme Court is a legislative override as a final check on judicial power. This would allow Congress to veto judicial decisions that overturn constitutionality of federal laws. The proposal would have to be accomplished through a constitutional amendment. Proposals for the process generally agree that the override should follow the general federal legislative process, being agreed upon by both the House and Senate and needing the president’s vote. Some proposals encourage a supermajority vote by the legislature.

Supporters of the measure argue that this would allow for a final democratic examination of some Supreme Court actions, keeping final say in the hands of the people. It could temper an unelected judiciary from straying too far from the popular will in the country. Opponents raise similar rejoinders to those against supermajority rules: instituting this practice would eliminate the counter-majoritarianism that the Court aims to foster.

Notable structural reform successes and attempts

Through time, Congress has done much to address this counter-majoritarian balancing test. They often did this by altering the size and practices of the Supreme Court, reforming it mostly through changing the number of justices on the bench, often for political reasons tied to national politics. However, Congress has rarely altered the jurisdiction of the Court.

1789 Judiciary Act