The German-Soviet air war on 22 June 1941 was the largest one-day air battle in military history. The battle involved both aerial dogfights and airstrikes on Soviet airbases. Around 14,000 combat aircraft took part in the air war on 22 June 1941, with more 2,000 combat aircraft destroyed. The loss ratio was estimated at 35:1 to 60:1 in favor of the Luftwaffe.
The Germans won a convincing victory, demonstrated superiority in tactics, the skills of pilots and, having destroyed significant forces of outnumbered Soviet air forces, gained air supremacy. The defeat was seen as forcing the Soviets to request replacement lost aircraft from the western powers, resulting in the July 1941 Anglo-Soviet Agreement cementing the Soviet Union as an Allied Power, despite longstanding ideological differences and Soviet participation in the Invasion of Poland.
Luftwaffe on 21 June As of 21 June, the Luftwaffe had a total of 4,948 combat aircraft on all fronts. These included 1,454 single-engine fighters and fighter-bombers, 282 twin-engine fighters and fighter-bombers, 196 twin-engine fighter-bombers, 422 dive bombers, 1,503 twin-engine bombers, 25 four-engine bombers, 244 seaplanes, and 822 reconnaissance aircraft. At last readiness, as of 21 June 1941, approximately 3,567 combat aircraft (72%) were in combat readiness. This included 76% single-engine fighters and fighter-bombers, 72% twin-engine fighters and fighter-bombers, 72% night fighters, 71% dive bombers, and 66% two- and four-engine bombers.
Even at the beginning of Operation Barbarossa, significant Luftwaffe forces remained in the West. In total, the West had about 33% of all available combat aircraft (including in the Mediterranean theater). This force consisted of 31% of all single-engine fighters, 27% of twin-engine fighters and fighter-bombers, 100% of night fighters, 20% of dive bombers, 37% of twin-engine bombers, 100% of four-engine bombers.
Soviet aviation on 21 June James J. Schneider has argued that from 1929, Joseph Stalin set out to create a "warfare state" in the Soviet Union, as a country that was continuously preparing to fight a large-scale war.
The Soviets were confident that in the event of war with Germany they would win an easy victory by defeating the Luftwaffe.
"What I heard exceeded all expectations: such a well-conceived and carefully prepared strike did not produce the expected results. I still don't understand how this could have happened: the Bolsheviks met us almost at the border"- says the German air fleet chief of staff in the 1939 Soviet military novel "The First Strike (The Tale of a Future War)", published by the Soviet Military Publishing House. In the novel, a German attack on Soviet airfields is thwarted by the coordinated activity of all Soviet air defense services, especially air surveillance posts, which make possible the timely launch of fighters whose pilots, the “Stalinist falcons”, completely defeat the German pilots and force them to retreat. A book written in the spirit of Stalinist slogans “the Red Army will respond with a triple blow to the blow of the warmongers” or “the Red Army will wage the war offensively with the goal of destroying the enemy and achieving victory with little bloodshed” contributed to the emergence of arrogant boastfulness and overestimation of Soviet aviation capabilities.
At the end of the 1930s, everything in Soviet engine building was still noticeably behind Western standards. Many Soviet aircraft manufacturing enterprises used outdated technology and the work was slowed down by a low-power experimental production base and the poor technical equipment of Soviet scientific institutes. The USSR had to resort to purchases from Western countries, especially the USA, and achieve the release of some licensed components and aviation materials. Materials science lagged behind, and the production of much-needed aluminum did not meet the needs of industry. Therefore, most Soviet aircraft had a mixed design with an extensive use of wood. The radio industry had failed to provide aircraft with reliable and compact radios and other necessary equipment, such as navigation.
No fewer problems arose when solving those of staffing. Bureaucracy, inertia, and the desire primarily for quantitative indicators seriously harmed the strengthening of the air power of the Soviet Union. Excessive ideologization and great attention to the "class" factor when recruiting the Red Army Air Force (80–90% of future pilots were recruited from workers or peasants) also had a negative impact on the overall combat readiness.
A meeting of senior command staff dedicated to the use of branches of the Armed Forces in the upcoming war, which took place six months before the Nazi invasion, showed examples of the many contradictory opinions expressed by leadership. The speakers presented different, sometimes directly opposing views on the optimal structure of the Air Force, the degree of centralization of control, the effectiveness of raids on enemy airfields, etc. This caused alarm among the People's Commissar for Defense of the Soviet Union, Marshal Semyon Timoshenko, who said, summing up: "We have a lot of accumulated experience regarding the use of the Air Force in operations, but, as noted at the meeting, this experience has not yet been generalized and studied. Furthermore, - and this can be fraught with serious consequences - our Air Force leadership does not have a unified view on such issues as the formation and planning of operations, assessment enemy, methods of conducting air warfare and imposing one’s will on the enemy, choosing targets, etc."
A significant part of the Soviet pilots had rich combat experience due to the Soviet Air Force having recently experienced combat over Finland at Winter War and against the Empire of Japan in the East.
Black day of Soviet aviation
The Luftwaffe's Chief of the General Staff, Hans Jeschonnek, wanted to begin air attacks before the German artillery started firing. However, Hitler and the OKW decided that that might give the opportunity for the Soviets to disperse their air units, and rejected Jeschonnek's proposal. Hitler gave the order for the air strikes on airfields to be carried out at dawn. Although many new German bomber crews had only limited training in instrument-flying, the Luftflotten overcame the problem by hand picking experienced crews, who would cross the border at high altitude, to swoop on their targets. The Germans deliberately targeted Soviet fighter air bases first, to knock out potential opposition to its bombers and dive bombers.
The first attacks began at 03:00 on 22 June. The Soviets, caught by surprise, had their aircraft bunched together in neat rows which were vulnerable. The results proved devastating. At Pinsk aerodrome the 39th Mixed Bomber Aviation Regiment of 10th Mixed Aviation Division lost 43 SBs and five Pe-2s on the ground after attacks by KG 3, which lost one bomber. Further to the west, the 33rd Fighter Aviation Regiment of the 10th Mixed Aviation Division lost 46 I-53 and I-16s to fighter-bombers of JG 51. Messerschmitt Bf 110s of SKG 210 destroyed 50 aircraft at Kobryn airfield, near the headquarters of the 10th Mixed Aviation Division and the Soviet Fourth Army. The airfield based the 74th Attack Aviation Regiment, which lost 47 I-15s, 5 I-153s and 8 IL-2 aircraft on 22 June. Slightly later, KG 54 attacked airfields in the area, and its 80 Ju 88s destroyed 100 Soviet aircraft. The VVS flew 6,000 sorties (in comparison to the Germans' 2,272 sorties) and VVS ZOVO put 1,900 aircraft into the air. In several cases Soviet pilots rammed German machines, using the tactic of taran.
The Stavka, stunned by the initial assault, took several hours to realize the disastrous situation and to respond. They ordered every available VVS bomber into the air. Without coordination and fighter escort, they suffered catastrophic losses, and flew, quite literally, to the "last man". In the event, the VVS' bombers kept coming, and on several occasions the Bf 109s wiped out entire formations. Only 10 hours after the first Axis attacks, at 13:40, did the commander of the Red Army Air Force (VVS KA - ), Pavel Zhigarev, order the long-range aviation into action. The 96 Long-Range Aviation Regiment of 3rd Bomber Aviation Corps put 70 DB-3s into the air but lost 22 with many others returning damaged. The German fighter pilots had it very easy under these circumstances, attacking unescorted bombers in a target-rich environment. JG 53 claimed 74 air victories for two losses. III./JG 53 claimed 36 air victories alone and 28 on the ground. JG 51 was credited with 12 fighters and 57 bombers. JG 54 accounted for 45 air victories and 35 on the ground for one Bf 109 damaged. The Bf 110s of SKG 210 accounted for 334 Soviet aircraft against 14 airfields. It lost seven Bf 110s destroyed or damaged.
At the end of the day, German reports claimed 1,489 Soviet aircraft destroyed on the ground alone. At first, these statistics seemed barely credible. Even Hermann Göring refused to believe the figures and had them secretly checked. In fact, German officers checking the airfields which the Wehrmacht soon overran, counted over 2,000 wrecks. Soviet sources confirm these totals. The VVS Baltic District lost 56 aircraft on 11 airfields. VVS ZOVO lost 738 of its 1,789 aircraft on 26 airfields. The VVS Kiev District had 23 of its airfields bombed it lost 192 aircraft, 97 on the ground. In addition, 109 training aircraft were destroyed. The Long-Range Aviation and naval air forces reported the loss of 336 aircraft. Entire units were nearly wiped out. The 9th Mixed Aviation Division lost 347 out of 409 aircraft including the majority of the 57 MiG 3 and 52 I-16s of its 129th Fighter Aviation Regiment. The division's commander, Sergey Chernykh was shot for the failure. Only the VVS Odessa, under the command of , was prepared for the assault, losing only 23 aircraft on six airbases to Emanoil Ionescu's Romanian Air Corps. Ionescu lost four per cent of his strength on this date, the worst Romanian losses on a single day in the 1941 campaign.
In all, two waves of Axis attacks struck. In the morning, the first wave destroyed 1,800 aircraft for two losses, while the second wave lost 33 Axis machines but destroyed 700 Soviet aircraft. The Soviet official history of the VVS only admits to "around" 1,200 losses. In the air battles, Axis losses were more significant. In some cases Luftwaffe losses, relevant to their strength were "shocking"; KG 51 lost 15 Ju 88s in one action. lost 10 He 111s over the airfields. In contrast other bombers units suffered lightly. claimed 40 Soviet aircraft on the ground, for no loss. Total Luftwaffe losses amounted to 55 combat aircraft on 22 June; 14 Bf 109s, 6 Bf 110s, 11 He 111s, two Ju 87s, 21 Ju 87s, one Do 17 and 6 miscellaneous types. The Romanian Air Force lost four Blenheims, two PZL P-37 fighters, two Savoia-Marchetti SM.79, one Potez 633, one IAR 37 and one IAR 39. Soviet statistics contained considerable exaggeration, claiming "more than 200 enemy aircraft" destroyed on the first day.
The balance of power in the air was altered for the next few months. The Luftwaffe had attained air superiority, if not supremacy at this point. The low German opinion of Soviet combat capabilities had been confirmed, and was bolstered by information provided by captured VVS personnel. The Soviet bomber fleet had been crippled; its remaining forces continued costly attacks on the German rear. The VVS recovered once surprise had worn off. The autumn weather also provided the Soviets with breathing space to partially rebuild.
Luftwaffe's tactics and pilot skills