The Kursk–Oboyan Offensive Operation in December 1941 – January 1942 was a front–line offensive operation of the Soviet Troops of the right wing of the Southwestern Front. An integral part of the winter counter–offensive of the Red Army of 1941–1942. Stubborn fighting in the Belgorod Direction continued for 70 days and ended in vain after mutual exhaustion of forces and the onset of mud.In Soviet historiography, January 26 was considered the end of the offensive. However, the fighting did not stop until the beginning of the spring thaw. Snow melting in the battle area began on March 24. Along with other unsuccessful offensives of the winter–spring period of 1942, the operation was not mentioned in Soviet official historiography.
Previous events After successfully repelling the German offensive in the Battle of Moscow, Stalin considered it possible to launch offensives on all sectors of the front from Leningrad to the Black Sea with the goal of achieving a decisive victory during 1942.On January 1, 1942, an extended meeting of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the highest command body of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, took place. The meeting was attended by: Chief of the General Staff Boris Shaposhnikov and his deputy Aleksandr Vasilevsky, members of the State Defense Committee Georgy Malenkov and Lavrenty Beriya, as well as member of the State Defense Committee Nikolay Voznesensky, who was responsible for plans for the production of weapons. The issue of strategic plans for 1942 was discussed. The main report was given by Shaposhnikov. It was proposed to launch an offensive on all sectors of the front – northern, central and southern – with the goal of achieving a decisive victory already in 1942. Georgy Zhukov and Nikolay Voznesensky spoke at the discussion. Voznesensky said that the material resources of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics were not enough to implement such a large–scale plan. Zhukov believed that resources should not be scattered in all directions, but concentrated on the central sector of the front, as the most important. The discussion was summed up by Stalin, who pointed out that it was necessary not to refer to difficulties, but to look for ways to overcome them. The plan for a general offensive was approved; the corresponding orders were sent to the front commanders.The Stalinist Method of "Offensive Along the Entire Front" was used later in the war, which often led to unjustified losses with limited results. The military industry, developed beyond the Urals, supplied more and more weapons. The Red Army was replenished with another conscription. All this made it possible not only to replenish the active units of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, but also to create 9 reserve armies.
One of the offensive operations in the spring of 1942 was the Kursk–Oboyan Operation.
Idea of the operation During the winter counter–offensive of 1941–1942, Soviet troops attacked the enemy on almost all fronts, especially on the North–Western, Western, Bryansk and South–Western fronts. In the zone of the Southwestern Front in the first half of December, during the Yelets Operation, troops of the 3rd and 13th Armies defeated German troops. The 40th Army, neighboring to them from the south, pinned down the enemy forces and attacked in the direction of Cheremisinovo from the line of the Kshen River, but made almost no progress.Alexander Nemtsev. Combat Operations of Soviet Troops in the Territory of the Central Black Earth Region in the Autumn of 1941 – Summer of 1942 (Based on Materials from the Kursk Region): Dissertation for the Title of Candidate of Historical Sciences – Kursk, 2006 – 423 Pages
Stalin's Directive of January 7, 1942 ordered the troops of the South–Western Direction (Commander–in–Chief – Semyon Timoshenko) to go on the offensive with the armies of the right flank of the South–Western Front (Front Commander – Lieutenant General Fyodor Kostenko): 40th Army (Commander Lieutenant General Kuzma Podlas) in the Kursk Direction and the 21st Army (Commander Major General Vasily Gordov) in the Oboyan Direction, with the goal of capturing the cities of Kursk and Oboyan, respectively.Alexander Manzhosov, Alexander Nemtsev. Kursk–Oboyan Offensive Operation (January 1942). Pages 140–146 // Oboyan and Oboyans in Domestic and Foreign History and Culture: Collection of Materials from the Interregional Scientific Conference (City of Oboyan; April 21, 2012) / Editor–Compiler Alexey Razdorsky – Oboyan, 2013 – 341 Pages If the offensive was successful, the Bryansk Front was ordered to advance in the direction of Oryol in order to enter the flank and rear of the German defense at Bolkhov from the north, defeat the enemy south of Belyov and support the offensive of the Western Front from the south.
At the same time, the 40th Army received practically no reinforcements, and the 21st Army, although it was brought into battle from the front reserve, where it was replenished for two months, also had a significant shortage. In fact, each of the armies was a reinforced rifle corps. There were no mobile means of developing success (tank formations) at all; there was also a great shortage of artillery and ammunition. Each of the armies solved the problem of breaking through the German defense independently; shock army groups were also not created within them. The tasks of breaking through enemy defenses were thus carried out by ordinary rifle divisions. And finally, the armies were not even fully involved in the operation, but acted only with parts of their forces (for example, in the 21st Army, out of 5 divisions, 2 participated in the operation); pinching and distracting blows were practically not used. The operation plan was not sufficiently developed by the front command; the main burden of its development was placed on the army headquarters. In essence, the operation was reduced to independent actions of two armies in separate directions. Even their transition to the offensive began at different times, as they were ready. All this made it easier for the German command to repel the Soviet offensive.
The Soviet troops in the Kursk–Oboyan Direction were opposed by the troops of the left wing of the 6th German Army (Commander Field Marshal Walter von Reichenau, from January 5, 1942 – General of Tank Forces Friedrich Paulus) (29th Army Corps) and the right flank of the 2nd German Army, General Colonel Maximilian von Weichs (48th Motorized Corps). They created a reinforced defense system, based on the creation of powerful defense units in populated areas and at commanding heights with completely shoot–through gaps between them.
Fighting Having received no time to prepare the operation and without strengthening the troops, following the orders of the command, the 40th Army went on the offensive on December 20, 1941, with the initial task of reaching the Tim River Line and then advancing on Kursk. Having advanced 10–12 kilometers with heavy fighting, on December 25 the army liberated the heavily fortified village of Tim by storm, and by December 28, 1941, it reached the line of the Tim River and crossed it.
On December 28, 1941, the 21st Army went on the offensive in the Oboyan Direction, liberating 5 villages on the first day, 2 more villages the next day and cutting the Kursk–Belgorod Railway.
In the following days, the offensive developed slowly, boiling down to squeezing out the enemy and slowly "gnawing through" its defenses: on December 30, the 40th Army occupied 3 villages (and lost one as a result of a counterattack), the 21st Army took 2 villages. The attacks were carried out in deep snow, without sufficient reconnaissance. Repeated frontal attacks on the same lines, without proper artillery support, prevailed. Aviation operations in conditions of prevailing cloudy weather and snowfall were sporadic and ineffective.
Having determined the direction of the attacks of the Soviet troops, the German command quickly brought fresh units to the threatened directions. The Germans carried out a stubborn defense of populated areas, even when they were surrounded, forcing Soviet troops to waste their strength in repeated attacks, and when the attacking units suffered heavy losses, they launched strong counterattacks, trying to influence the flanks and rear.
On January 1, 1942, the troops of the 21st Army, continuing the offensive, reached the village and stronghold of Marino, but were able to capture it only at dawn on January 4. On January 3, units of the 21st Army captured the villages of Gorodishche, Krivtsovo and Zorinskie Dvory, intercepting the Oboyan–Belgorod Highway. On January 4, the villages of Nagolnoe and Bobryshevo (the center of the Krivtsovsky District) were liberated, and the previously blocked garrison in the village of Shakhovo was liquidated. On January 5, 1942, Soviet troops reached the suburban villages of Oboyan: Kazatskoe, Pushkarnoe and Streletskoe.
Fierce, protracted battles for Oboyan unfolded. The first units broke into the eastern outskirts of the city on the afternoon of January 4 (160th Infantry Division). On January 5, Oboyan was completely blocked.
The enemy, having fortified itself in the city, offered stubborn resistance. Its resistance and counterattacks against other attacking units also sharply increased, which actually led to a halt in their advance. Throughout the entire zone of both Soviet armies, extremely stubborn but ineffective battles unfolded – the troops were marking time in one place, fighting for the same populated areas. In Oboyan on January 6, with heavy losses, they managed to capture the fortified buildings of the station and elevator. On the night of January 7, 1942, a decisive attempt was made to liberate the city; during the 24–hour assault on January 7 and 8, Soviet troops managed to break into the city center several times, but for the most part each time they were pushed back from there. Only some units managed to gain a foothold in the city, and they fought surrounded.
To turn the tide in the operation in the 21st Army zone, the 8th Motorized Rifle Division of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs was brought into battle. On January 8, 1942, one regiment of this division, in cooperation with units of the 169th Infantry Division, captured the northwestern outskirts of the village of Kazatskoe and the eastern outskirts of Oboyan, other units occupied the eastern half of the city. On January 9, units of the 8th Motorized Rifle Division of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs reached the center of Oboyan.
During these battles, a battalion of the 777th Infantry Regiment of the 227th Infantry Division under the command of Lieutenant Khachatur Melikyan made a daring 40–kilometer raid behind enemy lines. The battalion defeated 4 enemy garrisons in the village of Orlovka, the villages of Zorinskie Dvory and Vesely in the Ivnyansky District and Peresyp in the Oboyansky District. With his actions, he facilitated the offensive in the Oboyan Direction. In the battle on January 8, 1942, the battalion commander died a hero's death.Award List for Conferring the Title of Hero of the Soviet Union on Khachatur Melikyan // Generalized Data Bank "Memory of the People" On November 5, 1942, he was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.Heroes of the Soviet Union: a Brief Biographical Dictionary / Chairman of the Editorial Board Ivan Shkadov – Moscow: Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 1988 – Volume 2. Lyubov – Yashchuk – 863 Pages – 100,000 Copies – ISBN 5-203-00536-2