Since 2008, China has maintained a standing People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) task force in the Gulf of Aden as an anti-piracy measure in response to piracy off the coast of Somalia. The task force was initially authorized to escort only Chinese ships and ships carrying humanitarian supplies to Somalia; this was later expanded to accept commercial ships from other countries. Escorting Chinese ships in the Red Sea may have begun in January 2024 in response to the Red Sea crisis.

The task force is China's first sustained "far seas" military presence. It provides the PLAN with "invaluable" operational experience, the benefits of which are spread by rotating units from all fleets into the task force.

Background

Impact of piracy

In the 2000s, China developed greater interest and capability to protect its global interests.

Chinese discussions through 2012 identified the strategic importance of securing maritime trade routes. Shipping contributed to China's financial and energy security. 90% of China's international trade in goods was moved by ship. The country became a net importer of oil in 1993, and of natural gas in 2007. By 2012, 80% of imported oil arrived by sea. Reliable routes affected oil prices, which affected the stability of the United States dollar, and which in turn affected the value of Chinese investments in the United States and US capacity to buy Chinese products.

By 2009, views expressed by Chinese analysts included identifying piracy as a threat to national interests and that the state had a responsibility to protect Chinese shipping.

Global piracy increased every year from 2005 to 2010. China's response to piracy was uncoordinated and informal. The Ministry of Transport (MoT) responded to pirated ships through intermediaries, but this was "not very effective". Anti-pirate tactics for civilian ships recommended by MoT were also inadequate. By 2008, there was domestic support for comprehensive protective measures. By October, Chinese shipping companies, MoT, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) supported deploying naval escorts. That year from January to November, 83 of 1,265 Chinese ships were attacked with several being pirated.

Legal considerations Intervention would require exercising force inside the exclusive economic zone of another country beyond China's periphery. This novel scenario for Chinese foreign policy and law, combined with internal debate over the legality of intervention in terms of domestic and international law, delayed action. Three United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions in 2008 authorizing intervention in Somali waters may have provided China with part of the legal foundation to intervene. Another part was securing an invitation from the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) to avoid appearances of subverting sovereignty.

Planning and preparation

International and domestic pressure led the PLAN, the MoT, and the MoFA to develop a policy framework for the mission with "unusual alacrity" in late-2008.

The PLA began feasibility studies in May 2008; a task force may have been seen as an opportunity to test the navy's newest equipment. The PLAN publicly announced its support in November, and the Central Military Commission (CMC) approved the navy's plan shortly afterward.

China "worked frantically" to secure an agreement from the Somali TFG. In a late-November interview with the Global Times, Mohammed Ahmed Awil, the TFG's ambassador to China, reported that the TFG had sent an invitation for Chinese warships and was awaiting a response. In mid-December, Awil and Ali Jangali, the Somali Minister of Foreign Affairs reiterated the TFG's support for a Chinese naval task force.

On 20 December 2008, China announced it would deploy a naval task force. This followed the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1851, which extended the area of operations of UN authorized anti-piracy operations to include the Somali coast.

International cooperation

In late-November 2024, Wolfgang E. Nolting, the commander of the German Navy, met Liang Guanglie, China's Minister of National Defense, in Beijing and discussed military aspects of China–Germany relations. Nolting hoped improved cooperation would extend to anti-piracy efforts.

China's escort mission is organizationally independent from other coalition forces. In 2008, China may have perceived international piracy law as being too immature to provide a framework. Furthermore, the existing coalition forces—the United States' Combined Maritime Forces, NATO's Operation Ocean Shield, and the European Union's Operation Atalanta—were not UN-led, and close integration may have allowed partners to gather intelligence on Chinese capabilities. Integration may also have required installation of foreign software or hardware which may not have been possible or desirable for security reasons.

China participates in Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) which provides a high-level discussion forum for coordinating counter-piracy forces. SHADE does not exercise control over participating forces.

Organization and mission scope

The mission is jointly managed by the PLAN, the MoT, and the MoFA. The MoT participates in coordinating Chinese anti-piracy efforts with other countries and media relations.

The naval forces are controlled by PLAN headquarters instead of the Joint Staff Department, which nominally has control over operations beyond China's periphery. A task force is deployed by a PLAN fleet and typically include two warships, a supply ship, and approximately 800 personnel. The formations deploy for four to six months. It takes about two weeks to sail from China to Somalia.

Rules of engagement are restrictive to avoid capturing pirates and the need to prosecute them. Suspected pirates are advised to disengage through visual, verbal, and live-fire warnings before escalating the engagement; the main tactic is to deter, drive away, or disarm attacks. China's justice system lacks mechanisms to prosecute piracy, and it is also reluctant to try criminals captured in foreign countries in domestic courts. China is also sensitive to the lack of an internationally agreed upon process for dealing with captured pirates.

Nearby ports used for replenishment include Aden, Djibouti City, and Salalah. Djibouti was used as a forward repair base in August 2009; China's first overseas military base opened in Djibouti in August 2017.

The initial mission was the protection of UN World Food Programme aid to Somilia and Chinese shipping. This was expanded to foreign ships; foreign requests are handled through the MoT. In 2024, escorts may have started for Chinese ships in the Red Sea.

Events

The first task force deployed from Sanya on 26 December 2008.

In March 2011, the frigate Xuzhou from the seventh task force escorted a civilian ship transporting Chinese evacuated from the Libyan civil war. This was the PLAN's first noncombatant evacuation operation overseas.

By the end of 2012, the task forces had escorted over 5,000 ships.

Task forces 2008–2020 Escort Task Group Ships Departure Start End Return Ref 1st Escort Task Group(Task Group 169) DDG-169 Wuhan (Type 052B destroyer) DDG-171 Haikou (Type 052C destroyer) AOR-887 Weishan Hu (Type 903 replenishment ship) 869 26-12-2008 26-1-2009 15-4-2009 28-4-2009 2nd Escort Task Group(Task Group 167) DDG-167 Shenzhen (Type 051B destroyer) FFG-570 Huangshan (Type 054A frigate) AOR-887 Weishan Hu (Type 903 replenishment ship) 866 2-4-2009 15-4-2009 1-8-2009 21-8-2009 3rd Escort Task Group(Task Group 529) FFG-529 Zhoushan (Type 054A frigate) FFG-530 Xuzhou (Type 054A frigate) AOR-886 Qiandao Hu (Type 903 replenishment ship) 806 16-7-2009 1-8-2009 29-11-2009 20-12-2009 4th Escort Task Group(Task Group 525) FFG-525 Ma'anshan (Type 054 frigate) FFG-526 Wenzhou (Type 054 frigate) FFG-568 Chaohu (Type 054A frigate) AOG-886 Qiandao Hu (Type 903 replenishment ship) 788 30-10-2009 27-11-2009 18-3-2010 23-4-2010 5th Escort Task Group(Task Group 168) DDG-168 Guangzhou (Type 052B destroyer) FFG-568 Chaohu (Type 054A frigate) AOR-887 Weishan Hu (Type 903 replenishment ship) 825 4-3-2010 18-3-2010 20-7-2010 12-9-2010 6th Escort Task Group(Task Group 998) LPD-998 Kunlun Shan (Type 071 amphibious transport dock) DDG-171 Lanzhou (Type 052C destroyer) AOR-887 Weishan Hu (Type 903 replenishment ship) 981 30-6-2010 14-7-2010 20-11-2010 7-1-2011 7th Escort Task Group(Task Group 530) FFG-529 Zhoushan (Type 054A frigate) FFG-530 Xuzhou (Type 054A frigate) AOR-886 Qiandao Hu (Type 903 replenishment ship) 788 2-11-2010 23-11-2010 11-11-2011 9-5-2011 8th Escort Task Group(Task Group 526) FFG-525 Ma'anshan (Type 054 frigate) FFG-526 Wenzhou (Type 054 frigate) AOR-886 Qiandao Hu (Type 903 replenishment ship) 796 21-2-2011 18-3-2011 21-7-2011 28-8-2011 9th Escort Task Group(Task Group 169) DDG-169 Wuhan (Type 052B destroyer) FFG-569 Yulin (Type 054A frigate) AOR-885 Qinghai Hu (Type 908 replenishment ship) 878 2-7-2011 23-7-2011 15-11-2011 24-12-2011 10th Escort Task Group(Task Group 171) DDG-171 Haikou (Type 052C destroyer) FFG-571 Yuncheng (Type 054A frigate) AOR-885 Qinghai Hu (Type 908 replenishment ship) 875 2-11-2011 19-11-2011 17-3-2012 5-5-2012 11th Escort Task Group(Task Group 113) DDG-113 Qingdao (Type 052 destroyer) FFG-538 Yantai (Type 054A frigate) AOR-887 Weishan Hu (Type 903 replenishment ship) 779 27-2-2012 17-3-2012 18-7-2012 12-9-2012 12th Escort Task Group(Task Group 548) FFG-548 Yiyang (Type 054A frigate) FFG-549 Changzhou (Type 054A frigate) AOR-886 Qiandao Hu (Type 903 replenishment ship) 788 3-7-2012 18-7-2012 23-11-2012 19-1-2013 13th Escort Task Group(Task Group 570) FFG-568 Hengyang (Ex-Chaohu, Type 054A frigate) FFG-570 Huangshan (Type 054A frigate) AOR-885 Qinghai Hu (Type 908 replenishment ship) 787 9-11-2012 23-11-2012 13-3-2013 23-5-2013 14th Escort Task Group(Task Group 112) DDG-112 Harbin (Type 052 destroyer) FFG-528 Mianyang (Type 053H3 frigate) AOR-887 Weishan Hu (Type 903 replenishment ship) 736 16-2-2013 13-3-2013 22-8-2013 28-9-2013 15th Escort Task Group(Task Group 999) LPD-999 Jinggang Shan (Type 071 amphibious transport dock) FFG-572 Hengshui (Type 054A frigate) AOR-889 Tai Hu (Type 903 replenishment ship) 853 8-8-2013 22-8-2013 20-12-2013 22-1-2014 16th Escort Task Group(Task Group 546) FFG-527 Luoyang (Type 053H3 frigate) FFG-546 Yancheng (Type 054A frigate) AOR-889 Tai Hu (Type 903 replenishment ship) 660 11-11-2013 20-12-2013 18-4-2014 18-7-2014 17th Escort Task Group(Task Group 150) DDG-150 Changchun (Type 052C destroyer) FFG-549 Changzhou (Type 054A frigate) AOR-890 Chao Hu (Type 903 replenishment ship) 810 25-3-2014 18-4-2014 23-8-2014 22-10-2014 18th Escort Task Group(Task Group 989) LPD-989 Changbai Shan (Type 071 amphibious transport dock) FFG-571 Yuncheng (Type 054A frigate) AOR-890 Chao Hu (Type 903 replenishment ship) 1200 2-8-2014 23-8-2014 24-12-2014 19-3-2015 19th Escort Task Group(Task Group 547) FFG-547 Linyi (Type 054A frigate) FFG-550 Weifang (Type 054A frigate) AOR-887 Weishan Hu (Type 903 replenishment ship) 780 2-12-2014 24-12-2014 24-4-2015 10-7-2015 20th Escort Task Group(Task Group 152) DDG-152 Jinan (Type 052C destroyer) FFG-528 Yiyang (Type 054A frigate) AOR-886 Qiandao Hu (Type 903 replenishment ship) ~800 3-4-2015 24-4-2015 22-8-2015 5-2-2016 21st Escort Task Group(Task Group 573) FFG-573 Liuzhou (Type 054A frigate) FFG-574 Sanya (Type 054A frigate) AOR-885 Qinghai Hu (Type 908 replenishment ship) ~700 4-8-2015 22-8-2015 3-1-2016 8-3-2016 22nd Escort Task Group(Task Group 576) FFG-576 Daqing (Type 054A frigate) DDG-112 Harbin (Type 052 destroyer) AOR-889 Tai Hu (Type 903 replenishment ship) ~700 6-12-2015 3-1-2016 29-4-2016 30-6-2016 23rd Escort Task Group(Task Group 531) FFG-531 Xiangtan (Type 054A frigate) FFG-529 Zhoushan (Type 054A frigate)