The Sigonella crisis (named after the air base at which it originated, in Sicily) was a diplomatic case between Italy and the United States that occurred in October 1985.
The incident risked escalating into an armed confrontation between VAM (Vigilanza Aeronautica Militare, an Italian Air Force unit responsible for internal security) and Carabinieri on one side, and Delta Force (a special force unit of the U.S. Army) soldiers on the other, in the aftermath of a political rupture between Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi and U.S. President Ronald Reagan about the fate of the Palestinian terrorists who had hijacked and diverted the Italian cruise ship , killing an American passenger. Reagan asked Craxi to extradite the terrorists, but the Italian Prime Minister categorically refused, ordering that since the hijack had taken place on an Italian ship, the trial of the terrorists would be the sole responsibility of the Italian judiciary.
The crisis was resolved overnight, with the removal of hostile foreign military forces from the Sigonella base. The four Palestinian terrorists were all tried and convicted in Italy. However, one of the suspects, Abu Abbas, was acquitted and allowed to leave the country. Only years later the American claim about his direct involvement in the attack was confirmed.
The reconciliation between the U.S. president and the Italian Prime Minister occurred a month after the incident, when Reagan invited Craxi to the White House. However, the Sigonella crisis marked a rift within the Italian government, as the Italian Minister of Defence Giovanni Spadolini, leader of the Italian Republican Party and a staunch supporter of the American government, harshly criticized Craxi's actions in a letter and withdrew the Republican Party ministers from the cabinet.
October 7 and 8: Achille Lauro hijacking and murder of Leon Klinghoffer
On October 7, 1985, the Italian cruise ship , at 1:07pm, as it was preparing to leave Egyptian waters to dock in Israel, was seized by four armed Palestinian terrorists who had snuck on board with false passports. The terrorists, caught by a crew member handling weapons intended for one of their planned missions while landing in the Israeli port of Ashdod, reacted abruptly and, after a shootout involving the crew member (who was wounded in the leg), seized the ship.
However, the ship managed to send a mayday, picked up in Sweden, reporting the hijacking by terrorists, who were demanding the release of 50 of their comrades imprisoned in Israel. They claimed to be members of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), but actually belonged to the pro-Syrian faction of one of its minority components, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (FPLP).
Upon receiving the news, Italian foreign minister Giulio Andreotti and defence minister Giovanni Spadolini set about a negotiation that, from the outset, appeared particularly complex and highly risky, not least in light of the different political views within the Italian government. Spadolini summoned all the top leaders of the armed forces and counterintelligence. Andreotti, in the evening, convened the crisis unit at the Farnesina, immediately activating his diplomatic channels, owing to his historic friendship with the moderate Arab world whose policies he supported. The foreign minister was handed the "Asad" chapter by Prime Minister Bettino Craxi: Hafiz al-Asad was his privileged contact in the area and he knew him well. At that time he was considered a "decisive point, also because the hijacked ship seemed to be aiming for a docking right in Syria, in Tartus."Gennaro Acquaviva, La trappola contro Craxi, Mondoperaio, 11-12/2015, p. 21. Andreotti managed to "find the Syrian dictator within hours: he even tracked him down in Germany, where Asad was secretly residing in those days because he had to undergo surgery. As it is equally obvious that the Syrian leader immediately moved in our favor not only because he was familiar with the Italian minister who spoke to him on the phone. Asad acted immediately and harshly, forcing those in control of the ship to reverse course and head back to the waters off Egypt."
At 10:10 p.m. from the Port Said harbor master's office, the commando's first claim and demand was picked up over the radio, which was for the release of 50 of their fellow Palestinians held in the Israeli camp in Nahariya. The threat for failure to comply was to blow up the ship.
After a telephone call between Andreotti and Yasser Arafat (who was the chairman of the PLO, as well as head of al-Fatah, the most important force within the PLO), the Palestinian leader in a press release let it be known that he was totally uninvolved in the events of the kidnapping. Meanwhile, the foreign minister managed to get in touch with the Egyptian political leadership to be able to facilitate a negotiation, while Prime Minister Craxi also managed to secure the support of the president of Tunisia (the PLO was in Tunisia at the time).
On the night of October 7–8, after a summit at the Ministry of Defence and once the authorizations from the United Kingdom and the United States had been obtained, Operation Margherita officially got underway, involving the mobilization of four transport helicopters with 60 paratroopers, raiders and scouts to pinpoint the ship's location.Incursors from the "Teseo Tesei" grouping are transferred by helicopter to the flagship Vittorio Veneto, and from there four helicopters carrying 60 paratroopers from the IX "Col Moschin" Assault Regiment depart from there; from Sicily, on the other hand, air force scouts depart to locate the Achille Lauro: Immediately afterwards, Craxi, Andreotti and Spadolini arranged to meet at Palazzo Chigi for a nighttime summit.
On the same night Arafat sent a personal message to Craxi and Andreotti: "Two emissaries of mine are on their way to Cairo and will accompany the Egyptian authorities. From the first reports it seems that the group is pro-Syrian." The two envoys were Hani El Hassan (one of Arafat's chief aides) and Abu Abbas, founding head of the FPLP, whose idea for the failed hostage-taking plan in Ashdod was only later revealed.
Andreotti and Craxi expressed support for diplomatic negotiations to "avoid a tragedy," but were warned by the US ambassador that US President Ronald Reagan would oppose any negotiations with the terrorists. Craxi lamented how the U.S. obstructed Italy by failing to provide information picked up by their satellites. The ship headed to Syria and stationed off the coast of Tartus, where the hijackers asked to enter the port: the Syrian government informed Italy that it would only allow docking following the opening of direct negotiations between the Italian government and the terrorists; the U.S. objected.
The terrorists then demanded a negotiation mediated by the International Red Cross with the ambassadors of Italy, the US, the UK, and West Germany. Meanwhile, on the ship, the situation degenerated: the terrorists repeatedly threatened to kill all the passengers, starting with U.S. citizens. Leon Klinghoffer, a Jewish and paraplegic U.S. citizen, was killed and thrown overboard. However, the hijackers did not continue to carry out their threat, except by simulating it with several gunshots that intimidated crew and passengers.
October 9 and 10: the surrender of the hijackers and the discovery of the murder The Syrian government sought to insert itself into the handling of the affair, speculating an attack to free the ship; also in reaction, the US government threatened armed intervention on the ship to free the passengers. The first position found Andreotti in agreement; Craxi, who was opposed a priori to an action of force, replied that, in case the assault should take place, it should be led by the Italian armed forces, even if inter-force with American Marines and Special Air Service (SAS); in fact, the instructions to the soldiers who were on board stipulated that, since it was Italian territory, Italian special forces raiders would go up.. Thirty years later Craxi's former diplomatic adviser, Ambassador Antonio Badini, revealed that in this position Craxi was following the line, shared by the U.S., of marginalizing the Syrian role as an expression of anti-Western radicalism.Antonio Badini: "Craxi had understood the Palestinian question," in l'Unità December 4, 2015, drawing on the speeches (the one given by the same and those of Gennaro Acquaviva and Maurizio Caprara, among others) at the conference "Sigonella (thirty years later: 1985–2015), edited by the Socialism Association and Mondoperaio, Rome, Palazzo Giustiniani, October 16, 2015; Badini recalled that as early as a year ago – following the Tunis raid – Craxi had received a mandate from the European Council to support the creation of an anti-radical option that would activate the Middle East peace process through the establishment of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, which was supposed to open an alternative negotiating channel with Israel to the radical option based on the design for the destruction of the Jewish state: the design aborted because Shimon Peres, after giving guarantees, would shirk the commitment.
Achille Lauro, having been ordered away from the Syrian coast,"Andreotti manages to find Assad in Czechoslovakia. The latter would like to stay out of it but, as a personal favor, he agrees that the Achille Lauro will dock in the harbor, on the condition that Italy and the United States open a dialogue and do not take any actions of force. He leaves an hour to decide. Craxi desperately tries to convince Rabb, but he refuses: the U.S. does not negotiate with terrorists. Negotiations fail and Damascus denies permission to dock." returned to Port Said at the request of Abbas who, with the authorization of the Italian government, managed to get the terrorists to surrender after promising them a diplomatic escape route to another Arab country. This solution was supported by the PLO and managed by the Italian government on the condition that no crimes had been committed on board. The ship's commander, De RosaIn his book Terrorism, Force Ten (Mondadori), Commander Gerardo De Rosa claimed that his condition of isolation had not allowed him, at the time of the conversation, to be aware of the crime, which he only learned about later, upon release ("The pirates gave me a passport then told me they had killed a passenger. One of them had blood on his shoes and the bottom of his pants." For another version, at the time of the request from Rome De Rosa was still under the threat of terrorist fire and was forced, therefore, not to reveal the killing of Leon Klinghoffer: this version was referred to by Giulio Andreotti in La politica estera italiana negli anni ottanta, p. 117 ("Some things are still not clear to me. One, for example, is this: how is it possible that a crew then composed not of 'sons of Mary' but of seafarers from Torre del Greco allowed themselves to be held in check for a few days by four people, and the Captain then, talking to Craxi on the phone said, 'nothing happened,' when in fact a person had been killed? On this you who are historians can give clarification with a whole cultural apparatus that I do not have, I am an empiricist, maybe you can help me understand now for then." confirmed that all passengers were unharmed.