The First Battle of Szolnok was a battle in the Hungarian war of Independence of 1848-1849, fought on 22 January 1849 between the revolutionary Hungarian army led by General Mór Perczel against the cavalry brigade of the Austrian Empire led by General Ferenc Ottinger. The isolated troops of Ottinger were attacked by Perczel's superior army and were forced to retreat from Szolnok to Abony, then to Cegléd. This Hungarian victory was a sign that the Austrian troops, which after the occupation of the Hungarian capitals of Pest and Buda, believed that they already won the war, were far away from reaching that goal, and that the Hungarian army could cause them unpleasant surprises. After the Battle Perczel's troops continued the pursuit of Ottinger's troops to Cegléd.
Background On 30 December 1848, General Mór Perczel suffered a disastrous defeat in the Battle of Mór, mainly due to his own lack of caution and poor choice of battlefield.Horváth Gábor: Január 22. – Az első szolnoki ütközet (1849) Győri Szalon 2021.01.22 His corps was virtually entirely crushed by a smaller Imperial force, which included Major General Ferenc Ottinger's cavalry brigade. After the defeat, Perczel retreated towards Pest, where the main army led by General Artúr Görgei, retreating from Győr, also arrived. Here, on 2 January, a general military council decided on a new strategy. According to the battle plan, Görgei handed over some troops to Perczel, then marched through Vác - where he issued his famous Declaration of Vác - to secure the mining towns in Northern Hungary and relieve Lipótvár.
Mór Perczel's corps, the Central Mobile Army, was given the task by the decision of the War Council of 2 January 1849 to defend the capital during its evacuation, and then to slowly retreat to Szolnok, and repel the eventual Austrian attacks,. transporting all war material to a safe place. Perczel's troops left Pest on the night of 4 to 5 January, but he himself did not leave the capital until noon on the 5th. His army then arrived in Cegléd on the Üllő-Monor-Albertirsa route on 7 January.
At the military council held in Szolnok, Colonel József Kohlmann proposed to defend the Tisza line, but Perczel rejected this proposal, as the river had ceased to be an obstacle to the enemy's crossing due to the freezing of the Tisza; and so, instead of defending the river line directly, he preferred a central position further back, from where he could easily attack any enemy appearing at any crossing point of the Tisza from Szolnok to Polgár.Bánlaky József: Perczel műveletei Ottinger ellen és Dembinski első tevékenysége főparancsnokká történt kinevezése után (1849. január elejétől február elejéig). A magyar nemzet hadtörténete XXI Arcanum Adatbázis Kft. 2001 So on 13 January he left Szolnok. And he continued his retreat, and on 15 January he was already in Karcag with his army.. On 14 January, Perczel deployed his right wing under General Mihály Répássy at Tiszaújváros, his center at Nádudvar, and his left wing under his own command at Karcag.
But no one was pursuing Perczel. After the capture of the capital, the high commander of the Austrian armies Field Marshal Alfred I, Prince of Windisch-Grätz was convinced that the Hungarian Revolution would be over within weeks, the Hungarian army would be disbanded and the troops belonging to the line regiments, which joined the Hungarian army would slowly return to the imperial flag. Apart from the fortresses within Hungary, the only thing that interested the imperial commander-in-chief was Görgei's army, and he sent the bulk of his mobile forces to pursue it. Thus, there were not enough soldiers left for the main line of attack towards Debrecen. After the occupation of the capitals and after he had sent Lieutenant General Anton Csorich to pursue Görgei, and after other minor deployments, Windisch-Grätz had only 18 battalions, 31 companies of cavalry, and 126 cannons left in Pest. Considering that in the case of continuing the offensive towards Debrecen, Pest and Buda could not be left without defense, but troops could only be left behind for this purpose at the expense of the army's further offensive operations, and also considering that the popular uprisings from Transdanubia were already endangering his communication with Vienna, Windisch-Grätz saw the continuation of offensive operations beyond the Tisza towards Debrecen as very dangerous, thus for the time being he contented himself with placing the capitals under the protection of his troops, under the leadership of General Heinrich Hentzi. Only Major General Ferenc Ottinger's brigade, consisting of two cavalry regiments of cuirassiers, a cavalry battery, and a Congreve rocket battery, was detached from Lieutenant General Josip Jelačić's corps and sent towards Szolnok on 8 January, when Perczel was already in Cegléd. The task of the brigade was the restoration of the railway and telegraph connection between Pest and Szolnok, the rebuilding of the Tisza bridge in Szolnok, and the surveillance of the Tisza line in general. Ottinger also had to take control of the large stockpiles from Szolnok. Ottinger left Pest on 9 January and arrived in Albertirsa the next day. Ottinger arrived in Cegléd on 11 January and entered Szolnok on the 13th. In Szolnok, Ottinger seized significant stocks of food and equipment. Here, Ottinger soon realized that his troops were too far away and isolated from the support of the Austrian main army. He realized that the position of Szolnok could be compared to a bag that the attacking side always has the possibility to tie up because the confluence of the Zagyva and the Tisza enables the troops attacking the defenders of the city to surround them. This was particularly true during winter when the cold temperatures of minus 15-20 degrees Celsius made it possible to cross the frozen rivers almost unnoticed by cavalry and artillery. However, Ottinger was one of the most skillful Austrian cavalry commanders. Sensing his isolated position, he constantly called for reinforcements, but despite the restored railway line, Windisch-Grätz did not send him infantry, which would have been better suited to defend Szolnok, than cavalry. Ottinger therefore made preparations to retreat in case of an overwhelming attack.
Windisch-Grätz, however, understood the danger late as usual. On 22 January, he asked Jelačić whether Ottinger's brigade should be withdrawn to Abony, but this was too late to reinforce Ottinger's troops sufficiently before the Hungarian attack.. The Croatian Ban's last-minute reinforcements did not arrive in Szolnok before the battle on the 22nd.
Prelude Meanwhile, the National Defence Commission (OHB), which, starting from October 1848 was acting as a Hungarian government, was shocked to learn that Perczel had abandoned the Tisza line. Its president, Lajos Kossuth was not happy to see that the bridge over the Tisza at Szolnok was in the hands of the enemy, who had the opportunity to advance towards Debrecen or Szeged, to threaten the seat of government, or to lend a hand to the Serbs rebels from the southern front. On 15 January, both Perczel and Répásy received an order from the OHB demanding the two corps to stop the retreat and take offensive action.. By a strange twist of fate, Szolnok was defended against Perczel on 22 January by the same Ottinger cavalry brigade that had so badly beaten him at Mór. Now the Hungarian general had the chance to avenge his earlier fiasco against Ottinger. On 18 January, Perczel reported to the OHB that he was leaving for Szolnok the next day. After leaving a few thousand men under the command of Lajos Asbóth to guard the bridge at Tiszafüred, it set off for Szolnok.Bánlaky József: A szolnoki ütközet (1849. január 22-én). A magyar nemzet hadtörténete XXI Arcanum Adatbázis Kft. 2001 In December 1848, Kossuth began to organize a reserve corps under the leadership of General Mihály Répásy, which had many untrained and unequipped units, but he put the more capable ones at Perczel's disposal. Répásy sent Perczel substantial reinforcements, which rose his troops to more than 16,000 men and 52 guns. On 16 January, Perczel's troops presented the following composition. At Karcag, 5 battalions, 8 companies of cavalry, 1 twelve, 1 six-pounder, and a 1/2 cavalry battery; at Nádudvar, 4 battalions and a six-pounder battery. In Tiszaújváros, 4 battalions, 6 cavalry companies, 1 six-pounder, and 1/2 cavalry battery; in all, 13 battalions, 14 companies of cavalry, and 40 cannons, about 15,000 men, and 2,000 horses. In its organization, the corps was divided into three divisions of 2-2 brigades under Mihály Répássy, János Hertelendy and István Szekulics. The two brigades of Hertelendy, were led by Majors Károly Mihály and Ignác Mándy; those of Szekulics by Majors Luigi Venturini and Alexander Buttler; and the two brigades of Répássy by Lieutenant Colonel Lajos Kazinczy and Major Károly Albrich. On the 21st, Perczel and the bulk of his army entered Törökszentmiklós, while Kazinczy's division was detached to Tiszabő.
Opposing forces
Corps Troop Brigade Leader Men Horses CannonsPerczel's Corps
General Mór PerczelVanguard
Lieutenant Colonel Miklós Hertelendy 1. Brigade Major Ignác Mándy 915 913 3 2. Brigade Major Károly Mihály 1,752 90 9 Brigade total 2,667 1,003 12Main troop
Lieutenant Colonel István Szekulics 3. Brigade Major Luigi Venturini 3,795 70 6 4. Brigade Major Alexander Buttler 3,925 90 8 Brigade total 7,720 160 14RearguardMajor Miklós Perczel 5. Brigade Major Miklós Perczel 2,802 390 8 Corps total 13,189 1,553 34Troops from the Reserve Corps I. Brigade Lieutenant Colonel Lajos Kazinczy 1,750 400 14 II. Brigade Major Károly Albrich 2,900 648 18 Grand total 17,839 2,601 66
Unit Men Horses Cannons6th (Wallmoden) Cuirassier Regiment 786 786 -7th (Hardegg) Cuirassier Regiment 580 580 -1st Cavalry Battery 120 140 617th Congreve Rocket Battery 100 100 6Total 1,586 1,606 12
Battle Ottinger, having heard of the Hungarians' preparation of a raid against him, spent the night between January 20 and 21 with his whole brigade on horseback, ready to fight, and as the expected attack did not take place during the night, he sent a detachment in reconnaissance in the direction of Törökszentmiklós in the morning.
Perczel set 22 January as the date for his attack, on which day he himself intended to advance with the Hertelendy division against the bridge at Szolnok, while Kazinczy was to operate against the enemy's left flank, advancing from Tiszabő to Abony, and crossing the frozen Tisza and Zagyva, and the reserve under Lieutenant-Colonel Miklós Perczel was to operate against the enemy's right flank and rear, after crossing the Tisza below Szolnok.
Lieutenant Colonel Miklós Hertelendy's column of two brigades departed from Törökszentmiklós at 8 a.m. and arrived at Szolnok between 1 1/2 and 1 3/4 p.m.. A part of the 6th (Württemberg) Hussar Regiment (probably a company) advanced to the Szanda tavern and chased away the Austrian cuirassier company which was there on reconnaissance, capturing two prisoners.
Meanwhile, in the terrible fog, the Hungarian soldiers who tried to encircle Ottinger's troops could barely see up to their noses and got lost, while the Austrian intelligence detachment noticed that strong enemy columns were advancing towards Szolnok. Being informed about this, Ottinger immediately ordered two guns to the bridge at Szolnok and alerted the brigade which he sent to rest shortly before.
Hertelendy's column attacked the Tisza bridge, but the garrison repulsed it for now. According to the diary of artillerist Károly László 7 Hussars advancing in front of the Hertelendy column attacked 17 cuirassiers at 500 paces distance from the town, and they almost disarmed them, when the Austrian cannons started to shoot grapeshot on them, which forced them to retreat, leaving a dead Hussar behind.