The Battle of Cibakháza was one of the several battles for the bridge over the Tisza river from Cibakháza in the Hungarian war of Independence of 1848-1849, fought on 24 February 1849 between the Hungarian troops defending the bridge led by Major Károly Leiningen-Westerburg and the troops of the Austrian Empire, led by Major General Ferenc Ottinger, who were trying to capture and destroy it, in order to prevent the Hungarian incursions on the right bank of the river. The Hungarians defeated the Austrians, forcing Ottinger to retreat. The Hungarians managed to keep the bridge, which continued to remain a danger for the Austrian possessions on the right baank of the Tisza. One of the consequences of this thing was the Hungarian victory in the Second Battle of Szolnok in which, after crossing the bridge of Cibakháza, the Hungarian army surprised the Austrian garrison from Szolnok.
Background At the beginning of January 1849, the Austrian imperial main forces occupied Pest-Buda, and then pushed forward to the Tisza at several points.Bagi Gábor & Szurmay Zoltán: Kossuth Lajos azt üzente... Cibakháza. Száz magyar falu NKÖEOK Szerkesztőség - 2007 After this, the Hungarian revolutionary government retreated to East, and organized the defense of the Tisza line from Debrecen. It was then that the bridges at Tiszafüred, Szolnok and Cibakháza became crucial, as they could serve as the starting point for a future major counter-offensive. Around January 10, the National Defence Committee (the unofficial, but de facto Hungarian government led by Lajos Kossuth) called the people of Bihar, Szabolcs, Heves and Szolnok counties, the Jászkun and Hajdú districts to revolt to defend the Tisza line. The imperial commandment considered the war to be over after the successes achieved so far and expected a Hungarian surrender. This misconception was only dispelled by General Mór Perczel's attack on 22 January. After the victories in the First Battle of Szolnok and the Battle of Cegléd, Perczel's troops pushed forward toward Albertirsa. This caused quite a stir at the Buda headquarters of Field Marshal Alfred I, Prince of Windisch-Grätz.
For this reason, the possession of the bridges on the Tisza became important for the imperial command. The bridge at Cibakháza was initially defended by national guardsmen mobilized from the Tisza district of Heves and Szolnok counties, mainly from Mezőtúr, under the leadership of Major István Mesterházy (1811-1860), who were reinforced by national guardsmen from Nagykunság and a few field guns. On 28 January the imperial troops entered Szolnok, but the Hungarian possession of the Cibakháza bridge was a threat for the Szolnok garrison to be attacked from the flank and rear. Therefore, on 30 and 31 January, and on 1 and 2 February, attempts were made by the Austrians to occupy the bridge, but Mesterházy repulsed them relatively easily. Jelačić's forces launched a major attack on 4 February to take possession of the bridge. They attacked on Sunday, perhaps expecting to catch the Hungarians by surprise, but they were wrong. The imperial batteries were returned fire by the Hungarian guns, and within two hours they had managed to damage two guns and inflict considerable casualties on the Austrian Cuirassiers. The imperials then started to shoot at Cibakháza with Congreve rockets, setting fire to several houses. The National Guardsmen and the companies of the 48th Battalion prevented the more serious danger by quickly extinguishing the fires. In the meantime, two carpenters from Kecskemét managed to pick up the planks from the Tisza bridge "prepared for pedestrian passage", despite the hail of bullets of the Austrians. After the attack on 4 February, there was a temporary pause, which the Hungarians used for raiding, reconnaissance, and prisoner-taking. Mesterházy's horsemen were covering the passes from Tiszaföldvár, Vezseny, and Tiszainoka, and on 14 February 14 cuirassiers were captured at the vineyards of Tiszavárkony. On the 20th, Mesterházy personally led a reconnaissance towards Kecskemét.
Prelude The Hungarian forces in the Cibakháza-Tiszaföldvár area were soon reinforced. In the second half of the month, the 3rd Battalion of the 19th Schwarzenberg Infantry Regiment, two companies of the 3rd Battalion of the 52nd Franz Karl Infantry Regiment, the 65th Honvéd Battalion, the National Guard Battalion of Mezőtúr, a Jäger company and a sapper squadron, four companies of the 3rd Ferdinand Hussars Regiment, about three hundred insurgent cavalrymen, a six-pound infantry battery and half of a cavalry battery were stationed here. The Hungarian troops defending the bridge were composed as follows:
Veteran/regular soldiers: Infantry: 44 officers, 1,300 soldiers; Cavalry: 22 officers, 500 soldiers; Artillery: 15 officers, 200 soldiers; 17 cannons; Sappers: 1 officer, 300 soldiers; Non regular honvéds: 65th (Kökényessy) battalion: 27 officers, 1,000 men; 1 cavalry company from Mezőtúr: 5 officers, 120 men; Non regular national guards: Mezőtúr infantry battalion: 24 officers, 1,000 men with scythes; Free Cuman riders: 2 officers, 60 men; New rider squad from Kecskemét: 200 men; Total: 140 officers, 4310 men, 17 cannons.
The existence of the bridge at Cibakháza was, therefore, the biggest source of problems for the Austrian I. Corps, stationing in the region. If this were no longer the case, Lieutenant Colonel Stauffer and his detachment could be withdrawn from Kecskemét, concentrating only on Szolnok and providing better support for the main army's slowly outlining and soon-to-be-launched attack towards Gyöngyös. The imperial command decided to destroy the bridge in the second half of February in order to prevent a Hungarian attack from the direction of Cibakháza. As early as 16 February, Jelačić had already drafted a measure to General Ferenc Ottinger to carry out another attempt against the Cibakháza bridge, which this time had to be destroyed to its foundations. In the meantime, the commander of the Ottinger cavalry brigade gathered new news and found that General Károly Vécsey's division was already at Törökszentmiklós, while General János Damjanich's was approaching Cibakháza. The appearance of the two divisions posed a simultaneous threat at both Szolnok and Cibakháza, so to ease the situation the destruction of the bridge from Cibakháza was now unavoidable. On 22 February Field Marshal Windisch-Grätz issued his order that the I Corps should continue to cover the Tisza crossings and, if the opportunity presented itself, destroy the bridge at Cibakháza. This order came as the Austrian main army was moving towards Gyöngyös to join up with Franz Schlik's corps and force the Hungarian army, which was believed to be near Mezőkövesd, into battle. For this, Jelačić also had to provide troops, a detached brigade led by General Zeisberg, the Chief of General Staff of the I Corps. At the Tisza crossings, however, there was still a significant force, but only with "defensive competence", with which Jelačić was not happy. The only option left for him, was to achieve some military success, was to destroy the bridge at Cibakháza.
So when Ottinger received the written order to attack the bridge from Cibakháza, and also Stauffer's troops were summoned from Kecskemét, so the organization of the "expedition" could begin.
On 23 February, Major General Ottinger assembled his troops in Abony destined to carry out the operation. The experience of the attack on 4 February showed that artillery alone could not succeed in this task and that it was necessary to capture the bridge so that it could be destroyed. Only the infantry could do this. At the same time, the artillery had to be reinforced, both to tie up the Hungarian artillery defending the bridge and to be numerous enough to make it possible to destroy the bridge with their fire if necessary. Therefore, use of heavy artillery seemed advisable.
Ottinger, the cavalry brigade commander assigned for this action six cavalry companies, three from each of the two regiments of his own brigade. On this day, around noon, two infantry battalions from the Karger Brigade arrived as reinforcements (the 3rd Battalion of the 3rd - Archduke Charles - Infantry Regiment and the 3rd Battalion of the 11th -2nd Banderial - Border Guard Regiment). Probably already in Abony was the 5th Cavalry Battery, which was joined by the 1st Twelve Pounder Battery, which, like the others, was part of the corps artillery reserve. Also arriving from the Army's Artillery Reserve was the 16th Congreve Rocket Battery. The Austrian troops under Ottinger were as it follows:
Infantry: 50 officers, 2,000 soldiers; Cavalry: 36 officers, 960 soldiers; Artillery: 6 officers, 200 soldiers, 12 cannons; Total: 92 officers, 3,160 soldiers, and 12 cannons.
The march started towards Cibakháza at 10 o'clock in the evening. After a march of about 25 kilometers, they approached the mouth of the river loop at the entrance to the bridgehead from Cibakháza at around 5 in the morning.
Battle The column stopped at a farmhouse, where Ottinger began to organize the surprise attack.
The surprise was not to be, however, because their vanguard almost immediately got into a fight with a Hungarian hussar patrol. The Hungarian cavalry retreated after a short battle with the cuirassiers, and the whole Austrian detachment followed them.
On reaching the river, in the short portion between the two close-to-each-other bends of the river, in a defensive position behind a bank of earth, Hungarian infantrymen, presumably with at least one light gun, were standing waiting for the attack. In the foggy, damp weather, they began firing blindly, sending a signal to the Cibakháza garrison, and causing the Imperials to deploy, thus slowing them down.