The Battle of Branyiszkó was a battle in the Hungarian war of Independence of 1848–1849, fought on 5 February 1849 between the revolutionary Hungarian division led by Colonel Richard Guyon against the detachment of the Austrian Empire led by Major General Franz Deym von Stritež, in the Pass of Branyiszkó. This was the last battle of the Hungarian Upper Danube Army retreat through Northern Hungary led by General Artúr Görgei, which was a diversion to lure as many Austrian troops as possible, in order to prevent the Austrian main army led by Field Marshal Alfred I, Prince of Windisch-Grätz from attacking the Hungarian headquarters and interim capital from Debrecen. In this battle, the Hungarian army led by Guyon broke through the 750 m high mountain pass, chasing away the Austrian troops which tried to defend it, allowing the army of Görgei to arrive in Eastern Hungary, then force, together with Colonel György Klapka Lieutenant General Franz Schlik to retreat from there.
Background On 2 January 1849, the Hungarian military council held in Pest decided to retreat from the capital without a fight and that the Hungarian army should begin to concentrate on the region of the Upper and Middle Tisza.. In order to achieve this, they decided that the Hungarian troops from Bácska and Bánság must be evacuated, leaving only a weak force in the areas around Szeged and Szabadka. They concluded that after the retreat from Bánság, the line of the Maros must be held by the siege corps of Arad, Transylvania must be totally recovered to provide a rear for the concentration of the Hungarian armies, and the castles and fortresses in Hungarian hands, such as Komárom, Pétervárad, Eszék and Lipótvár, must be reinforced. The Corps of the Upper Tisza led by General Artúr Görgei must be reinforced to drive out or destroy the Austrian Corps led by General Franz Schlik which has invaded from the north. Artur Görgei, the commander of the Upper Danube Corps, suggested that only General Mór Perczel's reinforced corps and General Mihály Répásy's reserve corps should retreat directly towards the west, to Szolnok. The Upper Danube Corps, after the evacuation of the capital, had to march to Vác, then to the northwest, to relieve Lipótvár, and secure the mining towns after the evacuation of the garrison of the fortress. In addition, he had to lure after his troops as much enemy force as possible from the main theater to prevent Field Marshal Alfred I, Prince of Windisch-Grätz from attacking Debrecen, the seat of the Hungarian government. In order to achieve this Görgei had to give the impression to the Austrians that he wants to attack Vienna behind their back.
After the aforementioned diversion, the task of the Upper Danube Corps was to retreat through the mining towns (Kremnica (Körmöcbánya), Banská Štiavnica (Selmecbánya), Banská Bystrica (Besztercebánya), Nová Baňa (Újbánya), Pukanec (Bakabánya), Ľubietová (Libetbánya), Banská Belá (Bélabánya), Brezno (Breznóbánya) to the region of the Upper Tisza. The final goal was the concentration of the Hungarian troops at the region of the Upper and Middle Tisza: after the evacuation of Bácska and Bánság, General Antal Vetter calculated that 50,000 soldiers could be concentrated between Tokaj and Szolnok. After the retreat from the capital, Görgei turned north from Vác.. Windisch-Grätz sent a corps of about 12,000 men in pursuit of Görgei's troops only on 7 January entrusting Lieutenant-General Anton Csorich with the pursuit.. After the occupation of Vác, Csorich continued to follow the Upper Danube Corps with about 7,000 men. From Komárom, about 3,000 troops moved against the Görgei's corps, while Lieutenant General Christian Götz threatened the mining towns from the north.
The Upper Danubian Army Corps had about 12,000 soldiers, reorganized at Vác and divided into four divisions, set out towards the besieged town of Lipótvár.. On 11 January, the left wing of the Upper Danube Corps was at Komjáti, the right wing at Verebély, the center and headquarters at Léva, the rearguard at Ipolyság and Szántó. At Verebély, Colonel Lajos Aulich pushed back Simunich's outposts. Colonel Richard Guyon was attacked by Csorich at Ipolyság, and after repulsing the enemy, he retreated to Szántó. The next day, Lajos Beniczky, the government commissioner for the mining towns district, appeared at Görgei's headquarters and told him that he could not defend the mining towns against Götz with only 2,000 men at his disposal. Therefore, he asked Görgei to send him help or to march his army to the mining towns. Görgei, however, continued to consider the relief of Lipótvár as his more important goal. Major József Bayer, Görgei's Chief of Staff, also suggested that the corps should withdraw to the mining towns. He justified this by the fact that even if he succeeded in relieving Lipótvár, the corps would be threatened by the main forces of the K.u.K. troops sent in pursuit from the east. And if it would have not succeeded, the corps would have been squeezed between the enemy troops. Some of the enemy's main forces had already been diverted by Görgei's corps from the attack toward the new Hungarian power base at the Tisza River. But the road to the mining towns was open for only one more day. The army had time to rest there for a few days and save the precious metal and other supplies from there from falling into the Austrian's hands.
Görgei was in danger. Major General Christian Götz's troops could occupy the mining towns from the north and Csorich's troops from the south, and attack Görgei with a combined force. He, therefore, ordered his divisions to march. Aulich had to march to Körmöcbánya, Colonel János Piller to Zólyom and Lieutenant Colonel György Kmety to Selmecbánya. Guyon had to take up defensive positions at Szélakna (today part of Selmecbánya).. The execution of orders did not go without a fight. Kmety clashed with one of Csorich's detachments. Götz was about to capture Körmöcbánya, but Aulich repulsed him.. On 21 January, Csorich also went on the offensive and pushed Guyon back to Selmecbánya. Later that day, Guyon retreated to Besztercebánya. On 20 January, Görgei learned that an Austrian column was advancing up the Garam valley. For the moment he was calm, because he knew that a battalion was stationed in Žarnovica (Zsarnóca). He hoped it would hold off the forces threatening Guyon's right flank. It soon became clear that the battalion commander, who had the duty to defend the Zsarnóca, had not even attempted to take a position there. So Görgei set off with the battalion in question, some cavalry, and cannons to Zsarnóca. When he arrived there, he learned that the enemy had already crossed the village and was heading for Selmecbánya through the Hodrusbánya valley. Görgei caught up with and attacked the enemy detachment, but in the Battle of Hodrusbánya his troops were put to flight. Görgei then withdrew his troops to Körmöcbánya, where he learned of Guyon's defeat in the Battle of Szélakna the previous day. The Imperial troops occupied Selmecbánya and remained there until 24 January.
Aulich's division at Körmöcbánya was threatened with annihilation by Csorich's troops from the south and Götz's from the north. But Görgei found a way to unite his troops. Between Körmöcbánya and Besztercebánya, under the Szkalka Mountain, there was a collapsed old mine tunnel. Görgei and Aulich dug out and shored up the tunnel, and the division could march through it to Besztercebánya. Guyon's and Piller's divisions arrived here by crossing the flooded Garam. Görgei, after reorganizing the troops, withdrew his corps in two columns from Besztercebánya. Görgei led the northern column, which started in the Vág valley towards Kassa. The southern column, consisting of Guyon's and Piller's divisions, retreated down the Garam valley. The columns had to meet before the Branyiszkó pass. The north column reached Lőcse without any particular difficulty. On 25 January, Csorich's two brigades headed back to Pest, and only Major General Götz and Felix Jablonowski followed the southern column of the Upper Danube Corps. On 2 February, Guyon's division rested at Igló. Guyon had not posted outposts, and the Imperial garrison from Lőcse attacked his troops by surprise during the night. However, Guyon soon got his troops in order and drove the attackers out of the town.
Prelude Görgei, suffering from a hot fever due to the fatigue of leading his troops by three weeks of continuous retreat in the mountain passes during the harsh winter, spent three days in bed at Vichodna in sickness, and so only on February 3 he arrived at Poprád, where he received a report on the Battle of Igló, and on the same day he traveled on to Lőcse; where he learned that the Austrian column pursuing him was alarmingly close to his troops.Bánlaky József: A Branyiszkó megvétele (1849. február 5-én). A magyar nemzet hadtörténete XXI Arcanum Adatbázis Kft. 2001 He now had to decide quickly between two alternatives: either to make his way through the occupied Branyiszkó pass at the cost of a battle or to retreat southwards with his army through the valley of the Sajó River, avoiding confrontation. Görgei chose the former because with this northern detour, he could cut off the route of Lieutenant General Franz Schlik, who was near Kassa, to Galicia.. He also thought that a victorious battle would be good for his troops' morale, who were suffering from many retreats and Austrian raids.. He left the capture of the Branyiszkó Pass, which was the gateway to Eperjes and Kassa, to Guyon, who had fought rather unsuccessful battles in the retreat to northern Hungary, giving him the opportunity to make amends for his mistakes.
According to the Hungarian writer Kálmán Mikszáth: A characteristic habit of Artur Görgei had an even stronger psychological basis when he wanted to make a bold military action, usually he did not entrust it to his officers or subordinates, who were freshly laurelled [carried out successful military actions], but to the defeated, to those who had previously experienced some failure, thinking that in them the desire to repair the suffered damage with something great was most alive, and Görgei was not disappointed. Süli Attila: Egy elterelő hadművelet története - Branyiszkó, 1849 február 5 Ars Militaria. 2020 május 22
At the same time, Kmety had to demonstrate in the Hornád valley towards Krompachy (Korompa). Piller's division was sent to Spišské Podhradie (Szepesváralja) for possible support of Guyon, but did not take part in the following day's fighting, while Aulich's division was left in the Poprád valley for the time being. On 4 February, on the eve of the decisive battles from the end of February and the following Spring, the officers of the Simonyi column and the corps headquarters, stationed at Lőcse, organized a ball on Görgei's orders to boost the morale of the officers.
During that time at Branyiszkó, Guyon was preparing for the battle. The natural features of the Branyiszkó pass made it an excellent defense place. Its thirteen hairpin bends, its narrow paths, and the steep terrain all favored the defenders, who tried to fortify the pass, which already served as a natural fortress, with barricades.