is a principle in constitutional and administrative law that means in Latin that "no delegated powers can be further delegated". Alternatively, it can be stated ("one to whom power is delegated cannot himself further delegate that power").

The principle is present in several jurisdictions such as that of the United States, the United Kingdom and India as well as in Catholic canon law.

Australia In Australia the maxim has been largely superseded by statute and common law.M Aronson and M Groves, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (Thomson Lawbook Co, 2013) at 6.20.D. C. Pearce and S. Argument, Delegated Legislation in Australia (Lexis Nexis, 2012) at 2.31.R. Creyke & J. McMillan, Control of Government Action: Text, Cases and Commentary (3rd ed, 2012.) There is a long line of authorities applying the Carltona principlesCarltona Ltd v Commissioners of Works 2 All ER 560. to Australia.O'Reilly v State Bank of Victoria Commissioners (1983) 153 CLR 1 at 11 and 18.DPP v His Honour Judge Fricke 1 VR 361.Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 37–38.Racecourse Co-operative Sugar Association Ltd v Attorney-General (Qld) HCA 50 per Gibbs J. at 22.

However, courts have found that where a statute expressly requires a personal action, such delegation is not possible.Kutlu v Director of professional Services Review (2011)197 FCR 177.Din v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 147 ALR 673 at 682.Racecourse Co-operative Sugar Association Ltd v Attorney-General (Qld) HCA 50 per Gibbs J. at 22.

In DooneyDooney v Henry (2000) 174 ALR 41. the High Court of Australia (Callinan J),Matthew Groves, H. P. Lee, Australian Administrative Law: Fundamentals, Principles and Doctrines (Cambridge University Press, 2007) p. 262. observed that "No permanent head of a department in the Public Service is expected to discharge personally all the duties which are performed in his name and for which he is accountable to the responsible Minister."

This case law has been backed up by legislation. Section 34AA and 34AAB of the federal government's Acts Interpretation Act 1901 clearly create a statutory power to delegate, contrary to the maxim. The federal legislation is echoed in some state legislation.See, for example, the Interpretation Act 1987 of New South Wales, section 48; Acts Interpretation Act 1915 (SA); Interpretation Act 1918 (WA).

Section 34AB(1)(b), however, prohibits a delegate to further delegate; consequently a Minister delegating to a Secretary does not allow the Secretary to delegate to an Assistant Secretary. Vestiges of the maxim have therefore been preserved by the Act.

Canada The principle was summarised in Canada in 1943, in an article in the Canadian Bar Review by John Willis. While it is acknowledged as "the seminal articulation of the law governing the subdelegation of statutory and discretionary powers" and it is still often cited,Comeau's Sea Foods Ltd. v Canada (Minister of Fisheries and Oceans), 1 SCR 12 it has not achieved the rigid standing that was originally intended. The maxim has had some success as an operating principle in the restriction of delegation of legislative and judicial powers, but the demands of modern governmental regulatory practices have inhibited its application in the delegation of administrative powers. Exceptions are rare and dependent on the statute conferring power.Ramawad v Canada (Minister of manpower and Immigration), 2 SCR 375

India In Indian jurisprudence, the principle is applied across both private commercial law and public administrative law:

Statutory and Administrative Law: The Supreme Court of India established the constitutional boundaries of delegated legislation in the foundational advisory opinion In re Delhi Laws Act (1951), ruling that while ancillary machinery can be delegated, essential legislative functions and policy decisions cannot be shifted away from the legislature. Following this principle the landmark case A K Roy v State of Punjab (1986) reaffirmed that sub-delegation of an essential statutory power is invalid and ultra vires unless the parent Act explicitly or by necessary implication authorises it. Contract and Agency Law: The principle is statutory codified under Section 190 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. It dictates that an ordinary commercial agent cannot lawfully delegate acts they have expressly or impliedly undertaken to perform personally, unless allowed by trade custom or by the essential nature of the agency.

United Kingdom In the United Kingdom, the concept has been used to question the validity of the Parliament Act 1949, because that Act expanded the power of the House of Commons but was passed solely by that House (under the terms of the Parliament Act 1911) without the consent of the House of Lords.

In English administrative law, a landmark application of this principle occurred in the House of Lords case Vine v National Dock Labour Board AC 488. The court ruled that a public statutory body, which had been explicitly entrusted by Parliament with disciplinary and quasi-judicial powers to terminate workers' employment, could not validly sub-delegate those responsibilities to an executive subcommittee. Any administrative action or disciplinary decision taken under an unauthorised delegation of power is deemed ab initio ultra vires and void. While the judgment serves as a foundational precedent for the delegata potestas rule, the Law Lords primarily expressed the principle in English terms, emphasising that the ability to delegate turns entirely on the specific construction and nature of the statutory duty.

United States In the United States, one of the earliest mentions of the principle occurred when it was cited by counsel for one of the litigants before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in 1794, in M'Intire v. Cunningham, 1 Yeates 363 (Pa. 1794). The summary of the case reports, "Mr. Wilson had given no power to Noarth to transact his business; but if he even had, it is a maxim, that delegata potestas non potest delegari."M'Intire v. Cunningham, 1 Yeates 363 (Pa. 1794).

The maxim was first cited by the Supreme Court of the United States in United States v. Sav. Bank, 104 U.S. 728 (1881) in which the case summary reports that one of the litigants argued, "The duty imposed by statute on the commissioner cannot be delegated to a collector. Delegata potestas non potest delegari."United States v. Sav. Bank, 104 U.S. 728 (1881); see also, J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States , 276 U.S. 394, 405-406 (U.S. 1928).

Catholic canon law

Canon 137 of the 1983 Code of Canon Law states:

See also Carltona principle

References