The Tikhvin Offensive was a military operation undertaken by the German army in October 1941 during World War II in the course of Operation Barbarossa. The offensive, conducted entirely around the Volkhov River, was launched by Adolf Hitler with the primary objective of cutting off the supply routes supplying Leningrad. In addition, the German high command intended the deployment of troops in the region to cover the northern flank of the parallel offensive that the Third Reich was launching towards Moscow at that time and also to link up with the allied forces in Finland. The powerful Soviet counteroffensives, added to the accumulated attrition of the German army and the overextension of its logistic network, led to the collapse of the Army Group Norths and the German withdrawal from the occupied ground in the succession of combats.
The Soviet victory at Tikhvin marked their first successful counteroffensive in the sector and allowed Leningrad to continue to hold out in what would become one of the bloodiest sieges in history. The German Army Group North would henceforth not execute any further offensives in the region, being relegated to a defensive role.
Context
Operation Barbarossa, the name given to the German plan to invade the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941, was conceived as an eastward offensive in three directions: Leningrad, Smolensk and Ukraine. For this purpose, Germany dedicated an Army Group to each axis: North, Center and South. Four days later, Finland joined the German offensive, in response to Soviet preventive bombing and with the intention of recovering the ground lost in the Winter War of 1939-1940.
Army Group North ("Heeresgruppe Nord"), composed of three armies (4th Panzer, 16th and 18th), although the smallest of the three, managed in a succession of rapid advances across the Baltic to reach the gates of Leningrad in September. After the capture of Shlisselburg on September 8, the city, besieged by Finns and Germans, had been separated from the rest of the Soviet Union, maintaining as its only link the waters of Lake Ladoga. Although Leningrad, cradle of the October Revolution, was in the eyes of Nazism an important symbolic objective to be destroyed, the Germans found themselves at the arrival of autumn weakened and unable to assault it, with an enemy refusing to surrender and still supplied both by air and via the Lake Ladoga.Hitler's Directive No. 1a 1601/41 "Concerning the Future Existence of the City of Leningrad" stated that the objective of the siege would be to destroy the city completely by a blockade supported by bombardment.()
German offensive Following German advances throughout the summer of '41 and with the Battle of Kiev in full swing, Hitler issued Directive No. 35 on September 6, outlining both his plan for the advance toward Moscow and plans for Army Group North, which was to advance eastward to achieve these two objectives:
The new objectives given to the Army Group North, which had just ceded to the Army Group Centre its 4th Panzer Army and the VIII. Fliegerkorps to contribute to the offensive towards Moscow, caused a crisis between Hitler and Field Marshal von Leeb, responsible for Heeresgruppe Nord, who opposed at first to undertake a new offensive towards the east with his forces depleted and in circumstances that in his opinion were unfavorable for the Germans. The offensive was to take place in a territory 60% covered by swamps and in a season in which it was foreseeable that there would be snow and muddy thaws. To all these disadvantages would have to be added the loss of Finnish support for the Wehrmacht, since after the initial advance of Marshal Mannerheim, who had returned the Finnish border to its pre-Winter War state, Finland had gone on the defensive and even initiated a process of demobilization.
Von Leeb proposed instead an action to destroy the Oranienbaum bridgehead, west of Leningrad, and also an advance to the Ladoga, following the course of the Volkhov, to cut off supplies to Leningrad and destroy the Soviet 54th Army. This second plan was rejected by Hitler, who ordered instead to take Tikhvin, turning northwest, after this city was taken, in the direction of Volkhov, until reaching the Ladoga Lake. Then, if circumstances permitted, they were to advance to the Finnish border at Karelia. Franz Halder, chief of staff of the German army, assessed the plan in his diary as "Pure fantasy!".
To compensate for the units surrendered and the losses suffered since June, it was agreed to send fresh rearguard divisions during the autumn. Thus, from occupied France the 212th, 215th, 223rd, 227th infantry divisions were transferred to the Army Group North, taking advantage of the presence of standard-gauge railway in the Baltic countries; and from Belarus to the 250th (the Spanish "Blue Division"), taking advantage of the fact that it passed near a railroad link with Novgorod.
Von Roques Group
In order to make an advance east of the Ilmen to cover the northern flank of the axis towards Moscow, an ad hoc unit ("kampfgruppe" in German terminology) was formed in October consisting mainly of the 126th and 250th Infantry Divisions plus part of the 18th Motorized Infantry Division. This group was given to Franz von Roques, then responsible for the rear of Army Group North.
The maneuver planned for this group consisted of a strong advance on two axes: Malaya Vishera to the north and, further south, the route that crossed the Msta River to the east of Novgorod. Both advances would unite to the east with the final objective of reaching the city of Borovichi. For this purpose, the main assault across the Volkhov in the area of Gruzino was launched on October 16 and on October 19, further south, at Udarnik, by Blue Division troops. While the main assault served both to open the route to Tikhvin and to Malaya Vishera, the Udarnik assault served the function of attracting the maximum number of Soviet forces in order to clear the way for the planned crossing of the Volkhov from the city of Novgorod by the bulk of the 250th Infantry Division.
Although the advances at the bridgeheads were initially rapid, they soon began to attract Soviet counterattacks. On October 27, east of Malaya Vishera, the German advance eastward was halted. Two days later, the Blue Division's diversionary advance, devoid of heavy support in its assaults, was halted in the face of stiff Soviet resistance. On November 1, due to the increasing problems encountered, the scope of the offensive was reduced, leaving the Msta River as the new final objective. Nevertheless, the problematic advance towards Tikhvin at that time and the strong Soviet resistance encountered, forced the von Roques Group to give up the 18th Motorized to help the advance towards Tikhvin and the 126th Infantry Division to hold the defenses of Malaya Vishera. On November 6 von Roques received the order to cancel the expected assault from Novgorod and to pass completely to the defensive. The group was disbanded on November 14, returning its units to the XXXVIII Corps of Friedrich-Wilhelm von Chappuis and bequeathing positions in the bridgehead difficult to maintain.
Advance to Tikhvin Following the capture of Gruzino by the 21st and 126th Divisions and after four days of fighting in difficult terrain, the 12th Panzer Division and the 20th Motorized, both part of General Rudolf Schmidt's XXXIX Motorized Corps, launched an advance towards Budogosh causing a gap between the Soviet 4th and 52nd Armies, now separated by the road to Tikhvin. The rapid retreat of the 52nd condensed days later into a strong admonition from Aleksandr Vasilevsky, second in command of the Soviet General Staff, to General Klykov and forced the Stavka to reinforce both armies. On October 23 the Germans would take Budogosh. The seizure was answered by the Stavka ordering, on October 26, the 4th and 52nd armies to initiate a counterattack towards the Tikhvin road, with the aim of driving the Germans across the Volkhov. The counterattack, although it failed due in part to poor coordination, meant that the 12th Panzer Division temporarily halted its advance.
It was during these dates that von Leeb met with Hitler to ask for support from Army Group Centre in the form of an attack from Kalinin towards Bologoye, pushing northwards towards the right flank of Army Group North. Soviet pressure against Kalinin made it impossible to send such relief. Leeb at least got permission to cancel the assault on the Oranienbaum bridgehead west of Leningrad, thus obtaining three divisions from that sector.
The Stavka, before the advance to Tikhvin, ordered a new counterattack of the 4th Army, in which it would employ two shock groups of two divisions each, towards the increasingly closer mechanized forces of Schmidt. This counterattack was a failure, since the German counterattacks, added to their concentration of aviation and artillery, ended up disrupting them. Shortly thereafter, taking advantage of a frost that allowed the rivers to flow, the Germans set out to take over Tikhvin on November 6. The city was occupied in the middle of a snowstorm two days later. Schmidt's XXXIX Corps would from then on be bogged down in the city, going on the defensive in the face of mounting Soviet pressure.
The counterattack against the German advance to Tikhvin was simultaneous with that launched from the Neva River in the direction of Sinyavino, east of Leningrad, with the aim of linking Leningrad back to the Soviet lines. The plan for the Sinyavino corridor involved the Neva Operational Group and the 55th Army, which assaulted along the Neva while Jozin's 54th Army hit the Germans on their eastern flank, leaving the XXVIIIth in the middle of the pincer. The poor results and the difficult situation in Tikhvin forced the Stavka to redirect the effort of the 54th Army to the east, ending the hopes of lifting the encirclement before 42. The confrontation meant that the Germans relocated five divisions to defend the Sinyavino sector. The fighting in the area would be continued the following year in what would become the Sinyavino Offensive.
Advance to the Ladoga
Formed by units of the 8th and 12th panzer divisions and the 11th and 21st infantry divisions, kampfgruppe von Boeckmann (another ad hoc unit) had as its main objective the capture of Volkhov and to reach the shores of Lake Ladoga, cutting off the last supply route to Leningrad. Another mission of the group would be the defense of the left flank of the increasingly stretched axis towards Tikhvin. The von Boeckmann Group would manage, after a slow advance, to reach within 14 km of Volkhov before being completely halted. Forced by Hitler to maintain the advance, von Leeb reinforced von Boeckmann with the 254th Infantry Division and Schmidt's increasingly weakened motorized corps, bogged down at Tikhvin, with the 61st Division. Reinforced, von Boeckmann maintained an attack from 28 October that succeeded in pushing the Soviet 4th Army eastward, separating it from the 54th, which was defending the axis to the Ladoga, and reaching the Volkhov suburbs on 8 November. Despite being reinforced later with a kampfgruppe of the 8th Panzer, the 4th Army managed, in a desperate attack, to reach the outskirts of Volkhov on November 8. Army managed, in a desperate attack, to block the German flank and stop the offensive.
The presence of mechanized reinforcements in the von Boeckmann Group prompted the Stavka to take action in the sector: he exchanged 4th Army General Vsevolod Yakovlev for Kirill Meretskov; reinforced the 54th Army with five rifle divisions (one of them guard) and a marine infantry brigade; and ordered them to stop the attack to the west, in the direction of Sinyavino, and now to push eastwards, in the direction of the threatened Volkhov.