The military history of the Philippines during the presidency of Ferdinand Marcos, especially the 14-year period between Marcos' proclamation of Martial Law in September 1972 and his eventual ouster through the People Power Revolution of 1986, was characterized by rapid changes linked to Marcos' use of the military as his "martial law implementor".

During this time, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) units, particularly within the Philippine Constabulary, were noted to have engaged in various human rights abuses. Military camps throughout the country became the site of various detention camps for "political prisoners" which included any individual who spoke out against the Marcos regime, whether they were journalists, educators, religious workers, human rights advocates, academics, artists, or activists.

Officers were promoted and reshuffled, and top commanders were kept on past their retirement ages, based on their expressed allegiances with Ferdinand Marcos. This led to low morale among junior officers who were unable to get promotions in the AFP, and eventually led to the creation of the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM).

When revelations of cheating during 1986 Philippine presidential election came out in February 1986, RAM forces under Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile attempted to stage a Coup against Marcos, but their plot failed when it was discovered by Marcos. They sought help from Philippine Constabulary chief Fidel V. Ramos who joined them, and when they were cornered in Camps Aguinaldo and Crame on Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) from Roman Catholic Cardinal Jaime Sin. Sin called on private citizens, already planning protests connected to cheating during the elections, to help protect Enrile and Ramos' forces by forming a human barricade on the stretch of EDSA between the two camps. Marcos issued Military orders to attack Enrile and Ramos' forces while publicly pretending to issue contrary orders. AFP forces rejected the order and began defecting to the Enrile and Ramos faction instead.

Marcos eventually went into exile in Hawaii after the US administration of Ronald Reagan offered to fly him out of the country from Clark Airbase - marking the end of the Marcos dictatorship and bringing in a new administration under Corazon Aquino.

Marcos and the AFP before Martial Law

Patronage system in the Armed Forces President Ferdinand Marcos sought to have a strong personal influence over the Armed Forces as soon as he became president in 1965, holding on to the portfolio of defense secretary in the first thirteen months of his presidency to develop what scholars have noted to be "a patronage system within the defense establishment." The portfolio afforded him direct interaction with the AFP's leadership, and to have a hand in the AFP's day-to-day operationalization.

He also immediately began a massive expansion of the Philippine military, with Ilocanos notably being given a preference for promotion to higher ranks. Generals loyal to Marcos were allowed to stay in their positions past their retirement age, or were rewarded with civilian government posts. This phenomenon would later referred to as the "Ilocanization" of the AFP.

Marcos also immediately reversed Macapagal's position on keeping the AFP away from civic programs which could lead to the politicization of the military hierarchy. He instead gave the armed forces a central role in his economic development initiatives and gave the AFP significant training and resources to ease it into this expanded role. This had the effect of expanding the AFP's presence in the countryside, and also gave Marcos' central government the political benefit of weakening the influence of local politicians. Militarization in the countryside also enabled the administration to bulldoze past controversial measures such as dams and infrastructure development.Joanna K. Cariño, "The Chico River Basin Development Project: A Case Study in National Development Policy," Aghamtao Vol. III (December 1980): 2, https://pssc.org.ph/wp-content/pssc-archives/Aghamtao/1980/05_The%20Chico%20River%20Basin%20Development%20Project_%20A%20Case%20Study%20in%20National%20Development%20Policy.pdf.

Sacking of Commodore Ramon Alcaraz

One of Marcos' early confrontations with an AFP officer who disagreed with him took place within the first year after he was first elected president. Marcos was alleged to have made a deal with smuggler-king Lino Bocalan to restrain the patrols of the Naval Operations Force (NOF) against Smuggling, which was under the command of Philippine Navy Commodore Ramon A. Alcaraz.

In a radio broadcast on January 11, 1966, Marcos included Alcaraz' name in a list of "corrupt officials" and relieved him of command. Alcaraz protested this action and in doing so, also criticized the government's National Defense policy. Alcaraz was placed under investigation for these comments, and Undersecretary for National Defense Ernesto Mata gave him an ultimatum, saying he had a choice between retiring and be demoted. In Alcaraz' reply to Mata, he said:"You can reduce me to Apprentice Seaman… I don't care. My father was a farmer, I can go back to being a farmer."

Bulacan Representative Rogaciano Mercado eventually began a congressional exposé on the matter, and Marcos was forced to back off. Vindicated but still angry, Alcaraz chose a session of the House Defense Committee to once again criticize the national defense policy and announce his retirement. Alcaraz was applauded as he left the witness stand, and he would thereafter continue to be a staunch critic of Ferdinand Marcos' administration.

Beginnings of the New People's Army and Moro Conflicts The Marcos administration also marked the beginnings of at least two long-running conflicts that continued to plague later administrations: the Moro conflict and the New People's Army conflict.

1968 Jabidah Massacre and the 1972 birth of the Moro conflict The Moro conflict, began in earnest in 1968 when short-lived organizations such as the Muslim Independence Movement and the Bangsamoro Liberation Organization formed in reaction to news about the Jabidah Massacre,

With the declaration of Martial Law, in September 1972, political parties, including the BMLO and the MIM, were dissolved. So when former MIM member Nur Misuari formed an armed secessionist group called the Moro National Liberation Front, he was quickly able to consolidate power. The MNLF became the single dominant voice calling for Moro independence, and was able to raise a significant armed force. Only then did the Philippines' decades-long Moro conflict had begun in earnest.

Beginnings of the New People's Army conflict Meanwhile, the Communist Party of the Philippines was formed in 1968, while the New People's Army (NPA), founded in 1969.

The New People's Army initially had only 60 guerrillas and 35 WWII-era guns,Francisco Nemenzo, "Rectification Process in the Philippine Communist Movement", in Lim Joo Jock and S. Vani, eds., Armed Communist Movements in Southeast Asia (Hampshire, England: Gower, 1984) p. 90 which they all soon lost in an encounter against the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The NPA tried to follow the Maoist military doctrine of "establishing stable base areas," but they took heavy casualties in Northern Luzon as a result, and abandoned the Maoist strategy in favor of dispersing their forces.Rocamora, Joel. "The Rural Resistance." Southeast Asia Chronicle. No. 62. June–July 1978, P. 14

The NPA was finally able to regain weaponry on December 29, 1970, when Philippine Military Academy instructor Lt. Victor Corpus defected to the CPP-NPA and led a raid on the PMA armory, timing the raid when most cadets were out on Christmas vacation and the PMA's senior officers including its Superintendent, General Ugalde had left the camp to meet President Ferdinand Marcos upon his scheduled arrival in nearby Baguio. Corpus, who was PMA's designated officer of the day (OOD), guided the NPA raiding team which managed to escape with Browning Automatic Rifles, carbines, machineguns, and various other weapons and ammunition.

Even by the day Martial Law was announced on September 23, 1972, however, the NPA was not a big threat. Just a few days earlier on September 19, 1972, the Philippine National Security Council's threat assessment was "between 'normal' and 'Internal Defense Condition 1'," where the highest condition "3." In 1971, AFP Chief of Staff Manuel T. Yan had prominently told media that the grounds for Marcos to either impose of martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus did not exist. One of the generals serving under General Fabian Ver of the National Intelligence and Security Authority later recalled that "Even when Martial Law was declared, the communists were not a real threat. The military could handle them."

Oplan Sagittarius

A week before Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos declare martial law in September 1972, copies of the plan for its implementation were distributed to key officials within the Armed Forces. As a way of assuring that any whistleblowers could be easily identified, the copies of the plan were distributed with codeword titles taken from the different signs of the Zodiac. The copy marked "Sagittarius" was given to General Marcos Soliman, who commanded the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency at the time.

When Senator Benigno Aquino Jr. exposed the existence of "Oplan Sagittarius" a week before martial law was declared, other generals were able to deny that they had heard of any operation under the said code title, and it was easy for Marcos to pinpoint General Soliman as the whistleblower who gave the information to Aquino.

Not long after the declaration of martial law, the Marcos-controlled press reported that Soliman had died of a heart attack, but it is believed that Marcos had ordered that he be killed. Marcos then dissolved the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA) and put a powerful super-agency, the National Intelligence and Security Authority (NISA) in its place, with General Fabian Ver in command.

The AFP as "martial law implementor" Upon the declaration of martial law in 1972, Marcos used the AFP as what the Davide Commission Report would later call his "martial law implementor," and "one of the vital supports of the regime," functioning, political scientists have noted, "like a private army" for Marcos and his cronies.

Arrest and detention of political prisoners Upon the announcement of Martial Law in 1972, one of their earliest tasks was that of quickly arresting and containing Marcos' political opponents, and Marcos' hold on power was effectively broken once enough of the Military withdrew their support from him in February 1986. Antonio Parlade notes that to get the military to ensure their cooperation, Marcos "had to expand the military organization and patronize the generals to buy their loyalty."

Expansion of budget and takeover of civilian functions Since it was the "martial law implementor," Marcos expanded the AFP significantly, from a force of 57,100 in 1971 to a 97.89 percent increase of 113,000 personnel in 1976. He also increased the military budget from P880 million in 1972 to P4 billion in 1976.

The military was given many functions aside from its task of national defense, including assisting in the implementation of price controls imposed on key products like corn and rice, enforcing the rules of the national corn procurement program, assisting in the collection of rural and government bank loans, implementing the agrarian reform law, and various police functions such as collecting unlicensed firearms and enforcing curfews, and suppressing strikes, rallies, and other demonstrations.

Creation of the CHDF