The Armed Revolutionary Action (ARA) was the militant arm of the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) active in metropole Portugal. It was a semi-autonomous organization that was active from 1970 to 1973 under the Estado Novo dictatorship then led by Marcelo Caetano. The first meeting of the Central Committee of the PCP on the use of violence as an action of self-defense took place in December 1962, and marked the Party's position on this issue, seeking to relate it to mass actions. Violence was not excluded and could be used in the paradigm of the "national uprising", as long as it was directed by the PCP, and in a context of radicalization and intensification of the mass struggle, which could lead to a revolutionary environment.
In 1964, the PCP decided to create the "special actions", and in 1965, the nucleus, composed of Raimundo Narciso and Rogério de Carvalho, went to Cuba to take a course on military training. Five months later, the "special actions" already had cadres, military equipment, and several clandestine locations. Their first target was the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) facilities near Rio de Mouro, but they were unsuccessful. That year, a wave of repression weakened the PCP and the ARA, which was unable to contact the PCP leadership for months. In 1966 a new group of militants were sent to Cuba for military training, but when they returned, influenced by the guerrilla line of foquismo, outside the party line, they broke with the PCP. In the meeting about the event, Álvaro Cunhal argued that future operatives of "special actions" should study in the Soviet Union instead of Cuba. In 1967, when Narciso returned from the Soviet Union, he was given the task of restructuring the "special actions" with Ângelo Veloso. In 1970, the "special actions" gathered approximately 42 operatives, being relatively stable and able to execute the actions already planned, and with a secure headquarters. In the context of radicalization of the Portuguese society, Raimundo Narciso starts directing the ARA with Jaime Serra and Francisco Miguel.
The "special actions" began to present themselves as Armed Revolutionary Action after the meeting held after the attack on the ship Cunene on October 26, 1970. On November 20, they detonated three bombs, each with a symbolic value, representing the fronts of political combat: the struggle against repression, colonial war, and imperialism. The International and State Defense Police (PIDE) – predecessor of the General Directorate of Security (DGS) – only discovered that the ARA was an organization linked to the PCP in the sabotage of the Tancos air base, with the code name, Operation "Águia Real" (Royal Eagle), due to the complexity involved and the size of the feat, which destroyed 28 aircraft, 13 of them irrecoverably. On June 3, 1971, there was a sabotage of the national and international telecommunication central during the NATO ministerial conference, which caused "great embarrassment" to the regime, and was reported worldwide. On October 2, the ARA carries out a mission to deflect explosive material in the assault on the quarry's gunroom. On October 27, two days before the inauguration of the Comiberlant Barracks, at 2 a.m., a bomb exploded, which caused giant destruction to the barracks, both inside and outside. In January 1972, the ARA carried out an action of destruction of sophisticated and new war material from France that was going to the colonial war on the ship Muxima, and in July there was an unsuccessful attempt to sabotage a ship. On August 9, on the day of Américo Tomás' inauguration, the ARA carried out one last action, which was to cut power throughout the country with sabotage actions.
After a year without action, and with conciliation between the opposition and the PCP, the ARA was suspended in May 1973. It had suffered heavy blows earlier, with the imprisonment of several important operatives. It remained clandestine until the Carnation Revolution and was only dissolved with the fall of the dictatorial Estado Novo regime.
Political theory
Use of violence In the meeting of the Central Committee of the Portuguese Communist Party held in December 1962, the question of using violence as a means of self-defense and its relation to mass actions was discussed for the first time. The position taken at this meeting was subsequently addressed and revisited in later meetings:The possible organization of actions of a special type is a task to be carried out by special organizations which, although acting in conjunction with the actions and demonstrations of the masses and to stimulate them, must develop their action entirely independently of the action of the masses themselves. That is, the action of the organisms or groups for special actions can never be confused, even in the eyes of the repressive forces, with mass action and demonstrations.For the PCP, the primary approach was peaceful mass actions aimed at achieving a "mass uprising," with armed struggle being a secondary and less emphasized aspect of their strategy, though it was still considered. The possibility of armed struggle was neither dismissed nor actively pursued; instead, it was viewed as a potential option to be used only when deemed appropriate. The April 1964 report Towards Victory endorsed the use of armed struggle but stressed that the main objective of the "Democratic and National Revolution" was to mobilize the masses to overthrow the regime and its repressive apparatus. The goal was to achieve the overthrow of the dictatorship through a "national mass uprising," although the conditions for such an uprising had not yet been met despite the growing popular opposition to the regime. According to the PCP, not being in a revolutionary situation meant that the masses were not yet prepared to undertake such action. For the PCP, its task was:not only to push forward the popular struggle which itself aggravates the crisis of the regime, but to prepare to be able to lead the country into the decisive and final struggle in the coming revolutionary situation. [...] Guided by Marxism-Leninism, defining our orientation supported by the facts, we work to hasten the creation of a revolutionary situation and to create the political and organizational conditions to rise to the demands of the situation.According to the PCP, if broad mass struggles lead to popular insurrection, the increasing confrontations between the repressive apparatus and the masses would necessitate that trained cadres transition to armed struggle. For the PCP, gaining the support of at least some segments of the military was crucial in this anti-fascist insurrection, as the military was a key pillar of the regime. Consequently, the PCP consistently sought to establish clandestine cells within various military divisions to focus on agitation, propaganda, mobilization, and organization among discontented military personnel. Within the leadership, there were differing opinions on the use of armed struggle. While some leaders favored mass struggles, others contended that armed actions were essential for overthrowing a repressive and violent regime.
Ideological issues The PCP recognized the use of "special actions" as a means to deepen and intensify the political and social movement". Álvaro Cunhal defined "petty-bourgeois radicalism" as the "main ideological deviation that could affect the PCP:Today, petty-bourgeois radicalism, verbal revolutionarism, insists on only one thing: immediate direct action, immediate violent action, immediate armed struggle. Some people talk like that and get sick when they hear about mass struggle and organization [...] This anarchist tendency is above all harmful because of the orientation it tries to give to the democratic struggle. It causes enormous harm in that it influences the democratic forces away from their essential, instantaneous, immediate tasks, without which they can never launch a victorious insurrection: the mass struggle and organization.The most radical sectors included students and workers from the South Bank of the Tagus River. The PCP did not rule out violence but sought to use it within the framework of a "national uprising", provided it was directed by the PCP and occurred in a context of radicalization and intensified mass struggle, potentially leading to a revolutionary environment to overthrow the dictatorship. The PCP also aimed to combat "right-wing opportunism", "adventurism" and "leftism". After Álvaro Cunhal was released from prison, he strongly criticized the "right-wing policy" of Júlio Fogaça, and the possibility of armed insurrection was revisited. The PCP faced a complex situation, balancing Cunhal's criticisms, the Soviet Union's policy of peaceful coexistence, the most radical sectors of the workers' and students' movements, and attempts to reach agreements with other opposition groups. This impasse was resolved following the fraudulent elections in which General Humberto Delgado participated, which increased radicalization in Portuguese society. In 1964, the PCP began formulating a structure for non-lethal armed struggle against the colonial and repressive apparatus of the Estado Novo regime. This effort led to the creation of the Armed Revolutionary Action, a unique organization in the European context, as no other communist party had adopted armed struggle at that time. The ARA focused on targeting the colonial war—symbolizing imperialism, colonialism, repression, and loss of life—while also addressing the repressive state apparatus. The ARA committed to non-lethal actions, aiming to minimize the risk of loss of life, viewing lethal actions as counterproductive. Its struggle was designed to convey to the population that its primary target was the regime.
Background
Formation of "special actions" The PCP decided to begin the process of forming a new organization, focused on "special actions", stating that:The worsening crisis of the fascist regime, the development of the political struggle of the masses, their radicalization, the brutality of the repressive apparatus, and the evolution of the colonial war, place a new task on the Party: the task of organizing actions of self-defense of the masses, actions aimed at hitting more directly the military apparatus of the colonial war, that create difficulties for the repressive apparatus, that hinder fascist propaganda and give new aspects to anti-fascist agitation and propaganda. The execution of such actions cannot be left to spontaneity. It must be faced on the practical ground.Rogério de Carvalho, a member of the Central Committee since 1963, was tasked with establishing the "special actions" organization, which began recruiting its original core in 1964. Raimundo Narciso, a student at the Instituto Superior Técnico (IST) in Lisbon, who had been involved in several political activities, was contacted and went underground. A militia officer was also approached but refused to participate. Almeida, who collaborated with the PCP from 1965 to 1966, also declined to go underground due to his academic commitments but agreed to remain a party militant and carry out the tasks assigned to him. Consequently, the "special actions" group initially consisted of only two members and the support of Almeida.