The July 1936 coup d'état in Granada against the government of the Spanish Republic, which started the Civil War, managed to triumph in Granada and take control of the city.
On July 20, at five o'clock in the afternoon, the garrison of Granada revolted against the Government. On the 17th, the coup plotters of the African Army had seized the Spanish protectorate of Morocco, and on the 18th the conspirators led by General Gonzalo Queipo de Llano had risen in Seville, and also in Cordoba. The military commander of Granada, general Miguel Campins, was forced to sign the war proclamation, while the Nationalist troops and militias managed to quickly take control of the city center. The civil governor César Torres Martínez and the local commander of the Civil Guard, as well as the mayor of the city and the president of the deputation, were arrested. The rebels also managed to occupy the Armilla Airbase and other strategic points.
The government loyalists, despite being poorly armed and disorganized, made themselves strong in the Albaicín neighborhood. The rebels brought artillery and after several days of heavy fighting managed to conquer it. At the fall of the Albaicín, all of Granada was under the control of the rebels.
During this fighting the rebels arrested and in many cases executed any republicans or suspected republicans. It is not known how many people were executed. After the conquest of Granada, a strong repression against supporters of the Republic was launched. It is estimated that 5,000 people were executed during the conflict.
Background
Political and social situation Since the 1936 Spanish general election, the political-social climate in Granada had become extraordinarily polarized. The victory of the Popular Front and the return of the left to the municipal corporation was not well received by the conservative parties. Granada was a province where conservative and right-wing forces had an important presence. On March 8, the leftists organized a large rally at the Los Cármenes stadium that later toured the city, calling for the annulment of the election results, which were believed to have been fraudulent due to pressure and intervention by the local caciques. The following day, at a mass meeting of workers with their families, Falange gunmen caused several injuries among some women and children attending the event. The unions reacted by calling a general strike for the following day, March 10.
On the day of the strike the atmosphere was highly charged. Throughout the day incidents occurred all over the city. At 9:30 some workers burned the Falange local, located at number 3 Cuesta del Progreso. Then, other groups set fire to the Isabel la Católica Theater, the Colón and Royal cafés, and the headquarters of the conservative newspaper Ideal, whose machinery was destroyed and the premises burned to the ground. While these incidents were taking place, groups of right-wing gunmen fired from the rooftops at the demonstrators and the policemen who were present there. The premises of the Popular Action (Spanish: Acción Popular, AP) party and of the Acción Obrerista of the CEDA were also set on fire, the chocolate factory owned by a local CEDA leader, the Granada Tennis Club, the Convent of San Gregorio el Bajo and the Church of El Salvador, which was practically destroyed. It is unknown who were the perpetrators of many of these fires, although historian Ian Gibson notes the possibility that among the arsonists were some right-wing provocateurs. What is documented is that the police were present, but did not intervene to prevent these incidents. The riots caused a great commotion among the middle class in Granada and left a feeling of hatred and revenge among many Granadians.
As a result of the serious riots of March 10, the police arrested more than three hundred people and carried out numerous house searches, seizing a large number of weapons both in the city of Granada and in the province. The incidents resulted in the dismissal of the civil and military governors. The military commander, General Eliseo Álvarez-Arenas, had gone so far as to threaten to take the troops out into the streets if the riots did not end. He was replaced by general Llanos Medina, a military man markedly right-wing and with whom the military conspiracy would begin.
On March 31, with the votes in favor of the left and against the right, the Cortes annulled the results of the February elections in Granada and called for a rerun of the elections for May. The Popular Front won the repeat elections on May 3, with the thirteen Socialist and Progressive candidates obtaining deputies. The rightists did not obtain any deputies. The electoral failure of the rightists meant a strengthening of the Granada Falange, which at the level of all Spain had been very weakened after the illegalization of the party and the decapitation of its leadership. Many members of the juventudes of the CEDA switched to Falange.
Coup plot After the electoral victory of the Popular Front, reactionary and royalist officers began preparations for a military uprising. Republican authorities in Madrid ordered the civil governor of Granada, Ernesto Vega, to place under surveillance several officers of the Granada garrison who were known for their anti-Republican sentiments. But they realized that they were being watched, which may have led to Vega's dismissal on June 25. He was replaced by César Torres Martínez. Upon his arrival in Granada, Torres Martínez found a complex situation: a tramway strike and another of garbage collectors, the leftist councilors of the city council at odds with each other, and various problems in some towns of the province. Although he managed to stabilize the situation, in just 25 days in office he was only able to make contact with the military and civil conspiracy.
In 1936, Granada was the headquarters of the 3rd Infantry Brigade and depended militarily on the II Organic Division, headquartered in Seville. The military garrison of Granada was composed of the Infantry Regiment No. 2, commanded by Colonel Basilio León Maestre, and the Light Artillery Regiment No. 4, commanded by Colonel Antonio Muñoz Jiménez. The Infantry Regiment had about 300 troops, while the Artillery Regiment had about 180. The regiments had few forces available because the officers had granted many summer leaves.
Initially, the visible head of the military conspiracy in Granada was General Llanos Medina, but the government knew of his conspiratorial activities and on July 10 he was dismissed and transferred. He was replaced by Brigadier General Miguel Campins, who took command of the garrison on July 11. Campins was not involved in the military conspiracy, and it was done behind his back. Colonels León Maestre and Muñoz Jiménez were involved in the conspiracy and had the support of other anti-Republican officers of the Granada garrison. Other officers were also prominent in the conspiracy, such as the infantry commander Rodríguez Bouza or the commander José Valdés Guzmán. In the case of Valdés, his contribution to the conspiracy was important, since he had been head of the military administration of the Granada garrison since 1931, and in 1936 he was already well acquainted with the local political and military situation (unlike other posts, which frequently changed posting). In addition, Valdés was a member of Falange, "camisa vieja" (Spanish: "old shirt") and head of the Falange militias in Granada. The conspiracy also extended to other areas outside the Army.
The Security and Assault Corps was commanded by Captain Alvarez, and its forces numbered about 150-300 troops. While the Assault forces were not involved in the conspiracy, their former commander, Assault Captain José Nestares Cuéllar was.Until the beginning of 1936, Nestares had been the head of the Security and Assault Corps in Granada; but he was dismissed after the riots of March 10. — The Guardia Civil had about 40 troops in the city of Granada. The commander of the Civil Guard command in Granada, Lieutenant Colonel Fernando Vidal Pagán, was loyal to the Republic; this was not the case of Lieutenant Mariano Pelayo, who conspired against him and who would play an important role in the uprising. The Falange granadina also had an important role in the conspiracy; it is not known with certainty how many troops it had, but they probably did not exceed 400. Also involved in the conspiracy—although with a minor role—were several right-wing politicians who had not been elected in the May elections.Such was the case of the former deputy of the CEDA and new shirt of the Falange, Ramón Ruiz Alonso. —
The previous days On July 17, in the afternoon, the military garrison of Melilla unexpectedly revolted. After Melilla, the other squares of the protectorate of Morocco followed, and then—the next day—there was the uprising of the garrison of the Canary Islands, under the command of General Francisco Franco.
On July 18, the atmosphere in Granada was tense; the military governor, General Campins, condemned the uprising in Morocco, while Popular Front organizations demonstrated throughout the day. Campins held a meeting at the civilian government with the local Republican authorities, telling them that he had full confidence in the officers under his command and that they were loyal Republicans. However, this attitude of Campins contrasted with the telegram that same day he had sent to General Franco, where he informed him that he placed himself under his orders.
That day the uprising spread to the Iberian Peninsula. At two o'clock in the afternoon a part of the Seville garrison revolted against the Government. General Queipo de Llano arrested the commanders of the II Organic Division and took control of it. Although he met strong popular resistance in several parts of the city, Queipo de Llano managed to dominate the urban center and the Tablada airfield. A few hours later, in the city of Cordoba, Colonel Ciriaco Cascajo—following Queipo de Llano's instructions—at five o'clock in the afternoon revolted the artillery regiment and proclaimed a state of war, managing to dominate the city.
On July 19, the situation in Granada was still in dead pause, with the conspiracy immobilized and with the Popular Front militants still unarmed. The civil governor, Torres Martínez, refused again and again to distribute arms among the workers' organizations that demanded them, following the slogans of the head of the government, Casares Quiroga, not to arm the population. The Minister of War, General Luis Castelló, called Campins to tell him to organize a column to go to Córdoba and put an end to Colonel Cascajo's uprising; however, the officers of the garrison were very much not in favor of this idea. Vidal Pagán also received from Madrid the order to gather armamentd for the Córdoba column, but when he went to the Artillery Barracks he met with the rejection of the military commanders who, in order not to deliver him the requested armaments, gave him excuses and various pretexts. Some troops of the Granada garrison were sent to Almería, where they would later contribute to the failure of the uprising in that city. Campins went to the artillery barracks, where he made a harangue to the officers about the futility and dishonor of the military rebellion. Captain Nestares, for his part, went visiting the various military barracks in the city, urging the conspirators to take the initiative. That night the conspirators stayed awake, coordinating plans to revolt.
The coup