The Battle of Tordesillas was an armed conflict fought during the Revolt of the Comuneros, that engaged the royalist forces commanded by the Count of Haro and the comuneros garrison of the Valladolid town of Tordesillas, the headquarters of the rebels, on December 5, 1520.
At the end of November the army of the Santa Junta, led by Pedro Girón y Velasco, had advanced towards Medina de Rioseco, establishing its headquarters in the town of Villabrágima, only a league away from the royal army. This one, composed fundamentally of contingents provided and commanded by the nobility, was limited to occupy towns to avoid the advance and to cut the lines of communication.
The situation was maintained until December 2, when the rebel army left Villabrágima for Villalpando. With this movement the route to Tordesillas —headquarters of the Junta and residence of Queen Joanna the Mad— was left unprotected, so the royal army took advantage of the occasion and on December 4 headed out. The following day the army attacked the city and after a long and hard fight with the defensive garrison, it was able to seize the city.
On the political level, the occupation of Tordesillas was a major defeat for the comuneros, who lost Queen Joanna, and with her, their hopes that she would heed their claims. In addition, many of the procurators were imprisoned, and those who were not, had fled. On the military level, the angry criticism towards the General-in-chief Pedro Girón due to the movement of the troops, forced him to resign from his post and withdraw from the conflict, which in turn produced important desertions in the bulk of the comuneros troops.
The nobles, on the other hand, did not take advantage of the victory. Deeply divided, with scarce numbers, and fearing reprisals from the comuneros within their fiefdoms, they limited themselves to establishing garrisons in some strategic places, after which they discharged most of the troops and returned to their domains.
Prelude
At the end of November 1520 the Captain General of the Santa Junta, Pedro Girón y Velasco,The nobleman Pedro Girón y Velasco had joined the comunero movement in October, apparently because of the monarch's refusal to hand over to him the duchy of Medina Sidonia.( He was the son of Juan Téllez-Girón, 2nd Count of Ureña and Leonor de la Vega Velasco (daughter of the 2nd Count of Haro). mobilized the bulk of his army towards Villabrágima, at the same time that other smaller detachments occupied Villafrechós, to the north, Tordehumos, to the southwest and Villagarcía de Campos and Urueña, to the south. In this way the distance between the troops of the lords, grouped in Medina de Rioseco, was shortened to a league and hostilities seemed inevitable. However, the nobles commanded by the Count of Haro refused to take the initiative. They only limited themselves to impede the enemy's advance and cut their lines of communication by occupying towns such as Mota del Marqués, San Pedro de Latarce, Castromonte or Torrelobatón.
What was actually happening was that the royalist side was deeply divided over the right course of action. On the one hand, the regent Adrian and his collaborators insisted that a rapid and withering attack should be carried out against the comuneros; they were convinced that their troops were far superior to those of the rebels. The nobles, on the other hand, saw this position as very risky because the enemy was solidly entrenched in Villabrágima and because, in addition, the vineyards on the left bank of the Sequillo River were impassable terrain for the cavalry, on which their forces were mainly based, but perfect for the rebels' infantry.
However, their particular interests were also at stake in this problem. Above all, the lords feared to provoke a greater anti-seignorial reaction in their domains if they openly confronted the comuneros. Equally revealing are the declarations of Admiral Fadrique Enríquez de Velasco —since September Viceroy of Castile along with Adrian and the Constable—, who rejected the idea of fighting in his own fiefdom, on the banks and plain of the Rioseco.
As the days went by, the verbal confrontations between the two sides became particularly harsh. The Count of Benavente even went so far as to mock the intellectuals, the leaders who pretended to give lessons in strategy:
The rest of the nobles were equally disturbed:
Armies Although it is not possible to know the exact number of soldiers for each of the armies —we must not forget that contingents were being added all the time— it is possible to get an idea of the ratio of forces based on the letters dated in the days prior to the battle. LetterDateRoyalist ArmyComunero ArmyFrom the Admiral of Castile to SevilleNovember 287,000 infantry, 300 men-at-arms, 300 light horses, 400 horsemen and 20 pieces of artillery4,000 infantry, 400–500 lances and 6 pieces of artillery.From the Vozmediano brothers to the kingNovember 298,000 infantrymen and 2,000 lances4,000 infantrymen and 400 lances, although they expected important reinforcements.From Lope Hurtado to the kingNovember 295,000 infantrymen and 1,600 lances7,000 infantrymen and 600 lancesFrom Hernando de la Vega to the condestableDecember 1Speaks of 4 thick pieces of artillery, 2 cannons, 2 or more culverins and 6 or 7 pieces of falconets.From Vargas to the kingDecember 46,500 infantrymen and 2,200 lances9,000 infantrymen and 900 lances
Royalist army Commanded by the Count of Haro, the royalist army was made up mainly of infantrymen recruited by the nobles in noble lands, especially from Navarre, Galicia and Asturias, and part of the veterans of the Djerba expedition. Obviously, the troops of Antonio de Fonseca —licensed in August after the fire of Medina del Campo— and the urban militias could not be counted on, either because they were under the control of the rebels or because there was a certain reluctance to make the loyal cities fight with their brethren. At one point, the incorporation of three thousand German mercenary soldiers into the king's ranks was also considered, although this plan did not materialize in the end.
As for the artillery, it was obtained from Navarre and Fuenterrabía, but at the cost of leaving the French border unguarded. At the end of November it was placed under the direction of the mayor of Pamplona, Miguel de Herrera.
Comunero Army The comunero army was made up mainly of urban militias contributed by the cities most committed to the movement: Valladolid (where all the males between eighteen and sixty years of age were mobilized), Toledo, Segovia, etc. Together with these forces (which by November had been organized and paid their salaries), there was also the other part of the Djerba veterans, who had accepted to join Pedro Girón through the emissary Carlos Arellano, as well as the peculiar battalion of Antonio de Acuña, bishop of Zamora, made up of around 300 armed priests.
As for artillery and armament in general, the rebels could easily obtain it from Medina del Campo, Castile and the Basque Country.
Battle
First troop movements
The situation continued until December 2, when the rebel army began to abandon its positions in Villabrágima and moved towards Villalpando, the locality of the Constable, which surrendered the following day without resistance. At first, the lords considered the possibility of liberating the town by moving their troops to Castroverde de Campos, but finally decided to seize Tordesillas, whose route had been liberated thanks to the movement of Girón to the west.
On the 4th the army of lords marched towards the city, occupying the villages abandoned by the comuneros almost without resistance. There were only a few skirmishes in Villagarcía,In the occupation of this town the first contingent that entered -—and thanks to which it could be conquered— was the one led by Captain Valdés. For this service the Castilian Admiral recommended him to the king on December 27, 1520.( Vol. 2.) but Castromonte, Peñaflor and Torrelobatón fell without difficulty.
Fall of Tordesillas On December 5 the first detachments reached Tordesillas at ten o'clock in the morning. Three hours later the Count of Haro appeared with the rest of the men and by means of a king of arms, two trumpets and a secretary of the admiral Vol. 2. addressed to the city an ultimatum, which the comuneros asked for a time limit to answer. Above all, they were trying to make the royalists lose time while they awaited the arrival of reinforcements. The Count insisted with a new request but as this time the answer was negative, at half past three in the afternoon, after an intense artillery fire, he gave the order to begin the assault. The garrison of 80 lances and 400 infantrymen —some of whom were the priests of Zamora— defended themselves fiercely with Luis de Quintanilla from Medina at the head. On several occasions certain lords even suggested the idea of retreating ("alzar el combate", Spanish for "to cease the combat"), but in the end there was no need to reach this point. Vol. 3.
After an hour of uncertain confrontation, an infantryman of Gómez de Santillán, according to some, or the artilleryman Miguel de Herrera, according to others,( Vol. 2.)
( Vol. 3.) managed to open a gate in the wall and the attackers were able to enter the city, although the comuneros then prevented their advance by setting fire to the surrounding houses.Seven infantry flags entered through this gate. According to an anonymous manuscript of the time, an ensign of the Count of Alba climbed the wall and placed a flag on top of it to indicate that this was the entrance.( Vol. 2.) Fire was also sighted on the other side of the Douro:
It was only at dusk when the attackers entered definitively in Tordesillas; first the soldiers of the Count of Benavente, then those of the Count of Alba de Liste and later followed by those of Astorga and Haro. Even so, the resistance did not cease, since the royalists had to fight in the streets hand to hand with the defenders, amid the ringing of bells and the glow of the fires. Captain Suero del Águila, for his part, came quickly from Alaejos with 100 lances, but the enemy's army was too superior to face it effectively without Pedro Girón's forces. He was finally taken prisoner along with Colonel Gonzalo Palomino. At that time a new breach was also made in the wall to allow the entry of artillery and infantry.
Around eight o'clock at night the last pockets of resistance gave way and the soldiers surrendered to pillage, from which only the churches, convents and the residence of Queen Joanna were spared. Even the saddle of the Infanta Catherine of Austria was stolen. Of course, the nobles were disgusted by this behavior, but they claimed that they had not been able to control their men. The Count of Benavente went further and in addition to punishing some of the soldiers, he promised compensation for the residents of Tordesillas, albeit at the expense of the State.
If we base ourselves on the affirmations of the royal secretary Lope Hurtado, the royalist side suffered only fifty casualties, between dead and wounded. This figure could be revised as it is too small for the characteristics of the fight described above, especially considering that witnesses report that the combat lasted approximately six hours. It is also recorded that the Count of Benavente was hit in the arm, his son in the leg and Luis de la Cueva in the face. Vol. 2.