The military tactics of Alexander III of Macedon (356 BC - 323 BC), known as Alexander the Great, have been widely regarded as the core of his continuous success in battle throughout his campaigns. The Macedonian army that Alexander inherited had been created by his father, Philip II of Macedon. Additionally, Alexander employed and further refined the tactics his father had developed.Green pp. 24-25 At the battles of Granicius (334 BC) and Issus (333 BC), Alexander relied on the so-called 'hammer and anvil' tactic. At the Battle of Gaugamela (331 BC), he had to employ an innovative combat formation. Alexander arranged his units in a hollow square or box formation, to prevent the Persians, who were very strong in cavalry, from outflanking him and attacking his flanks and rear. However, the battle was still decided by the frontal attack of the phalanx (anvil) and the decisive charge of the Companion cavalry (hammer). Gaugamela was also an example of the refused flank tactic, regularly employed by the Macedonian heavy infantry when attacking.
Troop composition and weapons
Infantry The origin of Macedonian infantry conforming to the hoplite panoply and tactics of the Greek city states can be traced back to the reign of Archelaus.
Before him, the only heavy infantry available to the Kingdom of Macedonia was supplied by the allied Greek cities.
Foot companions (phalangites) However, the true creator of a distinctively Macedonian infantry was Philip II, considered the inventor of the Macedonian phalanx:Diodoro Sículo, Biblioteca histórica, xvi,3,1-2. a particularly effective heavy infantry formation. The individual phalangite was equipped with slightly lighter defensive equipment than the traditional Greek hoplite. The shield was smaller, less dished and was rimless, Heavy cuirasses were replaced by a lighter armour, called the kotthybos. The doru (δόρυ) spear of the hoplite was replaced by the much longer sarissa, a type of pike (), that required both hands to wield it, hence the larger, rimmed, hoplite shield (Argive shield) could not be employed.Daremberg et Saglio, Phalanx dans le Dictionnaire des Antiquités grecques et romaines, p. 425. Université de Toulouse.Connolly. p. 72
The length of the sarissa allowed an increase the number of files of infantrymen that could be actively engaged in combat, as the spearpoints of a number of ranks (at least five) projected beyond the men of the front rank in the formation. The sarissa consisted of a shaft tapered towards the spearpoint to aid balance and allow it to be held closer to its base. It was heavy () hence being a double-handed weapon. It also had a fluted metal counterweight at the butt end, called the sauroter, which also improved its balance.Daremberg et Saglio, Sarisse dans le Le Dictionnaire des Antiquités Grecques et Romaines, pp. 1076-1077. Université de Toulouse.
The sarissa was particularly effective in breaking cavalry charges or in halting enemy phalanxes. But the Macedonian phalanx was also fearsome in offensive use. The principle was to create a steady momentum, employing a controlled, close-order advance, so that the impact of the massed pikes would be as devastating as possible. To this end, the Macedonian phalangites fought in a deep formation of 16 files, so tightly packed that they maintained maximum cohesion. The relative lightness of their defensive equipment allowed the heavy sarissa to be used without excessive fatigue. The effectiveness of the Macedonian phalanx was reliant on the highest levels of training in weapon use, cohesion, manoeuvring as a body and the smooth transition between the 'open order', used in manoeuvring, and the 'closed order' used in combat.Warry, pp. 68, 72-73
To provide a measure of protection from missiles, the sarissas were raised to the vertical during an advance—they formed a hedge-like barrier — they were lowered by the front ranks to the horizontal fighting position at the last moment.
Outside the tight formation of the phalanx, the sarissa was unwieldy during marches and, therefore, it was divided into two parts that were united by an iron sleeve before combat. It should be stressed that the archaeological discoveries show that the phalangites also used the traditional Greek hoplite spear, which was much shorter than the sarissa. The sources also indicate that the phalangites were on occasion armed with javelins. The sarissa would have been useless in siege warfare and other combat situations requiring a less cumbersome weapon.Ashley, pp. 35–36.Markle, pp. 99, 102
Hypaspists The Hypaspists (hypaspistai) were the elite arm of the Macedonian infantry. The word 'hypaspists' translates into English as 'shield-bearers'. During a pitched battle, such as Gaugamela, they acted as guard for the right flank of the phalanx and as a flexible link between the phalanx and the Companion cavalry. They were used for a variety of irregular missions by Alexander, often in conjunction with the Agrianians (elite skirmishers), the Companions and select units of phalangites. They were prominent in accounts of Alexander's siege assaults in close proximity to Alexander himself. The hypaspists were Macedonians and their senior chiliarchy (χιλιαρχία) formed the agemaEllis, J. R., p. 27. foot bodyguard of Alexander III.Ashley, pp. 39–40.Campbell and Lawrence (ed.s), p. 165.
The organisation of the hypaspist regiment seems to have been into units of 500 (pentakosiarchies) before 331 and later, by 327, it was divided into three battalions (chiliarchies) of 1,000 men, which were then further sub-divided in a manner similar to the Foot Companions. Each battalion would be commanded by a chiliarch, with the regiment as a whole under the command of an archihypaspist.Campbell and Lawrence (ed.s), pp. 164–165.
In terms of weaponry, they were probably equipped in the style of a traditional Greek hoplite with a thrusting spear or doru (shorter and less unwieldy than the sarissa) and the typical large round hoplite (Argive) shield.Heckel, p. 41.
Greek hoplites The army led by Alexander the Great into the Persian Empire included Greek heavy infantry in the form of allied contingents provided by the League of Corinth and hired mercenaries. These infantrymen would have been equipped as hoplites with the traditional hoplite panoply. In appearance, they would have been almost identical to the hypaspists.Conolly, p. 70, p. 313.
Cavalry Macedonian The second main element of the Macedonian army was the heavy cavalry recruited among the Macedonian nobility, called the Companion cavalry or Hetairoi (). It consisted of 3,000 heavy, shock-capable cavalry, at the beginning of Alexander's campaigns, of which 1,800 accompanied him in Asia. It was divided into 12 squadrons, the first being the Royal Squadron (basilikè ilè). This squadron, also known as the άγεμα, agêma, 'that which leads', was 300 strong, while the other squadrons consisted of 250 lancers. "It is known that the Companion cavalry at Gaugamela were formed in eight squadrons or ilai (Arr. iii I 1.8), of which, one was the royal squadron par excellence, the agêma of the Companions."Brunt, P.A. (1963) "Alexander's Macedonian Cavalry", "The Journal of Hellenic Studies", Vol. 83 (1963), pp. 27-46, The Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies p.27 The Companion cavalry were the elite arm of the Macedonian army, and were the offensive force that made the decisive attack in most of the battles of Alexander the Great. They were unmatched in the pre-stirrup Ancient world in their ability to retain their seat and the control of their weapons through the impact of a charge.Ashley, pp. 5, 30
The tactical formation of the Companions was the wedge, adopted by Philip II from the Scythians. The squadron commander was at the point of this triangular formation. The formation was very manoeuvrable, with the squadron following its leader at the apex, "like a flight of cranes".Lendon, p. 98.
The primary weapon of the Macedonian cavalry was the xyston, a double ended cornel-wood lance, with a sword as a secondary weapon. From descriptions of combat, it would appear that once in melee the Companion cavalryman used his lance to thrust at the chests and faces of the enemy. It is possible that the lance was aimed at the upper body of an opposing cavalryman in the expectation that a blow which did not wound or kill might have sufficient leverage to unseat. If the lance broke, the Companion could reverse it and use the other end, or draw his sword. Cleitus, an officer of the Companions, saved Alexander the Great's life at the Granicus by cutting off an enemy horseman's arm with his sword.Gaebel, pp. 162–164. Companion cavalrymen would normally have worn armour and a helmet in battle.Sidnell, p. 84
Thessalian Alexander was Archon of the Thessalian League; the Thessalians provided a large force of heavy cavalry for the invasion of Persia, whose numbers, prowess and equipment were essentially identical to those of the Macedonian Companion cavalry. The Thessalians were considered the finest cavalry of Greece.Ashley, p. 31.
Light troops Light troops, both infantry and cavalry, had important roles in Macedonian tactics. Light cavalry were often armed with javelins, though after Gaugamela many Asiatic horse-archers were added to Alexander's army. Light infantry were split between javelineers, called peltasts, and archers, slingers are also recorded. Light troops performed scouting and screening duties when the army was on the march. Their mobility meant that they often formed part of any force detached from the main army and were prominent in any force that needed to move swiftly. In battle their primary duty was to secure the flanks of the Macedonian army and to counter similar enemy troops. However, Macedonian light troops were sometimes pitted against enemy heavy infantry, heavy cavalry and even elephants, and acquitted themselves remarkably well.Warry, pp. 72-74Connolly, pp. 73-74Ashley, pp. 24-25, 32-35, 45-48
Numbers Alexander's army, when embarking on his conquest of Persia, consisted of 12,000 Macedonian infantrymen, divided into phalangites and hypaspists. The hypaspists operated to the left of the Companion cavalry and acted as a flexible connection with the phalanx. Greek allies provided 7,000 troops (mostly hoplites), 7,000 Odrysian, Triballian and other Balkan tribal levies, 1,000 light infantry (Agrianian peltasts, and archers) and 5,000 mercenaries (mostly Greek hoplites). There were 1,800 Macedonian cavalry, 1,800 Thessalian heavy cavalry and 1,500 other cavalry. Additionally, an advanced guard, of around 12,000 troops, was already in Anatolia; making totals of 43,000 infantry and 6,100 cavalry.Green, p. 158
Grand strategy
In his book Strategy, Soviet military officer and theorist Alexander Svechin states that any offensive operation, by its very nature leads the attackers away from their base, stretches their communication, and places them under threat of attack in their turn. On the other hand, the enemy being attacked and retreating deep into his own country's territory finds his troops in a very favourable communication situation, as far as safety, convenience, and supply logistics are concerned. Svechin underlines the "basic precondition" for any operation but particularly offensive operations is to place one's troops in the most favourable "communication situation." He offers the precedent of Alexander the Great's invasion of Asia as resolving the problem of operations deep into enemy territory in an "exemplary manner."