The Iraq War began with the US-led 2003 invasion of Iraq. The Government of Canada did not at any time formally declare war against Iraq, and the level and nature of this participation, which changed over time, was controversial. Canada's intelligence services repeatedly assessed that Iraq did not have an active weapon of mass destruction program.
While Canada had previously participated in military action against Iraq in the Gulf War of 1991, it refused to declare war against Iraq without United Nations Security Council (UNSC) approval. Even so, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien said on 10 October 2002 that Canada would be part of a military coalition to invade Iraq if it were sanctioned by the United Nations. However, when the United States and the United Kingdom subsequently withdrew their diplomatic efforts to gain that UN sanction, Chrétien announced in Parliament on 17 March 2003 that Canada would not participate in the pending invasion. Nevertheless, he offered the US and its soldiers his moral support. Two days earlier, a quarter million people in Montreal had marched against the pending war. Major anti-war demonstrations had taken place in several other Canadian cities.
Canada's relation to the Iraq War that began in 2003 was unlike Canada's role in the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan because it was far less direct. About a hundred Canadian exchange officers, on exchange to American units, participated in the invasion of Iraq. It has been reported that Canadian troops in the region numbered fewer than only three other participating countries. The War also affected Canada in the form of protests and counter-protests related to the conflict, and United States military members who sought refuge in the country after deserting their posts to avoid deployment to Iraq—but who, unlike as with the Vietnam War, were mostly returned by Canada forthwith to the United States.
Decision not to participate
In September 2002, Chrétien informed both British Prime Minister Tony Blair and U.S. President George W. Bush that Canada's participation in any coalition against Iraq would be contingent on having the support of the United Nations (UN), or the majority of the international community. The official policy of the Canadian government was carefully worded so that the Canadian diplomats could still play an important factor in pre-war diplomacy with Iraq. Additionally, while it was their preference to have the approval of the United Nations Security Council, the policy still permitted the Canadian government to participate in the invasion if China or Russia vetoed a resolution that was supported by the rest of the UNSC. The Canadian government maintained this position in the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq.
During the lead-up to the conflict, Chrétien maintained contact with Ricardo Lagos, the President of Chile, and Vicente Fox, the President of Mexico. Lagos and Fox had noted they were under pressure from the United States to join the coalition, although both told Chrétien that they would refuse to participate if Canada does so as well.
The UN decision on whether or not to sanction the invasion rested on two elements: a discussion of international law, including the Nuremberg Principles on preemptive war; and the UN inspections for Iraq's alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). However, because the coalition failed to have the UN sanction their intervention, Chrétien advised Governor General Adrienne Clarkson not to have Canada join the "coalition of the willing" that was planning to invade Iraq. On 17 March 2003, two days before the invasion began, Chrétien publicly announced his decision to not join the coalition on the floor of the Canadian House of Commons. He did not privately inform the US government of his decision before publicly announcing it in the House of Commons, which contributed to a breakdown in Chrétien's relationship with U.S. President Bush in mid-2003.
Domestic opinion
By August 2002, Canadian officials held no doubts that the United States was planning on targeting Iraq. On 14 August 2002, Chrétien received a memorandum from Alex Himelfarb, the Clerk of the Canadian Privy Council, in which Himelfarb bluntly stated that US actions against Iraq were an attempt to implement regime change. The majority of the members of the Cabinet of Canada had little general knowledge of Iraq, although most were sceptical of the American cause. However, some cabinet members held concerns that not joining the coalition would damage Canada-US relations because American rhetoric had linked Iraq to the vital interests of the United States.
However, during the lead-up to the war, Chrétien did not take account of the opinions of all Cabinet ministers in deciding whether to join the coalition, instead only consulting with key Cabinet members, including Minister of National Defence John McCallum and Minister of Foreign Affairs Bill Graham. During this period, he also consulted key diplomats, including Canadian Ambassador to the United States Michael Kergin and Canadian Ambassador to the UN Paul Heinbecker. In particular, in the months leading up to the war, Heinbecker and Chrétien maintained contact in an attempt to find a resolution that satisfied the American positions and the anti-war position held by France, although Heinbecker had little belief that his efforts would succeed.
Chrétien also regularly updated himself with his parliamentary caucus, whose near-unanimous opposition to the war without UN support helped Chrétien make his final decision. Opposition within the parliamentary caucus largely stemmed from members having to respond to constituents who collected petitions critical of going to war. This may have reflected the view of the general Canadian public, as reflected through a poll conducted in March 2003 by EKOS Research Associates for the Toronto Star; and by the Montreal newspaper La Presse, whose results found 71 per cent of those questioned did not support the United States-led invasion, with 27 per cent expressing disapproval. However, the Leader of the Official Opposition, Stephen Harper, objected to the Prime Minister's position on Iraq, stating that Canada should be fighting alongside the US. However, the prime minister's decision-making was largely uninfluenced by public opinion, with anti-war demonstrations in 2003 only confirming the position he held with the Americans in 2002.
Protests
Protests against the Iraq War and counter-protests supporting the conflict took place in Canada both before and after the invasion of Iraq. One of the first large-scale demonstrations in opposition to the war took place at Queen's Park, Toronto, where approximately 2,000 people gathered on 16 November 2002. The following day, as part of a cross-country day of action, a 3,000-strong anti-war coalition held a peace march from Peace Flame Park in Vancouver, approximately 1,000 people marched in Montreal, and about 500 individuals gathered in a snowstorm on Parliament Hill in Ottawa, while other rallies took place in Edmonton, Winnipeg, and Halifax.
Canadians also took part in a set of protests that took place in towns and cities around the world in February 2003, the biggest in Canada being the gathering of 100,000 to 250,000 people in Montreal despite a wind chill of −30 °C (−22 °F). A further 10,000 to 100,000 people (sources varied widely) joined the demonstration in Toronto, 20,000 in Vancouver, 18,000 in Edmonton, 8,000 in Victoria, 4,000 in Halifax, and 2,000 in Ottawa; altogether, protests were held in close to 60 communities across the country.
Assessments from Canadian diplomats and intelligence Assessments from Canadian diplomats, as well as the Canadian intelligence community, played a constructive role in shaping Chrétien's view on US policy towards Iraq, as well as claims that Iraq possessed WMDs. During the lead-up to the conflict, Canadian intelligence reports were primarily relayed to Chrétien through verbal briefings from Claude Laverdure, the prime minister's foreign and defence policy advisor. In addition to the prime minister, reports from the Canadian intelligence community were also distributed to cabinet members, senior Canadian officials, and officers within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. However, intelligence reports had varying degrees of effectiveness for those who received them; with Eddie Goldenberg, the prime minister's chief of staff later remarking that none of the intelligence assessments played a factor in the advice he gave to the prime minister.
In the autumn of 2002, Bush had offered to send intelligence experts to brief the prime minister, and later offered to come personally to brief him; although Chrétien instead choose to have said information pass through regular intelligence-sharing channels where Canadian analysts analyzed the information and passed it on to him. Reliance on Canadian analysis may have helped Chrétien reach a different conclusion from his American and British counterparts; with Blair at one point expressing frustration on how the Canadian prime minister failed to "see the evidence," despite the fact they largely shared the same intelligence sources. The Canadian intelligence assessment of Iraq in 2002 and 2003 was notable in that it deviated from the assessments provided by its Five Eyes partners, even though they all had access to the same information. This has largely been attributed to the fact that the Canadian intelligence community saw no external political pressures placed on it. Subsequent inquiries after the 2003 invasion into American intelligence on Iraq also found that American analysts had assumed Iraq was determined to restart its WMD program as soon as possible. This contrasted the assumptions held by Canadian analysts, who believed Iraq would temporarily suspend its WMD program for immediate economic relief; providing Canadian analysts the possibility to entertain the idea that Iraq may not have WMDs to begin with.
On Iraq In the decade following the Gulf War, Iraq had been a high priority within the Canadian intelligence community. During the mid-1990s, Canadian intelligence analysts compiled several reports on UN inspections in Iraq, Iraqi internal developments, as well as deception efforts by the Iraqi government. However, the frequency of intelligence reports on Iraq dropped after the 1998 bombing of Iraq.
In early 2002, the International Assessments Staff (IAS), the intelligence assessment branch for the Canadian Privy Council Office and the foreign affairs department, held oral briefings with Canadian officials where they stressed that there was no credible evidence linking Iraq to the September 11th attacks; in response to claims made by the Bush administration. IAS analysts worked closely with members of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) who also shared the same view. In June 2002, the Intelligence Assessment Committee (IAC), a committee that coordinated the analytical units of CSIS, IAS, and the Department of National Defence's (DND) Director General Intelligence, had also concluded that there was little evidence that regimes like Iraq were providing chemical weapons to terrorist organizations.