Spanish coup of March 1939, in historiography often referred to as Casado's coup (), was a coup d'état organized in the Republican zone against the government of Juan Negrín. It was carried out by the military with support of the Anarchists and a major faction of the Socialists; its leader was commander of the Army of the centre, Segismundo Casado. The conspirators viewed the Negrín government as a hardly veiled Communist dictatorship. Most concluded that the government-endorsed strategy of unyielding resistance against the Nationalists would produce nothing but further deaths and sufferings while the war had already been lost. The military and some politicians intended the coup as a first step towards opening peace negotiations with the Nationalists; for the Anarchists and Socialists the priority was to remove the Communists from power.
The coup began on March 5, when rebels declared the setup of their own quasi-government, Consejo Nacional de Defensa (CND), based in Madrid. Following few hours of discussions the Negrín government, at the time based near the town of Elda at the Levantine coast, decided that any resistance was pointless; the following day they left Spain. The rebels easily took control of all provincial capitals with very little or no fighting recorded. The exception was Madrid, where the local Communist executive, unaware of the PCE Political Bureau decision to avoid bloodshed, mounted resistance. Communist-controlled units recalled from the frontline took control of most of Madrid and on March 9 they were closing in on CND headquarters. However, Anarchist-controlled units also recalled from the frontline entered the city on March 10 and in 3 days they ensured the triumph of the rebels. During the next 3 weeks the Republican zone was ruled by the CND.
Background
Throughout 1938, many key Republicans developed doubts about Prime Minister Juan Negrín's strategy to keep on fighting; the Communist Party, acting in the interest of the Soviet Union, was identified as its chief proponent. They were increasingly convinced that the war was already lost, and that further resistance would only produce unnecessary deaths, sufferings and destruction. Until 1939, however, the theory that the Republic should commence negotiations with the Nationalists to end the conflict was advanced using regular internal political mechanisms. President Manuel Azaña talked to this end with the prime minister; Socialist leader Julián Besteiro lobbied for his cabinet which would then engage in peace talks.Paul Preston, The Last Days of the Spanish Republic, London 2016, ISBN 9780008163419, p. 30
In early February, top military commanders tentatively agreed that in case Negrín – at the time trapped in isolated Catalonia – returns to the central zone, he should be removed from power. The conspiracy involved commander of all armed forces in the central-southern zone army General José Miaja, his chief of staff General Manuel Matallana, commander of the Army of Levante General Leopoldo Menéndez and commander of the Army of the Centre Colonel Segismundo Casado.Preston 2016, pp. 47-48 Around the same time 3 major Anarchist organisations, CNT, FAI and FJL, tried to sound Miaja on creating a “united anti-fascist organization” which would assume power in the central zone; its purpose was not that much commencing peace talks, but rather sidetracking the Communists.Preston 2016, p. 69 The proposal was followed up by talks between Casado and the Anarchist military commander of the IV. Army Corps, Cipriano Mera.
Since January, Casado maintained contacts with Nationalist agents active in Madrid; on February 15 he received confirmation that Francisco Franco was ready to enter talks on Republican surrender.Preston 2016, p. 101 From then onwards during the following 3 weeks there was continuous communication between Casado and the Nationalists; the former was already determined to organize a coup against Negrín – who returned to the central zone – and commence peace talks. Franco headquarters pledged that there would be no repression against Republicans who were not guilty of crimes;Preston 2016, p. 125 the Nationalists demanded also that an anti-Negrín coup be mounted as soon as possible, possibly already in February 1939.
Conspiracy buildup
In early 1939, the Anarchists were firmly opposed to what they saw as an almost unveiled Communist dictatorship in the Republican zone. The party leader Juan García Oliver, since early February on exile in Paris, declared that it was necessary to remove Negrín.Preston 2016, p. 70 Similar position was adopted by the Madrid Comité Regional de Defensa (CRD); though technically a sub-unit within larger Anarchist structure, in practice it emerged as the key Anarchist decision-making body. Its leaders were José García Pradas, Manuel Salgado Moreira and Eduardo Val Bescós, who acted as the party executive troika.Preston 2016, pp, 128-129 They had overwhelming support of the wide array of Anarchist organisations; a stormy plenary meeting of February 24 confirmed vehement hostility to the Communists and endorsed labors against “any sort of dictatorship”, though it remained inconclusive as to seeking peace with the Nationalists.Preston 2016, pp. 135-138
The Socialists leaders Indalecio Prieto and Francisco Largo Caballero crossed to France in January 1939 and decided not to return to Spain; they were also bitterly critical of Negrín and PCE. The PSOE politician of most prestigious standing who resided in the Republican zone was Juan Besteiro, since January 1939 engaged in cautious talks with military commanders on forming a local peace-seeking power structure. The key Socialist decision-making body was Agrupación Socialista Madrileña, with personalities of Besteiro, Wenceslao Carrillo, and Carlos Rubiera. Since February 27 they entered into direct talks with Casado on setting up an anti-Negrín government. Like the Anarchists, also the Socialists were firmly pitted against the Communists and somewhat divided as to peace talks with Franco.Preston 2016, pp. 141-142
The third component of the conspiracy were the military. The highest-ranking officer aware of though not particularly active in the plot was Miaja, freshly promoted to a somewhat titular position of overall commander of the Republican army, navy and air force. More real power rested with an active conspirator general Manuel Matallana, recently nominated to commander of the Republican army. Key local commanders were Real Admiral Miguel Buiza Fernández-Palacios (navy), Menéndez (Army of Levante), and Casado; Casado was clearly the leader and the moving spirit behind the plot. There were also key commanders unaware of the plot: Colonel Domingo Moriones (Army of Andalusia), Colonel Antonio Escobar (Army of Extremadura), and General Ignacio Hidalgo de Cisneros (air force commander).
Governmental reaction
Since returning to Madrid on February 11, Negrín and his closest collaborators were perfectly aware of defeatist spirit, prevailing among the top military and administration officials. As a few were considered ready to capitulate, some Communist leaders suggested either appointing political commissars to top army structures, which would require their co-signature under any order, or deposing them; the list of those suspected included Miaja and Casado.Preston 2016, pp. 89-93 For reasons which are not clear Negrín did not implement these plans; instead, for some 2 weeks he kept meeting top commanders every few days, either in Madrid or in Levantine locations, as he was touring the Mediterranean coast.
Since mid-February, Negrín was being informed by the army intelligence SIM about highly suspicious meetings taking place in Madrid between some key military on the one hand, and shady figures possibly related to Nationalist espionage network, politicians and foreign diplomats on the other.Preston 2016, p. 126 However, no measures have been taken; the intended one, like deposition of the Madrid SIM commander Pedrero, were blocked by the Army of the centre. On February 25 or shortly afterwards Negrín settled in what became known as Posición Yuste, provisional headquarters near Elda in the province of Alicante, some 30 km from the harbor and over 300 km from Madrid. It might have been a preventive measure aimed against an attempt to arrest Negrín; however, it left the Madrid conspirators free to act.Preston 2016, p. 143 He was last in Madrid on February 27.
On March 2 at Posición Yuste Negrín held the meeting with top military, including Miaja, Matallana, Casado and Buiza.Preston 2016, p. 156 He pondered upon replacing Casado either with Enrique Líster or with commander of the III Corps Bueno, but eventually he did nothing.Preston 2016, p. 170 On March 3 the government made public a number of military nominations; trusted high Communist officers were posted to key positions at the Levantine coast, especially in the provinces of Murcia and Alicante.Preston 2016, pp. 175-177 The same day Negrín called key military, including Miaja, Casado and Matallana, to a meeting to be held again at Posición Yuste on March 5. All of them played for time; in fact, final touches were being added to the plan of the coup.
Cartagena
The main Republican naval base was Cartagena, home to almost the entire Republican navy; unlike the army, in early March it was a force fully comparable to the Nationalist navy with 3 light cruisers, 10 destroyers and a number of other vessels, including submarines and torpedo boats. Since late February Negrín developed doubts about the navy commander, rear admiral Buiza, and commissar of the Cartagena base, Socialist . As the navy was probably assigned vital role in any Negrín plans for massive evacuation from Levantine ports, he decided to ensure there would be no surprises. On March 3 he replaced Alonso with the Communist colonel Francisco Galán, who arrived in Cartagena to assume command on March 4.
Some historians claim that Casado and Buiza planned to take the fleet out to sea as part of the coup. Arrival of Galán might have thwarted these plans, and in the afternoon of March 4 he was detained by local conspirators, though not clear whether on Buiza's orders. Shortly afterwards and aware of apparent breach among the Republicans, the Nationalist conspirators commenced action in the city. Sporadic three-way combat broke out. Buiza decided to prioritize fighting the Nationalists over fighting the Negrín loyalists and got Galán released. However, early on March 5, he ordered the fleet to make preparations to sail.Preston 2016, p. 193
During the day situation in Cartagena became shambolic. Nationalist rebels controlled the coastal battery and radio; they demanded the fleet to sail out, though some preferred to open fire at the vessels. Buiza controlled the fleet and partially the harbor, but was pressed hard by the anti-Negrinistas. Loyalist governmental units assembled at the outskirts of the city entered Cartagena and amidst fighting with Nationalist rebels advanced towards the harbor. Nationalist air force bombed the port, mistakenly fired at by own rebel Nationalist coastal battery. Franco ordered his troopships from Castellón and Málaga to sail to Cartagena. Amidst total chaos, around mid-day of March 5 the Republican navy sailed out to open seas. During the afternoon troops loyal to the government took control of the city and the port.
Consejo Nacional de Defensa