Turkish–Islamic synthesis () is a type of Turkish nationalism which has a conservative religious leaning instead of secular.
History While the Turkish–Islamic synthesis was officially formed during the Cold War as part of Operation Gladio, its roots, in reality predated the foundation of Turkey in 1923. While the Young Turks were forming their ideology, a group of Balkan Turks in 1898 declared that nationalism and Islam needed to be merged, and within 10 years, the Young Turks had begun to promote the ideology. The ideology thrived among Balkan Turks as they were inspired by how the nationalist movements in the Balkans (Bulgarian, Greek, Serbian) were connected to their national churches.Balci, T. (2009). From Nationalization of Islam to Privatization of Nationalism: Islam and Turkish National Identity. History Studies, 1(1), pp. 84 Ziya Gökalp had proposed that Islam be nationalized, with the prayers and sermons being in Turkish. Much of Atatürk's reforms regarding Islam were inspired by Gökalp.Balci, T. (2009). From Nationalization of Islam to Privatization of Nationalism: Islam and Turkish National Identity. History Studies, 1(1), pp. 86-87 Furthermore, the Turkish constitution banned the expression of Islam unless it benefitted the state.Balci, T. (2009). From Nationalization of Islam to Privatization of Nationalism: Islam and Turkish National Identity. History Studies, 1(1), pp. 93 Hamit Bozarslan claimed that while the Republic of Turkey was officially secular, its policies mirrored the Turkish–Islamic synthesis in practice.Political Function of Religion in Nationalistic Confrontations in Greater Kurdistan, Sabah Mofidi, 2022, pp. 35
The Turkish–Islamic synthesis was formed as part of Operation Gladio during the Cold War by American-backed right-wing intellectuals such as Alparslan Türkeş who were concerned about the increasing Soviet-backed leftist influence in the country. They wanted to make a religion-inspired nationalism. Türkeş did not support Pan-Islamism. Ahmet Ocak used the term "Turkish Islam" and insisted that the Turkish understanding of Islam was different from the others, rejecting the universality of Islam.Is There a Turkish Islam? The Emergence of Convergence and Consensus, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 2, October 2004, pp. 218, DOI: 10.1080/1360200042000296627 The Turkish government and military tolerated and even promoted the ideology during the 1976-1980 political violence.The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey, Angel Rabasa, F. Stephen Larrabee, 2008, pp. 37-38 When the Turkish–Islamic synthesis was presented in the 1970s, it was seen as the fulfillment of Atatürk's desire to nationalize Islam in line with the Kemalist state. In the 1980s, the Turkish–Islamic synthesis was officially promoted in school textbooks.Balci, T. (2009). From Nationalization of Islam to Privatization of Nationalism: Islam and Turkish National Identity. History Studies, 1(1), pp. 101 The ideology was also developed by the Intellectuals' Hearth.Translation and Westernisation in Turkey from the 1840s to the 1980s, Özlem Berk, 2004, pp. 222, ISBN 9789758070954.
While nationalists and Islamists were natural rivals in other Muslim nations, in Turkey, most Turkish Islamists professed a degree of ethnonationalism.Kuru, A. T. (2009). Secularism and State Policies Toward Religion: The United States, France, and Turkey. Cambridge University Press, p. 192Yavuz, M. H. (2003). Islamic Political Identity in Turkey. Oxford University Press, p. 166 The synthesis was based on the Hanafi school, and claimed that it was essential to Turkishness.Turkey's Alevi Enigma: A Comprehensive Overview, 2021, pp. 79 The synthesis also claimed that in the ummah, the Turks were spiritually, morally, and culturally superior.Yavuz, M. Hakan. Islamic Political Identity in Turkey. pp. 64. Oxford University Press, 2003. According to the synthesis, Turkish identity and Islam are both essential to each other. Followers of the ideology claimed that even before adopting Islam, Turks were receptive to Islam. The synthesis emphasised on Islam domestically among Turks, and not on Islam among Muslims worldwide.Lived Islam: Colloquial Religion in a Cosmopolitan Tradition, A. Kevin Reinhart, 2020, pp. 148 The synthesis also advocated for Islam in society which would culturally be more Turkish and less Arabic.Turkey's Alevi Enigma: A Comprehensive Overview, 2021, pp. 79-80 Ziya Gökalp claimed that one had to be Muslim to be a Turk. He also claimed that any Muslim who speaks Turkish is a Turk, regardless of ethnic origin. He claimed that all Turks were equally Turks, whether or not they were ethnically Turkic.Nationalism and Non-Muslim Minorities in Turkey, 1915 - 1950, Ayhan Aktar, 2021, pp. 113-114, , 1801350434
In the late 1970s, the Turkish political scene was full of ideological conflicts between far-right ultranationalists (Idealists) and far-left groups, along with little-to-no governmental effort to stop it. Under the Motherland Party rule, Turkish Islamonationalism became the de facto official ideology of Turkey (and until today it is accused of being so under AKP rule, although the AKP strongly denies it). In 1982, religion was strengthened in schools and education as a way to strengthen Turkish Islamonationalism, which intended to weaken mainstream Islamism and secular nationalism. According to Adnan Türegün, Erdoğan promoted "Turco-Islamism" which differed from the Turkish-Islamic synthesis in that it was a state policy.Islamist Political Thought in Turkey, Michelangelo Guida, 2026, pp. 151, ISBN 9780755656509.
Historically, Islamist movements in Turkey had an ethnic divide. Most Islamist or conservative groups solely recruited from either Kurds or Turks, with very few groups recruiting from both. The primary cause for the divide was that most Turkish Islamists held strong nationalist views, refused to fight against their own government, and often held Anti-Kurdish views as well. In turn, the Kurdish Islamists also held nationalist, separatist, and Anti-Turkish views, and often cooperated with secular Kurdish nationalists. Islamist militancy in Turkey was dominated by Kurds. Most Turkish Islamists preferred to travel for Jihad abroad. In the Bosnian War, Syrian civil war, as well as the First and Second Chechen War, they mostly professed Turkish nationalist, Neo-Ottomanist, and Pan-Turkist motives in addition to Islamism.German Jihad: On the Internationalization of Islamist Terrorism, Guido Steinberg, 2013, pp. 114-116, The Turkish AK Party and Its Leader: Criticism, Opposition and Dissent, 2016, pp. 209-210Primitive Rebels Or Revolutionary Modernizers: The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in Turkey, Paul J White, 2000, pp. 38-39
Views on non-Turks
Arabs İbrahim Kafesoğlu claimed that Pre-Islamic Turks had innately been better Muslims than Arabs.Lived Islam: Colloquial Religion in a Cosmopolitan Tradition, A. Kevin Reinhart, 2020, pp. 148 Alparslan Türkeş, founder of the MHP and Grey Wolves and one of the top ideologues of the Turkish–Islamic synthesis, was an advocate of the Turkish adhan and advocated for the Quran, Adhan, and even Salahs to be solely in the Turkish language in Turkey. He co-led the 1960 Turkish coup d'état and in an interview after the coup, Türkeş described the usage of Arabic for religion as a "betrayal", and said "In a Turkish mosque, the Quran should be read in Turkish, not Arabic." Turkish-Islamic nationalists portrayed Turks as the leaders of Islam, in contrast to Arabs, who were seen as either having distorted the faith or failed to modernize. Many Turkish-Islamic nationalists had long viewed Arab customs and the Arabic language as "unrefined" or "foreign", even as they upheld Islamic values.Akyol, Islam Without Extremes: A Muslim Case for Liberty, p. 203 Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, a major intellectual inspiration for Turkish political Islam, viewed Arabs as politically inept and culturally alien. His works often romanticized Turkish rule over Arabs and lamented the loss of Ottoman-era hierarchy.Yavuz, Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey, p. 112 Many Turkish-Islamic nationalists also cited the Arab Revolt to justify their claims that Arabs abandoned Islam whereas Turks remained loyal to it.Landau, Pan-Turkism in Turkey: A Study of Irredentism, p. 173 After the refugee crisis, anti-Arabism increased, mostly among Grey Wolves. In Gaziantep, approximately 2 dozen Syrian Arabs had to leave the city after angry Turkish crowds belonging to the Grey Wolves ransacked their homes. Another time a group of about 1,000 Grey Wolves, which organized on social media, blocked various roads in Kahramanmaraş and refused to leave even after police warnings. The protestors also removed Arabic signs from many Syrian-owned stores, and many store owners closed their shops in fear. They also attacked a Syrian in a car and broke his windows, however they ran away after the Turkish police fired a warning gunshot into the air. Many Turkish Islamonationalist organizations volunteer to fight in Syria in favor of Syrian Turkmen to strengthen Turkmen interests and weaken Arab rule. The Alperen Hearths sent 250 fighters in 2015 to "fight against Russia, Iran, and Assad. And to help Turkmen", although they were later accused of having just came into Syria to take photos with fighters, as many of the Alperen Hearths were seen in Istanbul just days after they went to supposedly fight.
Kurds
İbrahim Kafesoğlu claimed that Kurds were not a nation, but a tribe of Turkic-Turanid origin which migrated to the Middle East earlier than other Turks, and was assimilated by the neighboring populations, especially Iranian.Türkiye'nin Batılılaşması ve Millı̂ Meseleler, Ercüment Kuran, Mümtaz'er Türköne, 1994, pp. 271Millet ve Millî Birlik Bilinci, Şükrü Kaya Seferoğlu, Hayri Başbuğ, 1985, pp. 37 In a 2013 interview, Altan Tan claimed that the Islamist movement in Turkey was "full of nationalists" who despised Kurds, therefore prompting Kurds to vote secular. Turkish–Islamic nationalists often attempted to hide the Kurdishness of various Islamic figures.