Russian opposition to NATO enlargement relates to the aftermath of the Revolutions of 1989, when the fall of Soviet-allied communist states to opposition parties brought the Soviet spheres of influence into end. Russian authorities claim that agreement on non-enlargement of NATO to Eastern Europe took place orally and the alliance violated it with its enlargement, while the leaders of the alliance claim that no such promise was made and that such a decision could only be made in writing. Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev, who participated in the 1990 negotiations, spoke out in a 2008 interview about a verbal commitment by then U.S. Secretary of State James Baker to not move NATO "one inch eastward" , but later made clear there was "no promise regarding broader enlargement." Among academic researchers, opinions on the existence or absence of a non-enlargement agreement also differ, although the consensus remains Russian claims of such a guarantee are loosely interpreted and historical revisionism.
An active discussion related to this issue unfolded in Russia and in the world against the background of the Russian proposals on international security at the end of 2021 and the aggravation of the situation around the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. The position of Russia in such circumstances is that the question of the existence of an agreement on the non-enlargement of NATO in the eastern direction should be considered in the context of relations between Russia and NATO and Russia and the United States, since it determines the likelihood of a potentially possible entry of Ukraine into NATO, which Russia's leadership considers a threat. The NATO leadership points out that the decision to limit the enlargement of NATO has never been taken, and its adoption would entail a change in the fundamental documents of the alliance, and the support of Ukraine by NATO cannot pose a threat to Russia.
The last countries bordering Russia to join NATO before the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian War in February 2014 were the three former Soviet Baltic States, which joined on 29 March 2004. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which began in February 2022, Finland joined NATO in April 2023 and Sweden in March 2024.
Historical context
The proposal not to expand NATO eastward, which was one of the ways Western countries took the initiative on the issue of German reunification and reducing the possibility of the Soviet Union's influence on this process, started with a speech by German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher in Tutzing, on January 31, 1990, in which he included a call for NATO to clearly state: "whatever happens in the Warsaw Pact, there will be no expansion of NATO territory to the east, that is, closer to the borders of the Soviet Union." Genscher prepared his speech independently of German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, to whom he was a political competitor and a rival to the status of "father of unity", but his proposal matched interest among the leadership of other Western countries in the possibility of obtaining the consent of the USSR to the unification of Germany in exchange for limiting the expansion of NATO. Genscher outlined his plan to US secretary of state James Baker in Washington, D.C. on February 2 and said at a press conference with Baker: "What I said is there is no intention [by NATO] to extend to the East." He also outlined his plan to British foreign minister Douglas Hurd on February 6. Genscher explained that the proposed restriction would be applicable to both the German Democratic Republic (GDR or East Germany) and Eastern European countries. Ten days after his speech in Tutzing, Genscher repeated his words in an interview with Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze: "[...] NATO membership for a unified Germany raises complicated questions. For us, however, one thing is certain: NATO will not expand to the east."
The US–West German position became the basis for negotiations with the USSR in Moscow on February 7–10, 1990, which became key in the dispute years later over the existence of an agreement. During these negotiations, representatives of the US and West Germany repeatedly linked the unification of Germany with the limitation of NATO expansion. On February 9, 1990, at a meeting with Shevardnadze, Baker said that the US favoured a united Germany remaining "firmly anchored" in NATO, with which there would have to be "iron-clad guarantees that NATO's jurisdiction or forces would not move eastward." Later that day, at a meeting with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, he acknowledged that "not only for the Soviet Union but for other European countries as well it is important to have guarantees that if the United States keeps its presence in Germany within the framework of NATO, not an inch of NATO’s present military jurisdiction will spread in an eastern direction", and he asked Gorbachev whether he would prefer a united Germany "outside of NATO that is independent and has no US forces or [...] a united Germany with ties to NATO and assurances that there would be no extension of NATO's current jurisdiction eastward." When Gorbachev replied that "a broadening of the NATO zone is not acceptable," Baker agreed. Gorbachev said that Baker's approach was "very realistic[,] so let's think about" it. Baker made the suggested trade-off public at a press conference that day, saying that the US proposed, in order to mitigate the concerns of "those of the East of Germany", that there should be no expansion of NATO forces eastward, and that the unification of Germany is unlikely without "some sort of security guarantees" with regard to the advance of NATO forces or its operation to the east. In its February 13 press release sent to embassies, the US State Department said that "the Secretary [of State] made clear that the U.S. [...] supported a unified Germany within NATO, but that we were prepared to ensure that NATO's military presence would not extend further eastward." On February 9, 1990, Robert Gates, Deputy National Security Advisor to the US President, suggested "the Kohl/Genscher idea" (a united Germany "belonging to NATO" but provided that "NATO troops would move no further east than they now were") to the head of the Soviet KGB, Vladimir Kryuchkov, saying the US thought it "a sound proposal".
Meanwhile, while Baker and Gates were discussing non-expansion with the Soviet leadership, the idea was being questioned by the American leadership, as it appeared to leave east Germany outside NATO's security guarantees. On February 9, US president George H. W. Bush sent a letter to Kohl saying that he wanted east Germany to have a "special military status" within a united Germany that was member of NATO. However, in negotiations between the Soviet and West German leaderships on February 10, 1990, Kohl followed the softer statement from Baker's conversation with Gorbachev and the non-expansion of the NATO zone over Bush's idea, in an effort to get the USSR's consent to the unification of Germany, and assured Gorbachev about the non-expansion of NATO. Kohl told Gorbachev that NATO should not expand its sphere of activity, and Genscher assured Shevardnadze that "NATO membership for a unified Germany raises complicated questions. For us, however, one thing is certain: NATO will not expand to the east. [...] As far as the non-expansion of NATO is concerned, this also applies in general." After these assurances, Gorbachev gave the go-ahead for the creation of a monetary union of the GDR and the FRG, the first step towards the unification of Germany. And on February 12, 1990, at a conference in Ottawa, Baker assured Shevardnadze that "if U[nited] G[ermany] stays in NATO, we should take care about nonexpansion of its jurisdiction to the East", according to the diary of Shevardnadze's assistant, journalist Teymuraz Mamaladze, and the next day the Soviet leadership agreed to proposals for "2+4" (the two German republics and the Four Powers) negotiations on resolving security issues in connection with unification.
At Camp David on February 24–25, the leaders of the US and Germany agreed on a position to propose to the Soviets: east Germany would be granted "special military status", the whole of Germany would be a member of NATO and fall under the collective security guarantees of the bloc, and the alliance would have "jurisdiction" over east Germany even if NATO military structures did not extend there.
In this regard, some scholars consider that during February 1990 there was a significant change of position, which nullified the offer of NATO non-expansion, removing the opportunity for the Soviets to accept it. On the other hand, it is argued that the Soviet leadership had cause to consider the early assurances to still stand.
During a meeting on May 31, 1990, Gorbachev directly supported the wording of the joint public statement proposed by Bush: "The United States is unequivocally in favor of united Germany's membership in NATO, however, if it makes a different choice, we would not contest it, we will respect it."
Between the nomination of the "special status" in spring 1990 and the signing of the settlement agreement in autumn, Western leaders sought to reassure the USSR: the calculation was that they would approve Germany's unification and NATO membership if there were "sufficient sweeteners" about collective security and "appropriate assurances" regarding Soviet security needs. The Americans told them that the unification of Germany, "transformation" of NATO (shifting its emphasis from a military role to a political one) and strengthening of the role of the CSCE "would not yield winners and losers", but "would produce a new legitimate European structure [...] that would be inclusive", that US policy was not aimed at obtaining a "unilateral advantage", nor the separation of Eastern Europe from the Soviet Union, and that the US wanted the USSR to be "integrated [...] into the new Europe". Similar themes were part of the "London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance" adopted in July 1990. These assurances from the US and NATO found favour with the Soviet leadership, which in mid-July 1990 approved the unification of Germany on the basis of the special military status of east Germany, in which NATO security guarantees would apply to east Germany, but non-German NATO troops would not enter it. An addendum to the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany allowed foreign NATO troops to cross the Cold War line at the discretion of the government of a united Germany. Robert Zoellick explained afterward, “we needed to secure that possibility because, if Poland were eventually to join NATO in a second step, we wanted American forces to be able to cross East Germany on their way to be stationed in Poland.” The treaty was signed on 12 September.
In 2022, a 1997 video clip of then-Senator Joe Biden circulated on social media, in which he said although he did not expect a military response, a hostile Russian response was a consideration against admitting the Baltic states (which border Russia). In the remainder of his speech, Biden expressed optimism that Russia would eventually become comfortable with the expansion. The Baltic states joined NATO seven years later.
Potential Russian membership
In 2000, Russian President Vladimir Putin floated the idea of Russia potentially joining NATO. However these prospects went nowhere, and Putin began developing anti-NATO sentiment and espousing hostile views towards NATO from the early 2000s. In 2009, Russian envoy Dmitry Rogozin did not rule out joining NATO at some point, but stated that Russia was currently more interested in leading a coalition as a great power.
Strength and status of assurances