The M23 campaign is an ongoing series of military offensives launched by the March 23 Movement (M23), a Rwandan-backed rebel paramilitary group in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, since March 2022. In November 2021, M23 first launched attacks against the Congolese military (FARDC) and MONUSCO, seizing military positions in Ndiza, Cyanzu, and Runyoni in North Kivu Province. This coincided with the deployment of Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF) to the region to combat the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), a Ugandan rebel group operating in the Congo's North Kivu and Ituri provinces.
The conflict escalated between March and June 2022, as M23 overran key areas in Rutshuru Territory, including the strategic border town of Bunagana, forcing Congolese soldiers to flee into Uganda. Uganda alleged that Rwanda orchestrated the offensive to undermine UPDF operations against the ADF, while Rwanda counterclaimed that Uganda was leveraging M23 elements to threaten its national security. The DRC accused Rwanda of provisioning armaments and reorganizing the insurgency, a claim substantiated by a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Group of Experts report. Rwanda and M23, in turn, accused the DRC of collaborating with the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and claimed their campaign aimed to protect Banyamulenge from FDLR aggression. A UNSC report noted that Rwandan military incursions into Congolese territory had begun prior to alleged FARDC-FDLR cooperation, with analysts posited that M23's resurgence was primarily driven by economic and commercial interests rather than ethno-political or security concerns.
The conflict drew regional involvement, leading the East African Community (EAC) to deploy the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF) to stabilize the situation. On 26 January 2023, M23 captured Kitchanga. Exasperated by the perceived inaction of the EACRF, the Congolese government sought military assistance from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and established a reserve corps, which encouraged the formation of militias under the Wazalendo movement near M23-controlled areas. In June 2023, Human Rights Watch documented widespread human rights abuses by M23, including extrajudicial executions, sexual violence, and other war crimes, with allegations of Rwandan complicity. The UNSC subsequently called for sanctions against M23 leaders and implicated high-ranking Rwandan officials in the violence. By March 2024, M23 had launched further offensives, including a northern push into Rutshuru Territory, capturing Rwindi and the Vitshumbi fishery along Lake Edward. An April UNSC-commissioned report estimated that between 3,000 and 4,000 Rwandan Defence Force (RDF) troops were present in eastern DRC, surpassing the estimated 3,000 M23 combatants. In June 2024, M23 and RDF forces seized Kanyabayonga and Kirumba and entering Lubero Territory for the first time. Diplomatic efforts, led by Angolan President João Lourenço, faltered after President Paul Kagame failed to attend a tripartite summit in Luanda on 15 December, which was meant to address the FDLR issue alongside President Félix Tshisekedi and President Lourenço. Rwanda's absence fueled suspicions that its involvement in eastern DRC was driven primarily by economic interests, particularly access to Kivu's mineral resources, rather than security concerns.
Beginning in January 2025, M23 began making major advances towards Goma and Bukavu, the provincial capitals of North Kivu and South Kivu, with alleged Rwandan backing, intensifying growing tensions between the two nations. By 30 January, M23 had captured all of Goma and began an advance towards Bukavu, capturing the town by 16 February. Following the capture of Goma, M23 announced their intentions to march on Kinshasa. Despite the DRC and M23 endorsing a Declaration of Principles on 19 July in Doha, which pledged peaceful dialogue, recognition of Congolese sovereignty, and respect for international law, M23 persisted in carrying out its campaign.
Background
The March 23 Movement waged a rebellion in the northeastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) from 2012 to 2013. M23 was formed by deserters of the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), who had integrated into the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) following a 2009 peace agreement. The agreement, which was negotiated after the arrest of CNDP leader General Laurent Nkunda, included provisions for prisoner releases, CNDP's transformation into a political party, refugee reintegration, and the incorporation of CNDP members into government institutions and the national army. However, resistance from local communities—who viewed CNDP leaders as perpetrators of crimes—hindered the full implementation of these measures. Ex-CNDP fighters within the military were accused of exploiting their positions for illegal mineral trade. The rebellion formally commenced on 6 May 2012, culminating in clashes with the Congolese army and the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). Both the CNDP as well as the 23 March Movement's first rebellion were supported by Rwanda and Uganda. Human Rights Watch accused M23 of committing war crimes, including summary executions, sexual violence, and forced recruitment, and suggested that some Rwandan officials were complicit due to their continued support for M23 operations. The uprising was defeated by a joint campaign of the DRC and MONUSCO force. After agreeing to a peace deal, M23 was largely dismantled, its fighters disarmed and moved into refugee camps in Uganda.
Despite the agreement, hostilities between M23 and the DR Congo continued. In 2017, M23 commander Sultani Makenga and about 100 to 200 of his followers fled from Uganda to resume their insurgency, setting up camp at Mount Mikeno in the border area between Rwanda, Uganda, and the DR Congo. On 7 November 2021, Makenga's troops carried out a small-scale attack on FARDC positions in Ndiza, Cyanzu, and Runyoni, resulting in four fatalities. However, this offensive had little impact, as M23 no longer received significant international support. That same month, Uganda and the DRC had greatly improved their relations, cooperating against a common enemy, the Allied Democratic Forces, during Operation Shujaa. In early 2022, a growing number of M23 combatants began leaving their camps and moving back to the DRC; the rebel movement launched more attacks in February 2022, but these were repelled. The M23 leadership argued that parts of their movement had resumed the insurgency because the conditions of the 2013 peace deal were not being honored by the DRC government. The rebels also argued that they were attempting to defend Kivu's Tutsi minority from attacks by Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), although critics pointed out that the FDLR no longer posed a substantial threat and that M23 operations had commenced before FARDC-FDLR cooperation intensified. Meanwhile, Ugandan authorities accused Rwanda of reigniting M23's insurgency after its economic interests in the DRC were disrupted. Earlier, in June 2021, Presidents Paul Kagame and Félix Tshisekedi signed an agreement permitting Dither Ltd—allegedly linked to the Rwandan military—to refine gold extracted by Sakima. This deal was seen as an effort to cut off funding for armed groups profiting from mineral smuggling. However, as allegations of Rwandan backing for M23 grew, the DRC suspended the agreement in early June 2022.
The situation was further complicated by the factionalism within M23, as the movement was split into rival groups, namely the "Alliance for the Salvation of the People" headed by Jean-Marie Runiga, and the "Revolutionary Army of Congo" of Bertrand Bisimwa respectively. In addition, Makenga's group was de facto separate from the other M23 forces which were still mainly based in Uganda. Later research organized by the United Nations Security Council suggested that Makenga's return to an insurgency had started the gradual rearmament and restoration of M23, with Bisimwa's "Revolutionary Army of Congo" joining these efforts in late 2021 by reorganizing its remaining fighters and recruiting new ones in cooperation with Makenga. The headquarters of the restored M23 is believed to be located at Mount Sabyinyo.
By 2022, M23 was just one of 120 armed groups that operated in the eastern DR Congo. Before March 2022, the Congolese government made attempts to reinforce its position against the resurgent M23 by sending more troops. However, such measures weakened its presence in other areas, such as those affected by the Allied Democratic Forces insurgency.
Offensive Initial actions In the night of 27 March 2022, M23 rebels launched a new offensive in North Kivu, first attacking the villages of Tshanzu and Runyoni in the Rutshuru Territory from their strongholds at the surrounding hills. The two villages had been important strongholds of the M23 Movement during the 2012–13 rebellion. The rebel attack was reportedly led by Sultani Makenga. The DRC government claimed that Rwanda supported the insurgent operation, a claim which was denied by the Rwandan government and the rebels.
On 29 March, the FARDC was able to repel a rebel attack against the border town of Bunagana, but M23 captured several villages, including Mugingo, Gasiza, Chengerero, Rugamba, Kibote, Baseke and Kabindi. Also, a UN helicopter crashed at Tshanzu, killing eight MONUSCO peacekeepers. The FARDC blamed M23 rebels for shooting down the aircraft. At Bunagana, the FARDC received support by the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF). UPDF ground forces crossed the border, while Ugandan aircraft bombed the rebels. By 1 April, the clashes at Rutshuru had displaced 46,000 locals according to UNHCR. Meanwhile, the M23 fighters temporarily retreated to their mountain bases, with their first attacks being regarded as a failure. They subsequently proclaimed a unilateral ceasefire. One ex-M23 officer told the newspaper taz that it was entirely unclear what the rebel offensive was trying to achieve, with him speculating that Makenga was possibly hoping for one last battle to die in his homeland.
On 6 April, the FARDC rejected any negotiations with the M23 forces based in the DR Congo, and started a counter-attack. Four days later, M23 announced that it would withdraw its troops from any villages captured during the earlier clashes. However, as the fighting raged on, FARDC increasingly lost ground to the insurgents. Following the failure of initial peace talks, M23 forces, reportedly led by Makenga and including the Bisimwa faction, restarted their offensive in May. This operation was reportedly supported by at least 1,000 Rwandan soldiers. According to a local, M23 overran Kibumba on 18 May. On 19 May, M23 rebels attacked MONUSCO peacekeepers at Shangi, Rutshuru Territory, as the latter joined the FARDC in counter-insurgency operations. The rebel leadership declared that the attack was in response to a previous joint FARDC-FDLR operation. From 22 May, the rebels attempted to advance on North Kivu's provincial capital, Goma, displacing 70,000 people. From 22 to 23 May, a battle raged at Kibumba, while the insurgents temporarily seized Rumangabo before it was retaken by the FARDC. According to independent researchers, the insurgents were supported by Rwandan soldiers during the battle for Rumangabo.