The War in the Sahel, also known synonymously as the Sahel War is a multi-sided armed conflict that has been ongoing since 2012. In particular, the intensive conflict mainly takes place in the three countries of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso.
The conflict is generally seen to have begun during the early stages of the Mali War, which itself was seen as a spillover conflict of the Insurgency in the Maghreb. As Islamist Tuareg rebels overran Mali in 2012, a concurrent insurgency in Nigeria, led by Boko Haram, began to spread to nearby countries. By 2015, the Mali war had spread to Burkina Faso and Niger, which led to heavy fighting and humanitarian crises in both countries.
The conflict in Nigeria also reached a climax before a 2015 coalition offensive forced insurgents into remission. By 2019, the effects of the region-wide conflict began to accelerate as popular rage over government ineffectiveness led to a series of coups in Mali, Niger, Sudan, Burkina Faso, Chad and Guinea, which became known as the "Coup Belt".
Background Algerian incursions (1990s–2007) Amid the Algerian Civil War in the late 1990s, militants from the radical Islamist Armed Islamic Group (GIA) established connections with drug traffickers in Mali, Niger, Mauritania, and southern Algeria in order to establish supply lines and logistical support. However, the GIA did not establish themselves as a militant group in the Sahel until 2003. Mokhtar Belmokhtar, the commander of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) in southern Algeria, the GIA's successor, was on the losing side of an Algerian army offensive in the early 2000s. In December 2002, after an ambush near In Salah that killed several of his men, Belmokhtar crossed the Algerian border and settled in Mali. He reached Lerneb, near the Mauritanian border, and formed an alliance with the Berabich by marrying a daughter of the influential Hamaha family of the Oulad Idriss chiefdom. Belmokhtar enriched his in-laws through raids and preaching, and his in-laws protected him and gave him a local base. Other jihadists like Nabil Abou Alqama followed Belmokhtar's example. The Malian government did not react to these developments to not anger the jihadists.
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb insurgency (2003–2011)
The first kidnappings of Western nationals began in 2003. In February and March that year, 32 tourists, mostly Germans and Austrians, were kidnapped by Abderreza El Para, who had fled to Mali. Some hostages were freed by Algerian forces, but the remainder were under Belmokhtar's control. Malian officials sent two notables, Iyad Ag Ghaly and Baba Ould Cheikh, to negotiate for the hostages. The hostages were released on August 18 for a ransom of 5 million euros. Para was arrested by Chadian authorities shortly after the hostage-taking.
On June 4, 2005, in response to a series of arrests of jihadists and Mauritanian Islamists by Mauritanian officials and the announced participation of Mauritanian troops in American army exercises in the Sahel, the GSPC attacked Mauritanian troops at Lemgheity, killing 17 soldiers and taking 35 prisoner. While the attack was the start of the GSPC insurgency in Mauritania, it was more notable for the comment made by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi congratulating the Maghrebi mujahideen. This led to a warming of relations between al-Qaeda and the GSPC, with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb being formed in January 2007.
In the summer of 2007, Abdelmalek Droukdel, head of the GSPC/AQIM, deemed Belmokhtar as too independent and removed him as "emir of the Sahara", a position he gave to Yahia Djouadi. Droukdel split the Sahara zone in two; the first, comprising southwest Algeria and northern Mali and Mauritania fell under Belmokhtar's control. The second, comprising northeastern Mali, Niger, and western Chad, went to Abou Zeid. Belmokhtar opposed this decision and formed a new katiba, starting a rivalry between him and Abou Zeid.
Meanwhile, clashes between Mauritanian forces and AQIM continued through 2008. The killing of five French tourists near Aleg, Mauritania in late December 2007 led to the cancellation of the 2008 Dakar Rally. Twelve Mauritanian soldiers were also found decapitated by AQIM near Tourine. The accession of Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz in 2009 changed the situation; utilizing French and American support, the Mauritanian military was overhauled and restructured, forming a locally-driven counter-insurgency strategy. Under Abdel Aziz, Mauritanian forces curbed AQIM attacks and even entered Malian territory to ambush the jihadists. By the end of 2011, Mauritania and AQIM were under a non-aggression pact.
Organized crime connections Tuareg leaders, in the 1990s and 2000s, began forming connections with prominent Arab drug traffickers in central Mali, particularly around the cities of Gao and Timbuktu. The first drug trafficked through Mali was hashish, but expanded to cocaine by the 2000s. Tuareg youth would join the organized crime routes as smugglers and handlers, and in return receive good payment, a rarity in the impoverished north. The Air Cocaine scandal in 2009 broadcast media attention on the crisis, after a plane filled with 11 tons of cocaine crashed in the Malian desert.
At the start of the Mali War in 2012, these drug kingpins began collaborating with Tuareg arms smugglers to funnel the rebels' and jihadists' efforts to capture territory. This included AQIM and its allies, Ansar Dine and MUJAO, with civilians and soldiers alike reporting that the jihadist groups had copious access to cocaine and other drugs, along with the jihadist groups escorting drug convoys across the desert.
Libyan crisis
In early 2011, as part of the Arab Spring, Libyan protesters rose up against the dictator Muammar Gaddafi, who responded with brutal suppression of the protests. Many protesters took up guns and following a several-month long civil war, overthrew Gaddafi's government and killed him. Many Malian and Nigerien soldiers of Gaddafi's former Islamic Legion fought with pro-Gaddafi forces during the civil war, but fled to their home countries following the rebels' victory. These soldiers were predominantly Tuareg or Sahelien Arab groups like Bella, all minorities in their home countries.
In returning to their home countries, the former soldiers came back to a shaky peace in Kidal Region and Ménaka Region, where Malian Tuaregs held positions of local authority in the army as part of peace deals following the Tuareg rebellion of 2007–2009. Despite low-level violence occurring by Tuareg separatist militias continuing until 2011, the majority of battle-hardened Tuareg leaders like Iyad Ag Ghaly had defected to the Malian Army in exchange for authority and promises of economic development in the rural Kidal Region.
With Libya having given these Tuareg rebels a safe haven prior to their civil war, many rebels and Islamic Legion soldiers alike held an allegiance to a Tuareg identity over a Malian one, even if they were in the Malian army. Coming back to a region in 2011 that the Malian government had continued to neglect, along with new pipelines to weapons and supply chains from the former Libyan government, many Tuaregs were ready to revolt again.
Mali
Tuareg rebellion of 2012
In late 2011, Ibrahim Ag Bahanga, an irredentist Tuareg militia leader who was one of the last hold-outs of the 2006–2009 war, founded the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), which drew a support base from all Tuareg clans. The MNLA sought independence for a Tuareg state named Azawad located in northern Mali. This state, in practice, would include many non-Tuareg groups like the Songhai, Fulani, Bella, Arabs, and different clans of Tuareg. Many of these groups had collaborated with the Tuaregs or the Malian government depending on what was more advantageous for their community, with the Songhai most notably forming the self-defense militias Ganda Koy and Ganda Iso to fight alongside the government during the 1990s Tuareg rebellion. Bahanga's goal with the MNLA was to unite all Tuaregs under one organization in order to avoid fragmentation as had happened before.
Bahanga largely succeeded with his unification until 2012, when Ansar Dine was formed by Iyad Ag Ghaly. Ghaly's goal was to form a state in Mali under a strict interpretation of sharia law. Ansar Dine immediately sapped many Ifoghas Tuaregs, the dominant clan in Kidal Region and Ghaly's clan, from the MNLA. Ansar Dine received support from AQIM and another jihadist group, Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), that had split off from AQIM in late 2011.
The MNLA and jihadist alliance overran many cities and Malian bases in a surprise offensive in January 2012. By the end of January, the cities of Tessalit, Aguelhok, Andéramboukane, Léré, and Ménaka had been captured by the rebel alliance. In the first week of February, the MNLA captured Tinzaouaten and began fighting for Kidal. Discontent grew in Bamako by March, when the towns of Diré, Goundam, and Niafunké came under MNLA control, often without fighting. Jeremy Keenan said in 2012 regarding the MNLA-jihadist alliance, "What seems to happen is that when they move into a town, the MNLA take out the military base—not that there's much resistance—and Iyad [ag Aghaly] goes into town and puts up his flag and starts bossing everyone around about sharia law."
On March 21, Malian soldiers overthrew President Amadou Toumani Touré due to his lackluster response to the rebellion, with Amadou Sanogo taking over in a junta. Sanogo later passed power peacefully to Dioncounda Traoré.
Falls of Timbuktu and Gao and rebel infighting Despite the coup, Kidal fell on March 30 and Gao one day later. The fall of Gao was the start of public disputes between the MNLA and the jihadist groups, as there were conflicting reports of who actually controlled the town. As with other cities, the MNLA entered both cities but jihadist groups took up the administrative control. In Kidal, that was Ansar Dine; in Gao, it was both MUJAO and Ansar Dine.
Timbuktu and Douentza fell in the first week of April, and the MNLA declared Azawadi independence on April 6. With the seizure of Douentza, the MNLA ceased fighting and said that all of Azawadi territory was liberated. This directly contradicted Ansar Dine's goals, with the group seeking to spread Sharia across all of Mali and past its borders. Immediately after the declaration of Azawadi independence, several Tuareg groups sprung up against the MNLA, with the Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA) forming a pro-government and pro-rebel faction on April 8.
After failed negotiations between the MNLA and Ansar Dine in May, anti-MNLA protests began in Gao supported by MOJWA and Ansar Dine. Clashes broke out between the two groups, and the jihadist alliance seized power after a short battle. By August, the MNLA was forced out of every major city they had taken, and Ghaly was declared emir of the new Azawadi Islamic state.
The jihadist alliance began imposing strict interpretations of Sharia in the territories it controlled, destroying many mausolea of the World Heritage Site of Timbuktu and meting out harsh punishments like public executions to people who defied Sharia. The imposition of brutal punishments and Sharia law was considered by analysts a reason for the subsequent collapse of the Islamic Azawadi state—Droukdel even admitted his own commanders' rushed implementation was the reason for their collapse.
Foreign intervention
By January 2013, Islamist forces advanced to 600 km from the capital and were closing in to capture the major town of Mopti. The MNLA began peace talks to realign with the Malian government while the French military launched Opération Serval on January 11, intervening in the conflict. The furthest that the jihadist coalition was able to advance was Konna, being defeated at the Battle of Konna, one of the most significant events of the war.