Operation Himmler, also called Operation Konserve, consisted of a group of 1939 false flag operations planned by Nazi Germany to give the appearance of Polish aggression against Germany. The Germans then used propaganda reports of the events to justify their invasion of Poland, which started on 1 September 1939. Operation Himmler included the Germans staging false attacks on themselves—directed at innocent people, such as civilians and concentration camp prisoners. The operation arguably became the first act of the Second World War in Europe.
Planning Prior to the 1939 invasion, German newspapers and politicians like Adolf Hitler carried out a national and international propaganda campaign accusing Polish authorities of organizing or tolerating violent ethnic cleansing of ethnic Germans living in Poland. (what displays as page 188 on bottom of page is page 193/1125 of this PDF)
The plan, named after its originator, Heinrich Himmler,Roger Manvell, Heinrich Fraenkel, Heinrich Himmler: The SS, Gestapo, His Life and Career, Skyhorse Publishing Inc., 2007, , Google Print, p.76 was supervised by Reinhard Heydrich20 Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Volume 4; Thursday, 20 December 1945 . The Avalon Project. Retrieved 4 August 2007. and managedGerald Reitlinger, The SS, Alibi of a Nation, 1922-1945, Da Capo Press, 1989, , Print, p.122 by Heinrich Müller. The goal of this false flag project was to create the appearance of Polish aggression against Germany, which could be used to justify the German invasion of Poland. Hitler also might have hoped to confuse Poland's allies, the United Kingdom and France, into delaying or stopping their declaration of war on Germany.Steven J. Zaloga, Poland 1939: The Birth of Blitzkrieg, Osprey Publishing, 2002, , Google Print, p.39
Implementation The operations were mostly carried out on 31 August.James J. Wirtz, Roy Godson, Strategic Denial and Deception: The Twenty-First Century Challenge, Transaction Publishers, 2002, , Google Print, p.100 The operation, as well as the main German offensive, was originally scheduled for 26 August; the shifting diplomatic situation resulted in delay until 31 August and 1 September. The operations were carried out by agents of the SS and the SD. The German troops, dressed in Polish uniforms, would storm various border buildings, scare the locals with inaccurate shots, carry out acts of vandalism, retreat and leave behind dead bodies in Polish uniforms. The bodies were really prisoners from concentration camps who were dressed in Polish uniforms, killed by lethal injection, shot for appearances and left behind. They were described in plans as Konserve: canned goods, which also led to the informal name of the operation, Operation Konserve.Christopher J. Ailsby, The Third Reich Day by Day, Zenith Imprint, 2001, , Google Print, p.112John S. Craig, Peculiar Liaisons in War, Espionage, and Terrorism of the Twentieth Century, Algora Publishing, 2005, , Google Print, p.180
There were several separate operations, including staged attacks on the following: The strategic railway at Jablunka Pass (Jabłonków Incident), on the border between Poland and CzechoslovakiaJorgensen, Christer, "Hitler's Espionage Machine", Spellmount Ltd., 2004, The German radio station Sender Gleiwitz (Gliwice), the Gleiwitz incident being arguably the most notable of the Operation Himmler operations The German customs station at Hochlinden (now part of Rybnik-Stodoły)Martin Allen, Himmler's Secret War: The Covert Peace Negotiations of Heinrich Himmler, Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2005, , Google Print, p.51 The forest service station in Pitschen, now Byczyna The communications station at Neubersteich, which was Nieborowitzer Hammer before 12 February 1936 and is now Kuznia Nieborowska The railway station in Alt-Eiche (Smolniki), Rosenberg in Westpreußen District A woman and her companion in Katowice
Gleiwitz incident
On the night of 31 August a small group of German operatives, dressed in Polish uniforms and led by Alfred Naujocks, seized the Gleiwitz radio station and broadcast a short anti-German message in Polish (sources vary on the content of the message). Several prisoners (most likely from the Dachau concentration camp) and a local Polish-Silesian activist (arrested a day earlier) were left dead on the scene in Polish uniforms.
Aftermath In his 1 September speech to the Reichstag announcing war, Hitler cited the 21 border incidents as justification for Germany's "defensive" action against Poland:
By mid-1939, thousands of Polish Volksdeutsche had been secretly prepared for sabotage and guerrilla warfare by the Breslau (Wrocław) office of the Abwehr. Their activities were meant to provoke anti-German reprisals that could be claimed as provocations.Perry Biddiscombe, Alexander Perry, Werwolf!: The History of the National Socialist Guerrilla Movement, 1944-1946, University of TorontoPress, 1998, , Google Print, p.207
The German agents indeed co-operated with the German forces during the invasion of Poland, which led to some reprisals that were highly exaggerated by the German propaganda.For an example of Nazi propaganda document discussing "Polish atrocities against the German people", see The Polish Atrocities Against the German Minority in Poland Compiled by Hans Schadewaldt (Berlin: German Foreign Office, 1940) pp. 35–54, cases 1 - 15. signed testimony of Herbert Matthes, Bromberg furniture makerRichard Blanke, The American Historical Review, Vol. 97, No. 2. Apr. 1992, pp. 580–582. Review of: Włodzimierz Jastrzębski,Der Bromberger Blutsonntag: Legende und Wirklichkeit. and Andrzej Brożek, Niemcy zagraniczni w polityce kolonizacji pruskich prowincji wschodnich (1886-1918) One of the most notable cases of such a scenario was reportedly carried out during Bydgoszcz Bloody Sunday. An instruction issued by the Ministry of Propaganda stated that the press
The operation convinced very little international opinion about the German claims.
See also Mukden incident Operation Tannenberg Shelling of Mainila Operation Northwoods Gulf of Tonkin incident
References
Further reading Tomasz Chinciński, Niemiecka dywersja we wrześniu 1939 w Londyńskich meldunkach, Biuletyn Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej, nr 8-9/2004 Tomasz Chinciński, Niemiecka dywersja w Polsce w 1939 r. w świetle dokumentów policyjnych i wojskowych II Rzeczypospolitej oraz służb specjalnych III Rzeszy. Część 1 (marzec–sierpień 1939 r.) . Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość. nr 2 (8)/2005