American logistics supported the Western Allies in their invasion of Germany, the final campaign of the Second World War's western front in the European Theater of Operations. The campaign lasted from 26 January 1945 until the end of World War II in Europe on 8 May 1945.
By the end of January 1945, the American forces had recovered from the disruption to the supply system and the large losses of materiel inflicted by the German offensives in the Ardennes and Alsace. Sixty-eight ships loaded with replacement ordnance were dispatched from the United States. Casualties were harder to replace, and about 49,000 men were transferred from service units to the infantry branch. The Allied forces had to advance across the Rhineland, which was in the grip of thaws, rains and floods. They were then confronted by the Rhine, the most formidable barrier to the Allied advance since the English Channel. The river was crossed and bridged, and railways and pipelines were run across it. Most supplies were delivered by rail, and five railway bridges over the Rhine supported the final American advance into the heart of Germany.
Once across the Rhine, combat losses in terms of tanks, vehicles and equipment, and the expenditure of ammunition declined, while shortages of fuel and spare parts developed, as was to be expected in fast-moving mobile operations. The American logistics system was stretched, but came nowhere near breaking point. The railheads were pushed forward, the rehabilitation of the network keeping pace with the advance. No less than twenty-six engineer general service regiments worked on the railways, and by late April rail had supplanted motor transport and was carrying the bulk of supplies across the Rhine. By 8 May, when the war in Europe ended, railheads had been established at Stendal, Magdeburg, Leipzig, Regensburg and Stuttgart in Germany. The Motor Transport Service organized XYZ, an express road service that moved supplies from the railheads to the forward units. Air supply also played its part in bringing the campaign to a successful conclusion, with a substantial amount of gasoline delivered by air in the final weeks.
Background
The campaign in Northwest Europe had commenced on 6 June 1944 (D-Day), with Operation Overlord, the Allied Normandy landings. By early September, the Allied forces had reached the Dutch and German borders in the north and the Moselle in the south, but the advance came to a halt due to logistical difficulties, particularly fuel shortages, and stiffening German resistance. Between September and November, the American forces in Northwest Europe were beset by severe difficulties with port discharge capacity and inland transportation infrastructure that only eased with the opening of the port of Antwerp in Belgium in November. The American forces were then engulfed by the German offensives in the Ardennes and Alsace in December 1944 and January 1945.
With the German offensives dealt with, the Supreme Allied Commander, General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, planned to reach and cross the Rhine. He chose to make the main Allied effort in the north. There were tactical, operational and political reasons for this: the best crossing sites were there; a crossing in the north gave access to the North German Plain, where the terrain was best suited for mobile warfare, for which his Allied forces were particularly trained and equipped; and it had the political advantage of involving the British and Canadians. After some debate, the Combined Chiefs of Staff endorsed Eisenhower's strategy at the Malta Conference in January and February 1945.
Organization
In January 1945, there were five American armies in Northwest Europe. Lieutenant General Courtney Hodges's First and Lieutenant General William H. Simpson's Ninth Armies were serving as part of Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery's British 21st Army Group. The First Army returned to Lieutenant General Omar N. Bradley's 12th Army Group on 18 January 1945, but the Ninth did not return to the 12th Army Group until 4 April. While under the operational control of the 21st Army Group, their administrative control remained with the 12th Army Group. The 12th Army Group also included Lieutenant General Leonard T. Gerow's Fifteenth Army and Lieutenant General George S. Patton Jr.'s Third Army. In the south, Lieutenant General Jacob L. Devers's 6th Army Group controlled Lieutenant General Alexander Patch's Seventh Army along with the French First Army. Devers kept his headquarters down to around 600 personnel, while Bradley's was more than twice the size, with enough officers to staff an infantry division. This was primarily due to the 12th Army Group assuming logistical responsibilities, something which ran counter to US Army doctrine.
Logistical support of the American forces was the responsibility of Lieutenant General John C. H. Lee's Communications Zone (COMZ). COMZ headquarters doubled as that of the European Theater of Operations, United States Army (ETOUSA). It was the senior US headquarters in the theater, but the operational functions of a US general headquarters were exercised by Eisenhower's Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF). In administrative matters, the staff of ETOUSA, and the chiefs of the services in particular, were supreme. In a dispute between the service chief of the armies or army groups and the one at COMZ, the latter could appeal to the ETOUSA service chief, who was himself. This was resented by the staffs of the armies and army groups, who felt that ETOUSA favored COMZ.
The Advance Section (ADSEC) followed closely behind the armies to develop the lines of communication, take over forward dumps and depots from the armies as they advanced, and coordinate the activities with COMZ and the armies. The forces in southern France had their own line of communication from the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, United States Army (MTOUSA), with their own advance section, the Continental Advance Section (CONAD), and base section, the Delta Base Section. By February 1945, the integration of the Southern Line of Communications (SOLOC) with COMZ had progressed to the point where the SOLOC was superfluous, and it was abolished on 6 February. CONAD and the Delta Base Section then came directly under COMZ. The commander of SOLOC, Major General Thomas B. Larkin, became the deputy commander of COMZ on 12 March, and on 9 April he succeeded Brigadier General Royal B. Lord as chief of staff of COMZ and deputy chief of staff of ETOUSA.
The base sections were divided into districts. The base sections in the UK became Western, Southern and London districts of the UK Section. When the COMZ Loire Base Section was absorbed by the Brittany Base Section on 1 December 1944, it became the Loire district. Similarly, when in turn it was absorbed by the Normandy Base Section on 1 February 1945, it became the Brittany district. Henceforth, COMZ consisted of the two advance sections (ADSEC and CONAD), the three base sections controlling the ports (the Delta, Normandy and Channel Base Sections), and the UK, Seine and Oise Sections.
Situation in January 1945
Effect of the Ardennes-Alsace battles on logistics The opening of the port of Antwerp on 28 November 1944 ended the transportation difficulties related to port capacity that had dogged the American forces in the autumn. Major depot areas had been established around Liège, Belgium, to support the First and Ninth Armies, and Verdun, France, to support the Third Army. The Liège area was chosen for its accessibility by rail, and by barge via the Meuse. On one side of the river there was storage space for of subsistence; the other side had facilities for the storage of of petroleum, oil and lubricants (POL). The former had sidings for unloading 466 railway cars, and the latter for 352. There was closed storage for of subsistence, and cold storage for . In contrast, Verdun was not a single complex, but a cluster of eight subsistence and eight fuel depots that held up to of fuel and cold storage for of subsistence. It employed 315 German prisoners of war (POWs) and 2,000 Polish displaced persons.
The German Ardennes offensive disrupted the American supply arrangements. The movement of supplies to the depots around Liège, which were threatened by the German advance, had to be halted, and the unloading of ships at Antwerp had to be curtailed. Only 130 ships were unloaded in December, and on 23 December ETOUSA requested that 24 ships be cut from upcoming convoys. The Germans cut the main rail link between Antwerp and the Third Army depots, so alternative routes were developed. ADSEC units south of the German advance found themselves cut off. This included engineer units that became engaged in laying land mines, carrying out demolitions and fighting delaying actions. Some of the truck drivers who had helped move the 101st Airborne Division found themselves cut off in Bastogne, Belgium, and fought as infantry.
Stockpiles from threatened dumps and depots in the First and Third Army areas were back hauled to COMZ dumps by rail, so not only were unloadings held up, but freight cars had to be diverted to the forward areas to evacuate supplies. At Liège, tanker trucks took away of aviation gasoline, about half of the POL stock. The Third Army lost through air raids, and air raids and V-1 flying bomb attacks on ADSEC installations resulted in the loss of . By the end of December, the First Army's stocks of POL had dropped from nearly to less than . Supply trains and railway installations came under attack from the Luftwaffe, resulting in casualties and damage. A particular concern was the railway bottleneck around Liège, which was highlighted by damage to the by bombing in December and January. A new railway bridge was built over the Meuse at Maastricht in the Netherlands to provide an alternative route, but was not required.
With the army dumps being evacuated, the ADSEC depots began issuing supplies directly to the operational units. To relieve the congestion at the port caused by ships being unloaded without the ability to forward their contents, COMZ sought to acquire depot space around Antwerp. This was resisted by the British, who pointed to the original agreement that had been hammered out when the US forces had been granted access to the port. They relented under pressure from SHAEF, and allowed US depots to be established in France around Lille and Charleroi. POL shipments from Antwerp were consigned to Lille, and rations were sent to Charleroi.
Equipment loss and replacement
The tactical situation resulted in requests for large quantities of barbed wire, land mines, small arms ammunition, anti-tank rockets and demolition charges. Some 500,000 land mines were sent forward. The First Army alone used 186,000 anti-tank mines and of explosives in late December and early January to establish a series of defenses between the Ardennes and Liège. All available machine gun ammunition in the COMZ depots was dispatched, but still could not meet demand. Two ships loaded with anti-tank rockets and small arms ammunition were called forward and given top priority for discharge. The ammunition unloaded was moved to forward depots as rapidly as possible.
Ammunition expenditure soared. First Army's expenditure of 105 mm howitzer rose to 69 rounds per gun per day in December, easily exceeding its previous record of 44 rounds per gun per day in November. In December, the armies expended 2,579,400 rounds of 105 mm howitzer high explosive shell, and the theater stocks were reduced to 2,524,000 rounds, compared to an authorized stock level of 8,900,000 rounds. Expenditure of 155 mm howitzer ammunition was also high. To alleviate ammunition shortages, the 12th Army Group borrowed one hundred 25-pounder (88 mm) gun-howitzers with 300,000 rounds from the British.