On October 4, 1963, the President of Brazil João Goulart, sent to the National Congress a request for a state of exception for 30 days throughout the national territory. Citing the crisis and the threat of internal disturbances as justification, it was based on Congress's resistance to approving the reforms desired by the Executive, as well as the need to assert itself before the opposition. Its immediate antecedent was an interview by Carlos Lacerda, governor of Guanabara, to the American newspaper Los Angeles Times. Lacerda spoke explicitly of the possibility of Goulart being deposed by the military. The Ministers of War, Navy and , outraged, wanted forceful action against the governor, who was a right-wing oppositionist. The state of exception would possibly be accompanied by in some states, and is associated with a military plan to arrest Lacerda and an operation in Pernambuco, governed by leftist Miguel Arraes, who was against the measure. The proposal was rejected by both the right and the left, who felt they could also be targeted by the exceptional powers. Without support, the President withdrew the proposal on October 7, and his political position was weakened.
Background Situation of the country The Triennial Plan, the government's response to the existing economic crisis, was failing; inflation was strong and economic growth was slowing. For Goulart, success depended on measures such as land reform. However, his government did not have enough support in Congress to pass them, creating a stalemate between the Executive and branches. The military leadership of the government was concerned about the Army's loss of its monopoly of force and the regimentation of illegal weapons by the right wing.
Meanwhile, among the lower ranks of the military there were episodes of insubordination, notably the recent , which took place in Brasilia on September 12. The left was in favor of the sergeants' cause, while the officerate was very alarmed at the breakdown of the military hierarchy. In the same month, the President decreed the suspension of the operation of the Brazilian Institute of Democratic Action (IBAD), an organization that supported opposition candidates and harbored part of the coup plotting already underway against the government. Its financing had become a scandal and the object of a Parliamentary Inquiry Commission (CPI). The pressure from the strikes was significant, with one going on among the bankers at the time.
Carlos Lacerda, governor of Guanabara, was intensely critical of Goulart. His statements were supported by Ademar de Barros, governor of São Paulo, who spoke in Guaratinguetá that the government would fall by the end of the year and possibly not even the Presidential Election in Brazil in 1965 would be held.
Lacerda's interview to the Los Angeles Times Carlos Lacerda gave an interview to Julian Hart, correspondent of the Los Angeles Times, who published it in the United States. The Tribuna da Imprensa, owned by Hélio Fernandes, published it in Brazil, initially as "the text of the telegraphic news that arrived in Brazil yesterday", on the 1st, and the next day, the full one. As assessed, "Governor Lacerda is not saying anything these days for domestic consumption. His words were directed specifically to the people of the United States." In the governor's view, "Jango will not be able to remain in power until the end of the current year. Analyzing the Brazilian crisis, Lacerda suggests to the American people to suspend economic aid to Brazil until it returns to the right rhythm."
Lacerda criticized the "labor agitation," denouncing communist infiltration of the government and the (CGT). He denied that Goulart was a communist; instead, he "could be called a right-wing man... for what he is in reality is a totalitarian in the South American fashion. He is a caudillo with all the resources of modern times. At the moment, he is the communist version that descends to the left." Thus, Brazil was facing a conjunction of caudillismo and communism. The group in power intended to sabotage the economy, make workers angry, and isolate the country from the free world. Law, order and freedom were threatened. Addressing the Americans, he urged them not to be indifferent to who was running the country, because "not interfering is one thing, but ignoring what is going on is another," and they should therefore play an important role in the country. For him, Goulart was "inept," "favorable to the communists," and was only in power because the military was hesitant to depose him:
On September 30 , Minister of Justice, received a copy of the interview, which was discussed at a meeting in Goulart's cabinet. They also talked about the statements by the governor of São Paulo and the bankers' strike. The military ministers - General , Admiral and Brigadier - were indignant and, on the same day, issued a note. For them, it was an insult:
Moreover, they accused the interview of being a trigger for the outbreak of disorder, and Lacerda, of being part of a destabilization campaign through the lockout and the paralysis of the economy. They also declared that the country was threatened by right-wing and left-wing extremism.
The interview was scandalous even to the National Democratic Union (UDN) and the conservative business community. Tribuna da Imprensa considered that Lacerda's statements were untimely and ill-timed, but the reaction of the military ministers would be even worse.
The message to Congress On the 1st, the Tribuna da Imprensa reported that the First Army was on standby and the government leaders were already discussing federal intervention in Guanabara and São Paulo. The next day, government sources leaked the news of the possible declaration of a state of exception. The Correio da Manhã, on the 3rd, noted that the leadership had abandoned the idea of federal intervention for lack of a legal argument and reported the readiness of the Armed Forces.
Goulart called Leonel Brizola to get his support, without, however, making it clear what he would do. On the 4th, he sent bill no. 1,091 to Congress, accompanied by message no. 320. It requested the decree of a state of exception throughout the national territory for 30 days. The message was accompanied by a text by Abelardo Jurema and another by the three military ministers, both justifying the need for the measure, given the national situation. Goulart presented the state of exception as a way to solve the strikes, inflation and military insubordination. Minister Jurema's message described the country's crisis scenario:
According to the government, there was an imminent internal commotion. Thus, the instrument resorted to article 206 of the 1946 Constitution and boldly suspended several individual rights and guarantees present in article 141, such as the manifestation of thought, secrecy of correspondence, freedom of assembly, freedom of association, bail, habeas corpus, and the right to petition.
Motivations and interpretations of the state of exception The military ministers wanted to occupy Guanabara and oust, prosecute, try or even expel Lacerda from the country. Meeting with them on the night of the 3rd, Goulart defended the alternative of declaring a state of exception and arresting Lacerda. Besides Lacerda, Ademar de Barros was also targeted by the military. His removal could be popular, as he was accused of corruption and his state had the largest number of industrial workers, the President's political base.
Finally, the military ministers wanted to intervene against Miguel Arraes, the leftist governor of Pernambuco. However, according to historian Jorge Ferreira, Goulart was afraid to act against Arraes, who had supported him in the Legality Campaign. Marco Antonio Villa, on the other hand, sees an offensive against Arraes as a convenient way for Goulart to demonstrate balance, acting against both the right and the left, and, moreover, eliminating a possible rival within the left. Elio Gaspari writes that Goulart "At the very least, he would depose the governors of São Paulo and Guanabara. At most, he would also depose the leftist governor Miguel Arraes of Pernambuco."
The military wanted the request to be accepted quickly to avoid demonstrations. In the meeting with his ministers, Abelardo Jurema and Darcy Ribeiro were of the opinion that the President needed to act fast, delivering the state of exception as a fait accompli; otherwise he would fail, not having the support of the Social Democratic Party (PSD) nor the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB). Therefore, it would be necessary to put troops on the streets in Guanabara, São Paulo, and Minas Gerais, which would lead to the approval of the request within 24 hours. On the day the message was forwarded to Congress, tanks followed to the Ministry of War. However, Guanabara was not occupied and Lacerda could not be arrested.
According to Thomas Skidmore the emergency government could acquire an anti-party character, based mainly on military support, and would dismantle political mobilization, especially that of the left. Villa interprets coup character in Goulart's maneuver, comparing it to the coup attempt by Jânio Quadros and evaluating that "the democratic regime was threatened". He postulates the possibilities of dictatorship or continuism, with a change in the law to allow reelection. He cites several leftist figures. disputes this interpretation, stating that the state of exception did not explicitly allow for interventions in the states and Villa's evidence is flimsy. He compares the maneuver to the anticipation of the referendum on presidentialism, in which Goulart used undue pressure (military), but not coups. For Moniz Bandeira, this was not a coup, but "an attitude of force, without transposing the constitutional space, [...] not only for the adoption of defense measures but also for the realization of the basic reforms." According to him, Goulart did not follow the revolutionary idea of Brizola, who sometimes suggested a coup - "If we don't give the coup, they will give it against us."
Reactions Most politicians, both civilian and military, thought the proposal was unilateral and the country had no internal unrest to justify the legal device of a state of exception. He was rejected both by the right, within which were his immediate targets, and by the left, which feared that it, too, would become a target. San Tiago Dantas warned Goulart that the powers of exception could be used against the workers. Among members of the (FMP) there was the fear that the maneuver could result in the arrests of Arraes, Luís Carlos Prestes and Brizola and the repression of strikes, just as the bankers' strike was spreading. Brizola and other leftist leaders condemned Goulart for the request over Mayrink Veiga radio. In a statement, Miguel Arraes declared that the path "cannot be that of suspending the rights and liberties that the Constitution guarantees to citizens and to the people in general. [...] the path of illegality, in the present circumstances, can lead the country to a civil war, [...] the National Congress can be closed, organizations like the CGT and the UNE can be closed"; "The basic reforms are threatened by the state of exception". For the CGT, "suppression or restriction of democratic liberties is in no way a way to give impetus to the struggle of the Brazilian people, but constitutes, on the contrary, a step backwards in our democratic process".