Brazil–United States relations during the presidency of João Goulart (1961–1964) gradually deteriorated, culminating in American support for the ousting of Goulart in the 1964 coup d'état in Brazil. Although the crisis' dynamics were primarily Brazilian, American actions progressively increased the chances of the occurrence and success of a rebellion against the government. Historians differ on the inevitability of a clash between the Goulart and John F. Kennedy/Lyndon B. Johnson administrations, the relative importance of the attrition points, and the timing the U.S. government's decision to support the Goulart's ousting - earlier, as in 1962, or later, only in 1963.
Jango, as the Brazilian president was known, took office already distrustful of the Americans because of his connections with the radical left in the unions, although he was not considered a communist. Even so, the year 1962 did not start out negative, and Goulart managed to have a good relationship with Kennedy. There were several points of attrition. Internationally, the Brazilian government continued its , expanding its ties outside the Western bloc and disagreeing in part with the American proposals against Cuba. Domestically, it paid less attention to economic stabilization and limited the remittance of profits from American companies in Brazil. In 1963, Goulart made concessions and an attempt at stabilization, the Triennial Plan, but did not find the necessary American support for its success and hardened his position with the U.S. In Washington there was also concern about leftist forces such as governor Leonel Brizola, who took over subsidiaries of American companies, and the Peasant Leagues.
The U.S. used several instruments to alter the course of the Brazilian government and subsequently to weaken it. Kennedy's visit to Brazil was successively postponed, while opposition candidates in Brazil received millions of dollars in the 1962 elections and economic assistance was redirected to opposition state governments, the "islands of administrative sanity". The U.S. Embassy in Brazil, under Lincoln Gordon, became involved in Brazil's internal affairs. The important release of credit was hindered, different from the attitude taken for the previous government of Jânio Quadros. Finally, the U.S. government sought allies among the Brazilian military, who were already plotting a coup d'état and offered support for their in the form of Operation Brother Sam. It never reached Brazil due to the rapid deposition of Goulart beginning on March 31, 1964, but the withdrawal of the president was in part due to the knowledge that the U.S. State Department would recognize a parallel government organized by the insurgents. The Brazilian military dictatorship (1964–1985) was quickly recognized, and the U.S. acted diplomatically to facilitate its recognition by other countries.
The pressure on Goulart's government occurred when American foreign policy was defined by the Cold War, the Cuban Revolution of 1959, and pressure within the country for a tough foreign policy, Washington sought to reassert its hegemony. In Latin America, it tried to influence leftist governments through economic assistance from the Alliance for Progress or to favor their overthrow by local opposition, thus tolerating several military coups.
Context U.S. domestic conditions Internal conditions in the United States throughout the 1950s and early 1960s made it more difficult for the country to coexist peacefully with left and center-left governments in Latin America. If the U.S. president was too favorable to Goulart, he would fuel criticism from his internal enemies. The period was marked by "a national security state, high defense spending, militarization, and social conformism". The Cold War and paranoia about communism were intensifying. Trade unionism followed a shift to the right. Congress was dominated by the Democratic Party. Even if typically perceived as more moderate in foreign policy than the Republican Party, it was aggressive at the time, especially due to the great influence of conservative and militaristic representatives from the American South.
In the 1960 presidential election, Democrat John F. Kennedy narrowly defeated his opponent, Republican Richard Nixon, and to do so he had to be tougher on foreign policy. After Kennedy's assassination in 1963, Lyndon B. Johnson took over. By 1964 the new president was worried about the election and would not accept the political damage of supporting an unsuccessful coup in Brazil. In January the Republicans had criticized his reaction to the protests in Panama as lacking toughness.
U.S. Foreign Policy in Latin America Until the Cuban Revolution American foreign policy after World War II had global scope and the goals of organizing a world order and preventing the expansion of the Soviet Union's influence. The supporters of the realist school of international relations believed that a totalitarian regime like the Soviet Union would be aggressively expansionist. After communism was installed in a country, the restoration of capitalism and liberal democracy would be impossible. Thus, it sought to prevent the spread of communism through the containment policy. It also aimed at reasserting American hegemony.
In this context, Latin America was important as a source of raw materials and votes in the United Nations, as well as being the last region that could be relied upon in case Europe became anti-American. Realist theorists Hans Morgenthau and George Kennan believed in its relevance. However, in this early period of the Cold War (until 1959), little attention was paid to the region, and capital investment was minimal. There was a security system with a military component, the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR), and a political component, the Organization of American States (OAS). Armaments were supplied, but this was of little military use - "supplying tanks to Honduras or Ecuador would probably not prevent the Soviet Union from launching a nuclear attack." Containment had two instruments: economic aid and destabilization. In the first case, one example is Bolivia after 1952, whose government, installed after a revolution, was influenced in a more conservative direction. In the latter, the overthrow of Jacobo Árbenz's government in Guatemala by a paramilitary force organized by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Both were considered successful.
In 1958, the booing received by Vice President Nixon on a tour of several Latin American countries alerted the Eisenhower administration to the poor image of the U.S. in the region. The Cuban Revolution in 1959 and subsequent events led to a turnaround in Latin American politics. Attempts to achieve a moderate government, as late as 1959, failed. The following year, the quota on Cuban sugar exports was suspended. In his presidential campaign Kennedy criticized the American leadership's complacency with Latin America. In 1961 the military attempt to change the regime in Cuba, the Bay of Pigs invasion, failed, while Fidel Castro announced the implementation of socialism and his county's alignment with the Soviets. In 1962 the Cuban Missile Crisis tipped the balance of power in the region in favor of the United States, which allowed pressure to be put on reluctant countries such as Brazil.
Kennedy and Johnson administrations
The perception was that Cuba had been lost, which led to a reformulation of foreign policy and "a stance of paranoid vigilance" against a "second Cuba" or "other Cubas". Meanwhile, revolutionary movements that sought Soviet support were emerging. However, even leaders that came to power democratically, and even if not Marxist, but reformist or nationalist, were assumed as risks to the security and interests of the United States. Such were cases like Cheddi Jagan in Guyana, Árbenz in Guatemala, and João Goulart in Brazil. The loss in Cuba was on the minds of Johnson administration officials in 1964 and favored tougher decisions regarding Brazil.
The new policy had two pillars, the Latin American military and economic assistance. The local Armed Forces were seen as "the most stable and modernizing social organization." Since the last year of the Eisenhower administration there had been thoughts of making them smaller and focused on counterinsurgency, as if they were gendarmeries.
In turn, economic assistance came in the form of the Alliance for Progress, announced in 1961, with an investment forecast of $10 billion over ten years. Its administration was handed over to the newly created USAID. Based on Walt W. Rostow's modernization theory, it conceived poverty as an open space for unwanted ideologies, and economic development as the only way to prevent communist revolution. The Alliance's strategy was based on democratic reform, anti-communism and raising the standard of living. The latter would be achieved by economic planning, state and foreign investment, and social reforms, including land and tax reforms. It would be more than a common assistance program, reaching into political, economic and social structures, in a "revolution on the margins of capitalism" or "middle-class revolution". However, not all anti-communist right-wingers accepted issues such as land reform in Latin America, and so the U.S. acted against right-wing dictators Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic and François Duvalier in Haiti.
However, from the Latin American perspective, this was nothing more than a common assistance program. Applying Cold War logic to interpret a region with its own characteristics and the function of the Alliance as a tool to fight it limited its ability to realize its ideology. Further, the stated goal of supporting democratic regimes failed, and the U.S. government used political, economic, and military tools to destabilize leftist rulers elected within democracy. Cold War logic took priority. As late as 1950, George Kennan wrote that "It is better to have a strong regime in power than a liberal government if it is indulgent and relaxed and penetrated by communists."
Military coups occurred in Argentina and Peru in 1962, and in Guatemala and Ecuador in 1963, and in all of them the U.S. attitude moved from near-reaction (even stopping economic assistance) to expectation, and finally acceptance of the newly installed authoritarian regimes. By the "Mann Doctrine," established in 1964, dictatorships would not be questioned if they maintained anti-communism. The goal of preventing new socialist or communist governments in the region, thought of from the beginning by the founders of the Alliance, was achieved.
Kennedy had a good image in Latin America. His successor was, as far as the region was concerned, less interested and more receptive to the opinions of American businessmen. He appointed Thomas C. Mann as the person responsible for Latin American affairs.
Influence on the thinking of the Brazilian military The Brazilian Army in the 1960s had an American-style organization and military doctrine. Among the influences was the , disseminated from the US military to their Latin American peers and taught in military schools along the lines of the National War College. In the Brazilian case, it was the (ESG), and its ideology advocated alignment with the U.S. However, the theories developed at ESG were not merely those received from the U.S., since the School synthesized already existing concepts of both Brazilian and foreign origins, among them American. The officers connected with it were prominent, but they comprised only one among several military tendencies. Besides the ESG, the military was also influenced through the Caribbean School or School of the Americas.
Relationship with Jânio Quadros' government