8th Army Group Royal Artillery (8 AGRA) was a brigade-sized formation organised by Britain's Royal Artillery (RA) during World War II to command medium and heavy guns. It served in the campaign in North West Europe, participating in the battles in the Orne valley and the bocage south of Caumont before the breakout from the Normandy beachhead, operations to close up to the Maas, and the assault crossing of the Rhine (Operation Plunder).
Background The need for a higher organisational command structure for medium and heavy artillery became apparent during the Battle of France and the early part of the Western Desert Campaign. The Army Group Royal Artillery (AGRA) concept was developed during Exercise 'Bumper' held in the UK in 1941, organised by the commander of Home Forces, General Alan Brooke (himself a Gunner) with Lt-Gen Bernard Montgomery as chief umpire.Farndale, p. 99. This large anti-invasion exercise tested many of the tactical concepts that would be used by the British Army in the latter stages of the war. The gunnery tacticians developed the AGRAs as powerful artillery brigades, usually comprising three or four medium regiments and one heavy regiment, which could be rapidly moved about the battlefield, and had the punch to destroy enemy artillery with counter-battery (CB) fire. AGRAs were provided to field armies at a scale of about one per Army corps.Buckley, p. 41 & fn 60, p. 309.Ellis, Normandy Appendix IV. AGRAs were improvised until 26 November 1942, when they were officially sanctioned, to consist of a commander (CAGRA) and staff to control non-divisional artillery. They proved their worth in the Tunisian campaign.Playfair & Molony, Vol IV, pp. 273, 389.
Organisation 8 AGRA was formed on 1 May 1943 at Brandeston Hall, Woodbridge, Suffolk, from the Headquarters, RA, of 54th (East Anglian) Infantry Division, which was being broken up.Frederick, p. 965.Joslen, p. 89.8 AGRA at RA 1939–45. It was assigned to 21st Army Group being formed for the planned invasion of Normandy (Operation Overlord). At the time its organisation was as follows:Order of Battle of the Forces in the United Kingdom, Part 2: 21 Army Group, 24 July 1943, with amendments, The National Archives (TNA), Kew, file WO 212/238. 177th Field Regiment – redesignated 25th Field Regiment 14 March 1943Frederick, pp. 507, 539. 15th Medium Regiment – transferred to 2 Canadian AGRA May 194415 Med Rgt at RA 1939–45. 61st Carnarvon & Denbigh (Yeomanry) Medium Regiment 63rd (Midland) Medium Regiment 77th (Duke of Lancaster's Own Yeomanry) Medium Regiment 53rd Heavy Regiment
By the time of the Normandy landings, medium regiments were equipped with the 5.5-inch gun (two 8-gun batteries), heavy regiments with 155 mm guns and 7.2-inch howitzers (two 4-gun batteries of each). In the field they were often supplemented by 3.7-inch heavy anti-aircraft (HAA) guns from the AA brigades who had few air targets.Routledge, p. 314. Although AGRAs were 'Army Troops', 8 AGRA primarily supported VIII Corps
Service
Operation Overlord HQ 8 AGRA landed at Arromanches on 18 June and it fought through the subsequent campaign under the command of Brigadier Archibald Campbell of Achalader, DSO, OBE (previously Commander, RA, of 47th (London) Infantry Division). It was accompanied by C flight, 652 Air Observation Post Squadron, and set up at Sainte-Croix-Grand-Tonne to prepare for the forthcoming Operation Epsom.Townend & Baldwin, pp. 234, 236–8.Farndale, Annex J.Campbell at Generals of WWII. It was to have the following organisation for most of the campaign:Anon, Bluecoat, Appendix A.Townend & Baldwin, Appendix A. 25th Fd Rgt – arrived 18 June 61st (C&DY) Med Rgt – arrived 2 July'''Townend & Baldwin, pp. 315–6. 63rd (M) Med Rgt – arrived 2 July 77th (DLOY) Med Rgt– arrived 18 June 146th (Pembroke & Cardiganshire Yeomanry) Med Rgt – arrived 15 JulyTownend & Baldwin, p. 409. 53rd Hvy Rgt – arrived 18 June 116 Company Royal Army Service Corps
Operation Epsom Epsom was launched on 26 June. Phase 1 of the fireplan, which included neighbouring divisional artillery and AGRAs, was to support the attack by 15th (Scottish) Infantry Division with a creeping barrage of field and medium artillery on a frontage of advancing to a depth of , beginning at H-Hour (07.30) and continuing until 10.16. 25th Field Rgt was directly allocated to 15th (Scottish) Division to support its attached 31st Tank Brigade; it was ordered to deploy as far forward as possible to be able to support the tanks throughout their advance. 15th (S) Division's historian described the barrage opening at H-Hour 'with an ear-splitting crack'. The infantry advanced behind the barrage, though 44th (Lowland) Brigade on the left was disrupted by German artillery firing blind in to the smokescreen, and 46th (Highland Light Infantry) Brigade ran into a minefield and was held up, together with its supporting tanks, and lost the barrage. In some cases the advancing infantry failed to detect and 'mop up' some of the defenders from 12th SS Pioneer Battalion, who emerged from their trenches to fire into the backs of the infantry. When 25th Field Rgt reached its forward position and began to deploy, it found itself under fire from these parties; gunners of 12th/25th Field Battery had to fight a ground action with tank support to clear snipers out of a wood before the battery could deploy. The other two batteries also had to mop up defenders and clear mines from their positions. 44th (L) Brigade captured St Manvieu, but 46th (HLI) Bde had to fight all day for Cheux and Phase 1 was well behind schedule.Buckley, pp. 77–81.Ellis, Normandy, pp. 275–9.Martin, pp. 31–6.Saunders, Epsom, pp. 28–9, 39–66, Appendix A.Townend & Baldwin, pp. 247–51.
For Phase 2, the exploitation by 227th (Highland) Bde and 11th Armoured Division, the fireplan involved a series of concentrations between the railway and the River Odon, of which the first 10 were timed (including 68th Med Rgt) and a further 35 were to fired on call from the divisions (involving 68th and 77th Med Rgts and 53rd Heavy Rgt). 77th Medium Rgt was placed under the command of 11th Armoured to engage opportunity targets identified by the division's ground and air observation posts (OPs). With Cheux still not secured, Phase 2 developed into scrappy fighting. The tanks of 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend coming into action prevented an armoured breakthrough. However, the first day of Epsom had succeeded in creating a deep salient into the German lines (known as 'Scottish Corridor'), which VIII Corps endeavoured to exploit over succeeding days, extending it as far as the Odon bridges.Buckley, pp. 81–4.Ellis, Normandy, pp. 279–85.Martin, pp. 37–8.Saunders, Epsom, pp. 68–86, 90–120.Townend & Baldwin, pp. 251–60.
When II SS Panzer Corps counter-attacked on 29 June, the attack of 10th SS Panzer Division Frundsberg was broken by the combined Defensive Fire (DF) of 8 AGRA and the entire divisional artilleries of 15th (S) and 11th Armoured Divisions, which caused hundreds of casualties. 165th HAA Regiment fired to suppress German Flak ahead of the Royal Air Force fighter-bombers, and continued firing through the night at woods where the enemy were trying to reform – firing so fast that the paint blistered on the guns. German night attacks were illuminated with star shells, and the artillery fired protective barrages rather than trying to identify specific targets. Next day the Germans could only make probing attacks, to which 8 AGRA responded with some 38,000 rounds of ammunition.Ellis, Normandy, pp. 285–6.Saunders, Epsom, pp. 155–74.Buckley, pp. 84–5.Ellis, Normandy, pp. 275–86.Townend & Baldwin, pp. 261–4.
61st and 63rd Medium Rgts arrived on 2 July, deploying at St Manvieu and Secqueville-en-Bessin respectively. 8 AGRA was still short of one medium regiment so it was loaned 72nd Med Rgt, arriving ahead of the rest of 3 AGRA at Sainte-Croix-Grand-Tonne. However, this left on 6 July and for VIII Corps' next thrust (Operation Jupiter) on 10 July, 8 AGRA kept 84th Medium and 165 HAA Rgts, with 275 HAA Bty attached to 84th Med Rgt at Rauray while 198 and 317 HAA Btys were directly under 8 AGRA. The AGRA's tasks were to be CB, counter-flak, counter-mortar (CM) and harassing fire (HF), some fired at extreme range. The aim of Jupiter was to recapture Hill 112, which had briefly been held during Epsom, and the villages of Éterville and Maltot, thus opening the way to the River Orne. It was to be carried out mainly by 43rd (Wessex) Division supported by the guns of three divisional artilleries and three AGRAs, including 8 AGRA. The artillery allocation was as follows:Townend & Baldwin, pp. 319–21. 61st (C&DY) Med Rgt to Royal Scots Greys of 4th Armoured Bde 63rd (Midland) Med Rgt to 46th (HLI) Bde of 15th (S) Division 77th (DLOY) Med Rgt to 130th Bde of 43rd (W) Division 84th (Sussex) Med Rgt to 129th Bde of 43rd (W) Division
Each medium regiment provided a double OP with two forward observation officer (FOO) parties to the field regiment supporting the brigade and a flight of 659 AOP Squadron was allocated to 3 and 8 AGRAs. 10th Survey Rgt provided flash-spotting and sound-ranging troops to identify enemy batteries, and 8 AGRA was responsible for the CB and CM tasks, with the infantry's 3-inch and 4.2-inch mortars incorporated into the programme. On 10 July the fireplan began with HF tasks from 01.00 to 03.00, then heavy timed concentrations on all the known centres of enemy resistance began at 03.50. 8 AGRA's four medium regiments fired for 10 minutes on Les Duanes, the first objective of 5th Battalion Dorset Regiment, just south of Fontaine-Étoupefour. Meanwhile 53rd Hvy Rgt was firing a series of 9-minute concentrations on various target with 3 AGRA. There was a separate task table to support the Royal Scots Greys, with 14 targets to be fired on by up to ten field, four medium and a heavy regiment.
The infantry began their advance behind a creeping field gun barrage at 05.00. 10th SS Panzer Division was largely shattered by the weight of artillery directed against it. But the bombardment had failed to suppress the enemy artillery, which opened up on the British infantry's start line. 130th Bde got into Éterville and Maltot, but on Hill 112 129th Bde suffered casualties from 5.5-inch shells (possibly from 84th Med Rgt) falling short, and the Germans sent in a counter-attack by 9th SS Panzer Division Hohenstaufen. A stalemate developed on Hill 112, and Maltot was untenable unless the ridge could be taken. 43rd (W) Division launched a fresh attack towards the end of the day, and although driven back it gained a footing on the crest, which was held against counter-attacks during the night with artillery support. When a company of 5th Bn Wiltshire Regiment got into difficulties later in the day, it was extricated with corps-level fire support including guns of the AGRAs. The medium batteries moved forward to keep them within range of the battle. 61st Medium Rgt had fired 1877 rounds, their highest daily total of the campaign, and 77th Med Rgt had fired 22 full regimental concentrations. Fighting continued next day, and the infantry had to withdraw from the crest onto the reverse slope: the top of the ridge became a No man's land that neither side could occupy. However, the artillery support ensured that German counter-attacks could not succeed. Casualties had been heavy among the British artillery's OPs and command posts.Ellis, Normandy, pp. 317–8<.Essame, pp. 37–46.Saunders, Hill 112, pp. 52–96, 189.Townend & Baldwin, pp. 324–35.
Operation Greenline