The Hengyang "11.3" especially serious fire was a fire that occurred in Hengzhou Tower, Hengyang, Hunan Province on the early morning of November 3, 2003. The fire did not result in the death of any civilians, though 20 firefighters were killed. The subsequent collapse of the building was listed as an 'especially serious collapse and fire' by government regulators, the public security bureau and various inspectors, and the death of 20 firefighters was the largest loss of firefighters in China since 1949.汤淳."衡阳“11.3”特大火灾坍塌事故真相." 劳动保护 .08(2004):24-25. doi:CNKI:SUN:LDBH.0.2004-08-010.
Background Hengzhou Towers was a reinforced concrete masonry supported building with nine levels constructed as part of the plan for Hengzhou Market. The building was built in the courtyard style with an atrium in the centre, surrounded by the mixed-use building divided into five connected residential blocks occupying levels 2 to 9, with each block only accessed through its own set of stairs. It was constructed in 1998, when there were incentives in Hengyang for developers to take on such projects, such as projects with a cost of less than 3,000,000 RMB were not subject to a more thorough approval phase. This posed a significant risk to safety, as this meant the plans would not be first checked by experienced engineers.
Zhuhui District, where the building was located, had a significant fire risk due to insufficient planning oversight and being a relatively historical district. Many markets in the district lacked sufficient spacing between each other, lacked firewalls and were built with non-compliant fire escapes. By December 2021, a large scale retrofitting of indoors firefighting equipment had been completed, significantly reducing the fire risk.颜雨彬 & 陈仲文.(2022).让百姓生活更有保障——湖南衡阳珠晖区市场群重大火灾隐患整改清零. 中国消防(06),23-25. doi:CNKI:SUN:XFZG.0.2022-06-012.
Construction The building was originally built as a mixed use, residential and commercial building. Construction began in April 1997, immediately after Yongxing Group Corporation had been formed. While the approved plan was to have a building with a maximum floor area of 5809 m2, the constructed building instead had a total floor area of 9300 m2. Expanding building size without authorisation was common in Hengyang, which led to many buildings being inappropriately spaced from one another to as little as 2 metres,王秋衡."湖南衡阳特大建筑火灾事故的剖析." 建筑安全 .04(2004):38-39. doi:CNKI:SUN:JZAQ.0.2004-04-017. and creating fire hazards, as the new design was not signed off by enough architects. The building had two different architectural plans, where one depicting a land use of 5800 m2 of 3 blocks arranged east to west was to be shown to the authorities, while the other was the actually built plan showed it occupying 9300 m2 or 8600 m2 in a courtyard format, maximising the profits from construction by reducing the fees that would have to paid for constructing a larger building."法院受理衡阳11·3火灾案." 安全与健康 .21(2004):22. doi:CNKI:SUN:LDAQ.0.2004-21-019. The original design was planned by the city committee, and subsequently handed to Jiangdong City Construction Development Company, then given to Hengyang Yongxing Construction company, later Yongxing Group Corporation, an unlicensed construction company consisting mostly unskilled labourers.陈家强."关于湖南衡阳“11·3”特大火灾坍塌事故几个重要问题的研究." [Several critical problems concerning the severe conflagration of “11·3” in Hengyang] 武警学院学报 .(JOURNAL OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE’S ARMED POLICE FORCE ACADEMY) 03(2004):5-8. doi:CNKI:SUN:WUJI.0.2004-03-000. As the original plans were not required to be kept in the city archives, it made verification on the legality of construction work difficult, but this was made worse by the fact that no-one from the city administration even bothered to follow up on the significant discrepancies between the plans. Even when construction began, no attention was paid to the fact that the developers never received a permit to start work. This arrangement violated a regulation, stating that the developer was not allowed to also be the construction company for the building.
In 1997, when You Jiasi, responsible for the construction of the overall project of Hengzhou Market pointed out flaws in the construction of the building's fire exit and drainage pipes, which had to be ventilated by an air blower, he was beaten up by a group of people in the afternoon, who burst into his office. This beating resulted in three broken ribs. Eventually, Yongxing Group Corporation compensated him 20,000 RMB.
The building never received documentation allowing the construction. Instead, the company used outdated permits that merely showed the transfer of land rights to the developers. The construction company was not certified nor even qualified, and the construction of the building itself never received a permit. By paying a different company with a designing permit a total of 10,000 RMB, the developers were able to have the building appear as if had been legitimately designed. Upon completion of the residential portion of the building in October 1998, residents were immediately allowed to move in without the building undergoing a comprehensive inspection. Before an inspection is completed, the building should not be inhabited, and the residency certificates are only supposed to be issued after the inspection. The building was never inspected, as it had not received a permit to be built. As a building that had never been certified, it should not have been able to be sold, but the construction company forged documents that gave it the appearance of a legally constructed building. Through 'pre-sales', the developers were able to sell off housing that would otherwise have been illegal, and impossible to sell without a residential permit.
Nonetheless, a preliminary inspection upon completion by firefighters revealed that the building did not have adequate spacing to the buildings next to it, that there were less fire hydrants than such a building should have and insufficient firefighting apparatus inside the building. In theory, the fire department had the authority to fine the building owners and prevent its use, as stipulated in the 'Firefighting Law'.
A resident of Hengzhou Tower recalled that in 1999, the walls and ceiling around the kitchen and toilet started leaking water, and horizontal beams in the centre of the living room had shown cracks. Some of the vendors who used level 1 as a warehouse burned sulfur for the gas that it creates to process dried food. Although this was seen as a fire hazard, the property management group paid no attention to it even after the residents put together a petition.
The construction permit was issued in 2000 for a 6-story building. Even then, the actual plans were not handed over to the city archives. Out of over 20 developments by Yongxing Group, only 3 were provided to the city archives for inspection. The company used various excuses, such as being a private company or lobbying politicians to avoid more detailed scrutiny. From the available plans, several penalty notices were issued to the company, though this process complicated relations between the company and the archives, with the drawn out legal process hampering efforts to get more plans of their building developments.邱涛,罗加惕."衡阳“11·3”特大火灾坍塌事故的前后." 城建档案 .02(2004):38-39. doi:CNKI:SUN:CJDA.0.2004-02-015.
Building Various other changes to the building included reducing two evacuation stairwells to just one. The stairs from the residential to commercial areas were split into stairs on the east side of the building from level 1 to 2, and then five other stairwells that serves residential portion from 2 to 9. The building only had two hydrants, of which one lacked a hose and piping. Levels 2 to 9 were residential with 96 units housing 412 residents.
Originally, level 1 housed a medical supplies market, which closed in 1999 due to consolidation of the market. Subsequently, it was converted into a warehouse, without notifying the fire department as would be necessary, due to the changing purpose of the building. It was protected with roller shutters, but the 21 storage compartments were not closed off from one another, merely separated by a metal mesh which would contribute to the spread of the fire. It was used to store flammable goods among dry goods, but extra firefighting equipment associated with the storage of dangerous goods was never fitted and the cluttered nature hampered firefighting efforts.
Fire
Fire reported At 4:39 a.m., a fire broke out on level 1 of building, which originated in the northwest of the floor and eventually spread to the rest of the building. The security guard initially did not react to the smoke coming from Level 1, and only after a visible fire was seen did he attempt to use a dry powder fire extinguisher to fight the fire, but was unable to extinguish the fire. Subsequently, he attempted to use one of the two fire hydrants in the building, but found that the hose and pipe were missing.
The first call to 119 was connected at 5:39 a.m., giving ample time for the fire to develop. Within three minutes of the call, the first firefighters from Zhuhui District arrived with 20 firefighters in three engines and started using the hose to attempt to douse the fire. Firefighting efforts were hampered by the large amount of objects placed in the makeshift warehouse on level 1, which was mostly electronics, dry goods and synthetic rubber. When set on fire, these objects released large amounts of noxious fumes, hampering the efforts at controlling the fire. Due to the density of the illegal constructions surrounding the building, it was hard to attack the fire from outside, but also hard to do so from the inside due to the cluttered nature of the warehouse area. The courtyard layout turned the atrium area into a funnel, where the fire was extremely fierce and necessitating firefighters to cross deeply through the building to access this area.
At 5:58 a.m., an additional three water tenders, one ladder and a support vehicle were deployed from Zhuhui District; another four water tenders came from Yanfeng District and Shigu District. Two municipal water spraying vehicles were also deployed with a total of 130 firefighters arriving. This was due to low pressure in the hydrants on the street.
Evacuation of residents As the fire occurred before sunrise, most residents were asleep and unaware of the fire. Firefighters had to run from door-to-door to wake up the residents, and alert them to evacuate from the building. By 8 am, all residents had been safely evacuated, but it was slowed down by the inadequate number of stairwells, as to go down from level 2 to 1, residents of all five blocks had to pass through a single set of stairs and the inadequate supply of breathing apparatus. A number of people opened the roller shutters to attempt to reach their level 1 storage space or stall, but due to the open-plan nature of level 1, the opening of the shutter not only allowed winds to increase the spread of the fire, but also provided more fuel for the fire to burn.
Collapse After three hours, the fire, was brought under control at around 8 am to the ground floor and firefighters started to be rotated out to have breakfast, but at 8:33 a.m., Block 3 and 4 (the east and west wings, about two-fifths of the building) of the residential towers collapsed without warning, trapping 21 firefighters under the debris.
It was captured on camera by one of the journalists, who was injured by in the collapse.
Recovery