Polish arms sales to Republican Spain took place between September 1936 and February 1939 during the Spanish Civil War. Poland sold weapons to the Republicans. Since Poland was bound by non-intervention obligations, Polish governmental officials and the military disguised sales as commercial transactions mediated by international brokers and targeting customers in various countries, principally in Latin America; there are 54 shipments from Danzig and Gdynia identified.
Most hardware sold were obsolete and worn-out second-rate weapons, though there were also some modern arms delivered; all were 20-30% overpriced. Polish sales amounted to $40m and constituted some 5-7% of overall Republican military spendings, though in terms of quantity certain categories of weaponry, like machine-guns, might have accounted for 50% of all arms delivered. After the USSR, Poland was the second largest arms supplier for the Republic. After the USSR, Italy and Germany, Poland was the 4th largest arms supplier to the war-engulfed Spain.
Background
Antecedents
Prior to outbreak of the Spanish Civil War there was very little interaction - either in terms of conflict or co-operation - between Spain and Poland. Both countries operated in entirely different geo-political zones and their interests did not coincide. Mutual relations were reduced to very meager trade exchangeDawid Kabaciński, Polsko–hiszpańskie kontakty gospodarcze w okresie międzywojennym, [in:] Przegląd Historyczny CI/4 (2010), pp. 651-662 (in both cases below 0,5% of the overall foreign trade volume),Spanish-Polish trade volume in 1932–1935 averaged 3,3m zlotys ($0.6m) annually (2,5m zlotys 1932, 3,0m in 1933, 2,4m in 1934 and 5,4m in 1935), Jan Stanisław Ciechanowski, Podwójna gra. Rzeczpospolita wobec hiszpańskiej wojny domowej 1936–1939, Warszawa 2014, , p. 145 diplomatic maneuvers within the League of Nations (competition for permanent seat in the Council led to Spanish temporary withdrawal from the organization; other issues included the question of Tangier in case of Spain or the question of national minorities in case of Poland),Pablo de Azcaraté was longtime official and then head of the Minorities Secretariat; for detailed discussion see Xosé Manoel Nuñez Seixas, Entre Ginebra y Berlín. La cuestión de las minorías nacionales y la política internacional en Europa: 1914–1939, Madrid 2001, and typical consular problems (e.g. properties of Spanish aristocrats in Polande.g. Karl Stephan Habsburg, owner of numerous estates in southern Poland, was brother to Maria Christina, queen-regent and mother of Alfonso XIII, Ciechanowski 2014, p. 38. María de los Dolores of Bourbon-Two Sicilies was married to a Polish aristocrat August Józef Czartoryski or demi-world of Polish shady traders and prostitutes, mostly of Jewish origin, resident in Catalonia).Ciechanowski 2014, p. 43 Both states maintained their diplomatic representations in respective capitals, though not at the embassy level.Ciechanowski 2014, pp. 35-37 Internal political developments in either Spain or Poland were duly acknowledged; fall of liberal democracy, Primo dictatorship and arrival of the Second Republic did not cause any particular reaction in Warsaw; similarly Piłsudski's coup and further increasing authoritarian and dictatorial evolution of the government in Warsaw did not trigger any response in Madrid. However, in the early 1930s the Polish trading conglomerate SEPEWE, made of companies from the arms industry and controlled by the Polish general staff,Ciechanowski 2014, pp. 474-5 a number of times approached the Spanish army and police offering tankettes, hand grenades, training aircraft and communication equipment,the official SEPEWE representative in Spain was the retired general staff colonel, José Doménech Vidal. In early days of the civil war he sought shelter in the Polish legacy in Madrid. Between April and September 1939 he again acted as the SEPEWE representative; since he clearly sided with the Nationalists, it is unlikely he was involved in arms trade with the Republic, Ciechanowski 2014, pp. 469-470 but it kept losing to foreign competitors, who usually operated their own manufacturing facilities in Spain.Marek Piotr Deszczyński, Eksport polskiego sprzętu wojskowego do Hiszpanii podczas wojny domowej 1936–1939, [in:] Kwartalnik Historyczny CIV/1 (1997), p. 48
Warsaw diplomacy and the Spanish Civil War
One of two fundamental principles of the Polish interwar diplomacy – apart from remaining equidistant towards Germany and the USSR - was cultivating the political-military alliance with France, the only reliable Polish ally. Hence, in cases where no specific Polish interest was at stake, Warsaw tended to side with Paris. When France embarked on the non-intervention policy towards the Spanish Civil War, Poland soon followed suit,Ciechanowski 2014, pp. 51-55 though in some specific and usually minor issues the Polish diplomacy might have sided with Italy, considered a rather friendly country.see e.g. Polish stance on aerial bombings, discussed at the League of Nations sitting in September 38, Ciechanowski 2014, pp. 132-133 In general terms Poland calculated that co-operation between Britain, France, Italy and Germany in enforcement of non-intervention was highly desirable, since it worked towards political stability on the continent.Ciechanowski 2014, p. 65
No specific potential political gains to be achieved in Spain have been identified by the Poles and it has been decided that in principle, Warsaw should stick to neutrality and refrain from supporting any of the warring sides. In terms of problems the Poles were gradually getting concerned about the growing Soviet influence in Spain, which triggered some anti-Soviet Polish votes at the Non-Intervention Committee. The German engagement caused much less anxiety, though some Polish diplomats had misgivings about France being potentially surrounded by 3 hostile neighbors.Polish policy towards the war in Spain discussed in general in Ciechanowski 2014, pp. 120-142 Earlier Polish historiography speculated that these concerns might have triggered secret arms sales to the Republic,"Tym też - jak się zdaje - należy tłumaczyć potajemne dostawy broni dla armii republikańskiej przekazywane za pośrednictwem II Oddziału Sztabu Generalnego", Józef Buszko, Historia Polski vol. 4, Warszawa 1984, , p. 328 but this theory is no longer maintained. Some Polish decision-makers believed that as long as Germany and the USSR were engaged in Spain they were unlikely to embark on aggressive policy in Eastern Europe, but there is no evidence that such speculations shaped the official Polish stand.review of Polish intelligence reports and speculations within the official Polish structures, including Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the army General Staff, in Ciechanowski 2014, pp. 298-456
Two Spains and Poland
The Republic continuously maintained official diplomatic relations with Poland. The pre-war Spanish minister in WarsawFrancisco Serrat y Bonastre (1871–1952) was a professional diplomat. In 1936 he briefly acted as minister of foreign affairs in Junta Técnica del Estado, the Franco quasi-government and its first secretary sided with the rebels; following 7 months when the second secretary was in charge, since March 1937 the mission was taken over by 3 successive envoys acting as charge d’affaires.the mission was headed by the second secretary until in March 1937 Marian Ruiz-Funes García arrived as chargé d'affaires. In June he was transferred to Brussels and the mission was assumed by Manuel Martínez Pedroso y Macías, who in July 1938 left for Moscow. At this point the representation was taken over by José Medina Echevarría (1903–1977; he was professor of law in Murcia and deputy to the Cortes; after the war he resided in Mexico, Colombia and Chile, where he passed away) he acted as deputy during the tenure of both his predecessors The Polish minister in MadridMarian Szumlakowski (1893–1961) was a career diplomat, in 1927–1933 effectively second in command in the MFA. In Nationalist/Francoist Spain he was extremely respected as the one who co-ordinated first sheltering and then evacuating some 400 refugees, seeking asylum in Polish missions in republican Madrid. Official Polish representative to Francoist Spain until the exile government was refused recognition in late 1936 set his residence in Saint-Jean-de-Luz, like most of the diplomatic corps did. He refused invitation to settle in Valencia and until the end of the conflict operated from France, last visiting the Republican territory in late 1937. The Madrid mission was headed by chargé d'affaires, who became the key interface between the republican Foreign Ministry and the Polish diplomacy.Leopold Koziebrodzki (1909–1999, at times referred as Leopold Bolesta Koziebrodzki; he remained in diplomatic service of the exiled Polish government and passed away in the United States), later Mieczysław Skolimowski (1886-?, also "Skólimowski"; in diplomatic service he was employed in Brasil, France, Portugal and elsewhere; his later fate is unknown) Poland ceased to recognize Republican Spain in mid-February 1939; the Madrid mission was closed and evacuated in few days.
The Cabanellas’ message to Warsaw which notified emergence of Junta Nacional was ignored by the Polish diplomacy.Ciechanowski 2014, p. 48 Since October 1936 the former second secretary of Spanish diplomatic representation in BudapestJuan Serrat y Valera (1905–1978) was son of Francisco Serrat y Bonastre; he spent all his life in diplomacy, since 1929 in the royal service, in 1931–1936 in the republican one, and after 1936 as representative of the Francoist Spain started to act as unofficial Nationalists’ representative in Warsaw; he had access to lower-level officials of Ministry of Foreign Affairsnormally the Spanish affairs were handled by Witold Kozłowski, head of the one-man section in MFA, Ciechanowski 2014, p. 494 and enjoyed increasingly favorable treatment. In Nationalist Spain initially the Polish mission in Lisbon maintained sporadic contacts with the Burgos administration. Since mid-1937 its employeeBohdan Szmejko (1900–1977); other sources prefer the "Szmejka" spelling. Before 1936 he was a low-level official in Lisbon; after 1939 he remained in diplomatic service of the Polish government in exile, mostly in Latin America. Did not return to communist Poland became the first unofficial Polish representative, resident mostly in San Sebastián; also the Polish minister with the republican government became increasingly engaged in parallel contacts with the Nationalists. In October 1938 Poland recognized Nationalist Spain de facto,Since late 1937 the Nationalist diplomacy insisted on de iure recognition, and in the spring of 1938 Poland was leaning towards granting it; the Ebro offensive put these plans on hold and in February 1939 de iure.
Republic seeking arms