The Battle of La Haye-du-Puits was fought between the armies of the United States and Germany as part of the Normandy Campaign of World War II. Following the Allied invasion of Normandy on D-Day, 6 June 1944, US First Army under the command of Lieutenant General Omar Bradley began an advance to the south, aiming to break through the German defenses and secure a line from Coutances to Saint-Lô. This would help the rest of the First Army cross the swamps and , and put the American front on firm and dry ground more suitable for the employment of mechanized forces. Although the battle was costly for the Americans, it was also costly for the Germans; by wearing down their forces, it paved the way for Operation Cobra on 25 July, which broke through the German defenses.
The most striking geographical feature of the area was the , earthen embankments topped with small trees and tangled underbrush and vines, separated by sunken lanes. The hedgerows provided cover, camouflage and concealment to the German defenders, which reduced the effectiveness of American artillery. Small detachments defended each field. The terrain favoured the defense, and the German LXXXIV Corps under the command of Dietrich von Choltitz effectively utilized the bocage with defensive tactics. The German Seventh Army commander, Paul Hausser, echeloned his forces in a defense in depth, manning the forward area lightly with prepared fallback defensive positions, and hoarded the bulk of his troops, tanks and assault guns for counter-attacks.
Between 5 and 14 July, the American troops of the VIII Corps under the command of Major General Troy H. Middleton's pushed southward through forest, swamps and bocage to capture the high ground around La Haye-du-Puits. The advance was bitterly contested. The 82nd Airborne Division achieved some success, taking the key positions of Hill 131 and La Poterie ridge. The 79th Infantry Division captured Hill 121 and make progress towards Montgardon ridge. The 90th Infantry Division fought through heavy German resistance to capture Mont Castre ridge and advance towards Périers. The 8th Infantry Division captured the ridge overlooking the Ay River. The Americans reached their objective, the Sèves River, on 14 July.
Background
Following the successful Allied invasion of Normandy on D-Day, 6 June 1944, progress was slow. The original plan for the campaign envisioned the British Second Army under the command of Lieutenant-General Miles Dempsey in the east securing Caen and the area to the south of it to acquire airfields and protect the left flank. Meanwhile, the First US Army under the command of Lieutenant General Omar Bradley in the west was to capture the deep water port of Cherbourg by D plus 15 (15 days after D-Day), and advance south to the Loire valley by D plus 20. The American forces would then turn west to clear Brittany and capture the ports there, before heading east to the Seine, which was expected would be reached by D plus 90. This would conclude the first phase of Operation Overlord.
Before D-Day, the German commanders had disagreed on the correct way to handle the anticipated Allied invasion, with Erwin Rommel, the commander of Army Group B favoring a forward defence, while his superior, Gerd von Rundstedt, the commander of (OB West), favored a mobile one. In the end, neither was fully adopted. Afterwards they agreed on containing the Allied advance while massing their forces for a counter-attack, but the British Operation Epsom attack near Caen on 25 June forced them to deploy their reserves in that sector. On 29 June, a new strategy was adopted: containing the Allied forces in Normandy where the terrain favored the defense, and the Allied ability to maneuver their mobile forces was restricted.
Successive Anglo-Canadian offensives failed to take Caen, but they kept the best of the German forces in Normandy, including most of the armor, in this area. With no ports in Allied hands, all reinforcements and supplies arrived over the beaches or via two "Mulberry" artificial harbors. On 19 June, a storm descended on the English Channel that lasted for three days, destroyed the American Mulberry, and caused significant delays to the Allied build-up. In the west, Bradley halted attacks to the south before the town of Saint-Lô, in order to concentrate on the capture of Cherbourg. Cherbourg fell on 26 June, and organized German resistance in the northern Cotentin Peninsula ended on 1 July.
The First US Army's next task after the capture of Cherbourg was to head south towards the Loire. The US VIII Corps, under the command of Major General Troy H. Middleton was ordered to make a quick advance to Coutances. This would help the rest of the First Army cross the swamps and , and put the entire American front on firm and dry ground more suitable for the employment of mechanized forces. The ground in front of the VIII Corps formed a sector between the Prairies Marécageuses de Gorges and the tidal flats of the . American activity in this sector had been restricted due to ammunition shortages, with priority being given to the capture of Cherbourg.
The Supreme Allied Commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, wanted Bradley to commence the operation as soon as possible in order to prevent the Germans from consolidating their position. Not all the American forces were in position, with many still in the north or yet to arrive from the UK, so Bradley elected to commit them piecemeal rather than wait. The advance would begin on his western flank; since the forces there had further to advance than those around Saint-Lô, all might reach the objective at the same time.
Opposing forces United States For the attack, Middleton had three divisions, all of which had participated in the June fighting in Normandy. The 79th Infantry Division, under the command of Major General Ira T. Wyche, would advance west of La Haye-du-Puits in a southerly direction, seizing Montgardon ridge and Hill 121. Meanwhile, the 90th Infantry Division would advance to the east of La Haye-du-Puits in a southwesterly direction and capture Mont Castre. The two attacks would converge to the south of Mont Castre. The choice of the 90th Infantry Division was problematic: it had performed poorly in the early fighting, and its commander, Brigadier General Jay W. MacKelvie, had been relieved and replaced by Brigadier General Eugene M. Landrum.
Major General Matthew B. Ridgway's 82nd Airborne Division, was the most experienced of the three, having seen action in Sicily and Italy, and American airborne troops had higher physical and mental standards than regular infantry. Nonetheless, it was given the least demanding assignment because it was scheduled to soon return to the UK to participate in upcoming airborne operations. It was due to be replaced by the 8th Infantry Division, but that formation did not arrive in Normandy until 3 July, and it had not yet been in combat. The 82nd Airborne Division's mission was to seize the high ground to the north, consisting of Hill 131 and the three hills of the Poterie ridge. As the other two divisions advanced, it would be pinched out of the line.
To support the attack, Middleton had nine battalions of medium and heavy artillery, including two battalions of 240 mm howitzers, and the temporary assistance of four battalions of the neighboring VII Corps Artillery. Air support was also available. First Army had been rationing artillery ammunition, but stocks were considered adequate for the attack, and restrictions were temporarily lifted, with the caveat that excessive expenditure would result in their reimposition. It was expected that the battle would not last for more than two days.
The VIII Corps military intelligence staff was confident that the attack would be successful. The German forces were known to be understrength and short of ammunition and equipment. A counter-attack or staunch defense was not considered likely. German morale was rated as poor to fair; while German patrol activity had increased in the VIII Corps sector, the patrols had not been aggressive. In the days leading up to the attack, it was noted that German artillery had become more active, and small arms, automatic weapons and mortar fire had increased, indicating a higher level of alertness. The hitherto sporadic use of German ammunition had been interpreted as a conservation measure, and the increased activity was taken as a sign that the Germans were preparing to withdraw.
The basic weapon of the American infantryman was the M1 Garand, a semi-automatic rifle. Each American infantry squad had twelve men, of whom ten were equipped with Garands. One had the older, bolt-action M1903 Springfield, which was used as a sniper rifle, and one carried an M1918 Browning automatic rifle (BAR). Three squads formed a platoon, and three platoons, a small headquarters and a weapons platoon made up a rifle company with a strength of 6 officers and 187 enlisted men. The weapons platoon was equipped with two M1919 Browning machine guns, a Browning .50 caliber machine gun, three 60 mm mortars and three 2.36 in rocket launchers, commonly known as bazookas.
Three rifle companies and a heavy weapons company formed a battalion, and three battalions, an anti-tank company, a cannon company and a service company formed an infantry regiment. The infantry division had three regiments, which were supported by four field artillery battalions, three of which were equipped with twelve 105 mm howitzers and one with 155 mm howitzers. The Germans considered the American artillery to be extremely effective, but its true power lay not in its caliber or their number, but in effective communications and fire control.
The American infantry division did not possess an organic tank battalion. Instead, there was a pool of separate tank battalions that could be attached to infantry divisions, individually or in groups. This was based on doctrine that the main role of armor was for exploitation, and that they were best used massed together. The separate tank battalions had the same organization as those of the armored divisions, with three medium tank companies equipped with 17 M-4 Sherman tanks, and a light tank company equipped with M5 Stuart tanks. Nonetheless, they were considered inferior in training to their armored division counterparts, and had a lower priority for replacement officers, crewmen and spare parts.
Tank-infantry coordination was hampered by the practice of switching separate battalions between divisions. Between 12 June and 16 July 1944, the 746th Tank Battalion, for example, was attached to the 9th, 83rd and 90th Infantry Divisions. Many infantry officers had no training in working with tanks because doctrine was for them to operate separately, with either armor or infantry leading depending on the situation. The Shermans were outclassed by the heavier German Tiger I. Panzer IV and Panther tanks, which had more powerful guns and thicker armor. The main advantages of the Shermans were numbers, mechanical reliability, and rapidity of fire.
Germany