The presidential transition of Dwight D. Eisenhower began when he won the 1952 United States presidential election, becoming the president-elect, and ended when Eisenhower was inaugurated on January 20, 1953.
The transition was the first United States presidential transition to employ a large-scale transition process, with Eisenhower's transition having a staff of more than 100 individuals.
The transition has been considered to have been a rough one, with much tension between the president-elect and the outgoing president, Harry S. Truman. Eisenhower and Truman had developed bitter feelings during the course of the 1952 election campaign, which lingered through the transition. Eisenhower and Truman only met once in person in the time between the election and the day of the inauguration. Eisenhower regarded the advice that Truman had attempted to provide him with as being of little value, and rejected an invitation for a second in-person meeting. Eisenhower also declined offers from Truman for him to be involved in the lame duck Truman administration's decision making during the transition period. There was mixed-success in coordination between the designated subordinates of the incoming Eisenhower administration and the outgoing subordinates of the Truman administration. After the election, Truman instructed White House staff and heads of government departments to prepare briefing documents for the incoming Eisenhower administration, and Eisenhower was the first president-elect to appoint liaison representatives for key federal agencies.
The transition took place amid active United States combat in the Korean War. Fulfilling a campaign promise to visit Korea if elected, two weeks after his election victory Eisenhower made a covert three-day visit to Korea.
Background A presidential transition was guaranteed to occur in 1952 when incumbent president Harry S. Truman declined to run for reelection.Henry (1961), p. 457 This would be the first post-election presidential transition to take place following the ratification of the Twentieth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which shortened the duration of such presidential transitions from four months to just over two months.Brauer, p. XV This was also the first time there was a president-elect since the 1932 election.
Pre-election preparations Truman administration After Truman's March 29, 1952 announcement that he would not be seeking an additional term, a number of people in the federal government began making considerations for the impending presidential transition. For instance, in the weeks following the announcement, numerous staffers in the Bureau of the Budget began circulating staff papers on the topic of transition. These papers addressed a number of factors, including the history of relations between outgoing and incoming presidents during transitions and the question of whether the outgoing or incoming president should be responsible for proposing a budget for the incoming president's inaugural years.Henry (1961), p. 471 The Bureau had workers begin creating materials that would be used to brief the incoming president and their associates on matters such as the federal budget system and current budget, the functions of the office of the presidency, and the significant organizational issues of the United States federal government.Henry (1961), pp. 471–472
Soon after Truman's announcement that he would not seek reelection, work on preparing for a transition began among the White House staff, with Truman granting approval for such preparations to be undertaken.Henry (1961), p. 472
Truman had the Bureau of the Budget assumed the role of compiling briefing information for the next president. The bureau's various departments prepared an array briefing materials for the next president.Henry (1961). p. 477–478
In addressing the question of whether Truman or the incoming president should submit the budget proposal for 1953, Truman and his associates decided that Truman would submit a budget, but would invite liaisons of the president-elect's team to have access to the Bureau of the Budget promptly after the election concluded.
Soon after Truman's announcement that he'd forgo seeking an additional term, a staff member of the United States Department of State was assigned to study the problem of relations between outgoing presidential administrations and incoming administrations. The resultant report identified several foreign policy and national security matters where the nation could be vulnerable, both during the election campaign and transition. It also analyzed top prospective candidates for the presidency on how they might approach continuity of foreign policy. It made the recommendation of providing both major party nominees with briefings on defense and foreign affairs during the election campaign, and providing even greater briefings for the president-elect during the transition. It also recommended placing representatives of the president-elect in the federal government's principal agencies. The report also suggested that the president could possibly invite the president-elect to offer their agreement on certain decisions, while also insisting that ultimate responsibility for decisions would continue to rest on outgoing presidents until they leave office. The report was compiled in a matter of weeks. It then received the endorsement of United States Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who forwarded it to the White House, where Truman read it. Truman was grateful for this report. Based upon an interview with Truman staffer Charles Burton Marshall that he conducted in July 1959, Laurin L. Henry observed that this report, "apparently coincided with President Truman's thinking and served as an important policy guide during the subsequent months.Henry (1961), pp. 472–473
Truman determined that his administration would provide briefings to both major party candidates. While both candidates would receive weekly reports from the CIA and occasional updates from the Department of State, the overall effort to brief the candidates was ultimately poorly managed, and largely unsuccessful. However, it did help to further cement the practice of administrations providing briefings to the campaigns of major candidates.Henry (1961), pp. 473 and 477 The practice of a president providing opposition candidates with briefings had been begun by President Franklin D. Roosevelt during the 1944 presidential election, with Truman having continued it in the 1948 presidential election, with the presidents, in both instances, briefing their Republican opponent Thomas E. Dewey on certain matters.
In August, shortly after the Democratic National Convention, Truman invited newly-minted Democratic presidential nominee Adlai Stevenson II to meet with him at the White House for a briefing. The same offer was not extended to Eisenhower. Instead, Truman asked Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Omar N. Bradley to contact Eisenhower and provide him a general briefing, and to provide Eisenhower with regular intelligence reports after that. Bradley would misunderstand the urgency of Truman's request, and would fail to act on this before Truman's meeting with Stevenson. Truman's meeting with Stevenson would take place on August 12. The meeting was made known to the press, however, its purpose was not made clear, and, after the press speculated it would be focused on the role Truman would play in Stevenson's election campaign, Truman gave statements supporting this false narrative. Immediately before the meeting, the White House announced that Stevenson would be receiving a briefing during the meeting on defense and international affairs, though this announcement largely went unnoticed. For part of Stevenson's White House visit, he met in the Cabinet Room for a meeting with numerous administration officials, including as Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Omar N. Bradley, Director of Central Intelligence Walter Bedell Smith. The evening of the meeting, Eisenhower made a public statement lambasting the meeting, arguing that it demonstrated how Truman had hand-picked Stevenson to be his political successor, and criticizing the participation of figures such as Bradley and Smith it what was misunderstood to have been a campaign-focused meeting, arguing that their including indicated, "a decision to involve responsible nonpolitical officers of our Government...into a political campaign in which they have no part". Numerous Eisenhower backers echoed his grievances. The following day, Truman attempted to save face by extending Eisenhower a direct invitation to travel to Washington for a meeting with the Cabinet, briefing by the CIA, and the report on "the situation in the White House", which Eisenhower declined. Truman also informed Eisenhower that he and Stevenson were both to receive weekly reports by the CIA. Truman further attempted to save face, by publicly stating that arrangements had already been made much earlier to provide briefings to Eisenhower's camp, which Eisenhower's campaign denied. Soon, Bradley released a statement in which he took responsibility for his failure to have promptly carried out Truman's earlier orders to make arrangements with Eisenhower regarding briefings.Henry (1961), p. 473–477
Upset that Eisenhower had declined his offer for a White House meeting, Truman sent him a hand-written letter on August 16 urging him to change his mind. Eisenhower replied three days later, still declining. It appears that this may have been the last instance in which Eisenhower and Truman would communicate with each other until after the election.Henry (1961), p. 476
Eisenhower's pre-election planning Herbert Brownell Jr. and Lucius D. Clay began planning aspects of Eisenhower's administration ahead of the election, compiling a list of recommended candidates for his Cabinet in the weeks before the election.Henry (1961), p. 491
Eisenhower's victory After receiving a concession message from his Democratic opponent Adlai Stevenson, Eisenhower delivered his victory remarks at approximately 2pm Eastern Time on November 5, 1952 (the day after the 1952 election).Henry (1961), p. 445 Later that day, he would receive a congratulatory telegram from President Truman.Henry (1961), p. 446 Truman would, that afternoon, give a public statement to signal his acceptance of the election results as the will of the American voters, and urging Americans to lend their support to the president-elect, as well as making public a number of facets of the transition.Henry (1961). p. 479
Transition personnel and logistics Eisenhower's transition was headed by Herbert Brownell Jr. and Lucius D. Clay.
Eisenhower's presidential transition was the first to employ a large-scale transition process. In his 1960 analysis of presidential transitions, Laurin L. Henry would write that its headquarters presented, "by far the most systematic staff activity ever at the disposal of a President-elect". The transition had roughly 120 staffers.Brauer, p. 21 The transition relied significantly on volunteer staffers.
Soon after Eisenhower's victory, Joseph Dodge and Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. were named as Eisenhower's liaisons to the Truman administration.
Brownell was Eisenhower's top advisor on strategy, organization, and personnel. Another of Eisenhower's top advisors was Sherman Adams, who would be placed in charge of shaping Eisenhower's White House staff. Other key figures in the transition included James Hagerty (its press secretary) and Arthur H. Vandenberg Jr.Henry (1961), p. 489 In early December, Sherman Adams named Roger Steffan to be an advance agent for Eisenhower at the White House.
Eisenhower centered his transition planning at the Commodore Hotel in New York City, which had been the location of his presidential campaign headquarters.Henry (1961), pp. 463–464