The 1972 invasion of Uganda was an armed attempt by Ugandan insurgents, supported by Tanzania, to overthrow the regime of Idi Amin. Under the orders of former Ugandan President Milton Obote, insurgents launched an invasion of southern Uganda with limited Tanzanian support in September 1972. The rebel force mostly consisted of the "People's Army" whose forces were mainly loyal to Obote, but also included guerillas led by Yoweri Museveni. The operation was hampered by problems from the start, as a planned rebel commando raid had to be aborted, Amin was warned of the impending invasion, and the rebels lacked numbers, training, and equipment. Regardless, the militants occupied a few towns in southern Uganda at the invasion's start. However, no major popular uprising erupted as Obote had hoped.
Without mass civilian support and outnumbered as well as outgunned, the rebels were mostly defeated by Amin's loyalists within hours. Most insurgents were killed or captured, while the rest fled in disarray back to Tanzania. Reinforced by allied Libyan and PLO troops, the Ugandan security forces launched operations to hunt down and destroy rebel stragglers, while initiating political purges against suspected Obote supporters. Meanwhile, Amin ordered his air force to retaliate by bombing Tanzania, prompting the latter to mobilize its army along the border. Before the conflict could escalate into a full war between Uganda and Tanzania, the two countries agreed to a ceasefire under Somali mediation, and subsequently ratified a treaty in Mogadishu to defuse tensions. Despite this, the conflict greatly worsened the already poor relations between Uganda and Tanzania, and ultimately contributed to the Uganda–Tanzania War.
Background
In 1971, a military coup overthrew the President of Uganda, Milton Obote. Colonel Idi Amin installed himself as new Ugandan President and ruled the country under a repressive dictatorship. However, this takeover was initially welcomed by many Ugandans, as Obote had become deeply unpopular in sections of the country's population and Amin presented himself as reformer. He freed several opposition figures who had been imprisoned under Obote, including Shaban Opolot, Grace Ibingira, and Benedicto Kiwanuka. The coup resulted in a deterioration of relations with neighbouring Tanzania, as Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere withheld diplomatic recognition of the new government and offered asylum to Obote and his supporters. After the coup, Amin launched purges of his enemies, and empowered his own followers to consolidate his regime. The country's military, officially known as Uganda Army (UA), was most affected by this development. Much of its leadership was killed or expelled, while members of ethnic and religious groups supportive of Amin were recruited and promoted en masse. A large number of soldiers and opposition figures targeted by the purges consequently fled into exile. They set up training camps and organized militant groups in Sudan and Tanzania. Sudanese President Jaafar Nimeiry opposed Amin due to his support for Sudanese Anyanya rebels, while Tanzanian President Nyerere had close ties with Obote and had supported his socialist orientation.
As a result, relations between Uganda and Tanzania became increasingly tense. Nyerere frequently denounced Amin's regime, and Amin made repeated threats to invade Tanzania. The situation was further complicated due to a border dispute, as Uganda claimed that the Kagera Salient—a stretch of land between the official border and the Kagera River to the south, should be placed under its jurisdiction, maintaining that the river made for a more logical border. The border had originally been negotiated by British and German colonial officials before World War I. In addition to the Kagera Salient, Amin also harbored hopes of acquiring a corridor to the Indian Ocean. Accordingly, he contemplated plans of conquering Tanzania's north, including the harbor town of Tanga. Following an armed clash between soldiers along the countries' common border a few months after the coup, Amin issued rules of engagement which clarified that the Uganda Army was only allowed to attack Tanzania in retaliation or if he gave orders to do so. Regardless, his political stance remained highly aggressive.
At the same time, the Ugandan exiles plotted to overthrow Amin with Tanzanian support. One of the first groups to act was Yoweri Museveni's yet-unnamed militant group. It infiltrated Uganda and attempted to establish a guerrilla base at Mount Elgon in 1971, but the militants were discovered and arrested by security forces. Despite being opposed to Obote and his policies, Museveni and his small group of comrades subsequently decided to team up with the former president, viewing Amin as the greater threat. As time went on, Obote's rebel alliance suffered several setbacks. Obote had already planned simultaneous invasions from Sudan and Tanzania to take place in August 1971, but this operation was cancelled due to Nyerere's fear of British and Israeli support for Amin, doubts by the Tanzania People's Defence Force's (TPDF) high command about the invasions' chances of success, and inter-rebel feuds.
In early 1972, Amin reportedly requested Israeli aid for an invasion of Tanzania. When the Israeli government refused to provide weaponry for this plan, the Ugandan President responded by severing diplomatic ties and allying with anti-Israeli forces such as Libya under Muammar Gaddafi and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Amin also stopped assisting the Anyanya rebels and signed a deal with Sudan, after which the country expelled most Ugandan insurgents from its soil. Sudan-based Obote loyalists had to be evacuated through Kenya to Tanzania; on the way, many died. The survivors joined the few hundred already stationed at Kigwa in the Tabora Region. A few rebels remained in southern Sudan, and attempted an invasion of Uganda in April 1972. The operation was easily crushed by the Uganda Army. In August 1972, Amin ordered the expulsion of Asians from Uganda, confiscating their wealth and claiming that he was redistributing it to other Ugandans. This move was very popular locally, and distracted the population from the ongoing economic crisis. There were growing fears among the rebels and the Tanzanian government that delaying a major rebel invasion continued to diminish its chances of success, while Nyerere was informed that Uganda had joined an international plot to overthrow him. As a result, the Tanzanian President finally signed off a rebel invasion of Uganda for 15 September 1972. Meanwhile, Obote had amassed a force of about 1,300 ex-soldiers who had escaped into exile. His followers were known as the "Uganda People's Liberation Front" (UPLF).
Prelude
Obote's plan for the invasion was complete by 10 September: First, the rebels would "borrow" an East African Airways McDonnell Douglas DC-9 and use it to transport 80 commandos to Entebbe Airport. These rebels would capture the airport, march on Kampala, and capture its radio station to broadcast a prerecorded message by Obote. The former president hoped that this would inspire an uprising by civilians and soldiers. Meanwhile, two strike teams of insurgents would cross the border from Tanzania and attack the important towns of Mbarara and Masaka in southern Uganda. After securing these, the rebel ground forces would push on towards Kampala, Mubende, and Fort Portal. The western team targeted Mbarara would attack from the rebel camp at Kigwe, while the team attacking Masaka would start at the Handeni rebel camp. The Voice of Uganda, the Ugandan state newspaper, claimed Tanzanian intelligence director Lawrence Gama was involved in the invasion's planning.
At the same time, the TPDF supplied Museveni's force with guns and assisted them to conduct forays into Uganda to set up anti-Amin cells such as the "Temporary Committee" based in Kampala. Museveni told the Tanzanians that these missions were a great success and that several thousand people were willing to revolt in the Mbarara area. However, he was generally critical of "putschist solutions", believing that Amin could only be toppled through long-term guerrilla war. On 14 September, Museveni was informed of the invasion plans by the Tanzanian defense minister who told him that trucks were already on the way to transport his rebels from their camp to the border. The battle plans presumed that Museveni's undercover network would produce a large number of rebels to assist the invasion. Museveni later claimed that he had not been the one to promise a large fifth column in Uganda. As proof, he pointed at the short notice he was given of the invasion, which made it impossible for him to prepare his underground network for an uprising. Museveni argued that Obote had deliberately overplayed the extent of his insider contacts to convince the Tanzanians of greenlighting the invasion. In general, there were reportedly strong tensions within the rebel alliance, as members of Obote's faction treated Museveni's group "as enemies". Following his capture during the invasion, rebel Alex Ojera also told his Ugandan interrogators that the insurgents had been affected by tribalism, as Bantu, Acholi, and Lango militants distrusted each other.
Amin was informed that a rebel invasion was being organized, and prepared for this possibility by strengthening his southern defenses. The South African magazine Drum stated that the Kenyan intelligence agency was reportedly responsible for leaking the invasion plans, while researcher A. Kasozi argued that information had been leaked by Baganda civilians in southern Uganda who opposed Obote. Journalist Faustin Mugabe held Ugandan spies in Tanzania responsible for uncovering the rebel plans. According to Ugandan army officer Bernard Rwehururu, many Ugandan military officers did not take the warnings about an invasion seriously, and did not properly prepare for this possibility.
Invasion Initial rebel operations
From the beginning, the invasion was a "fiasco" and "disaster." Ugandan historian Samwiri Karugire described it as "One of those rare events in military history. A perfect failure." The DC-9 airplane never arrived at Entebbe. Obote had selected James Lalobo, a son of a friend, to fly the aircraft despite him lacking experience. Although the DC-9 was successfully stolen with support by the Tanzanian intelligence from the Dar es Salaam Airport, the pilot failed to retract its landing gear. In his attempt to temporarily stop at Kilimanjaro International Airport to pick up the commandos on 15 September, he landed at an exceptionally high speed, destroying the DC-9's tires. The raid on Entebbe had to be canceled, while journalists got wind of the events at Kilimanjaro. A newspaper, the Uganda Argus, promptly ran an article titled "Pilot vanishes in DC-9 mystery," alerting Amin that a rebel operation was imminent. He put his southern commanders on alert, sending Simba Battalion commander Ali Fadhul to assess the situation at the border.
Despite having lost the surprise element, the ground invasions continued. Having dubbed his force the "People's Army" or "people's army forces", Obote and the rebel factions under his leadership launched the invasion on 17 September. The entire rebel force was 1,340 to about 1,500 fighters strong. The main rebel group crossed the border at 5:30 a.m. after killing several border guards, and captured Mutukula. It was supposed to target Masaka, about 1,000 fighters strong, and led by Captain Anach or Lieutenant Colonel David Oyite-Ojok and Tito Okello. The main group initially made good progress, overwhelmining a few small groups of soldiers and capturing some military equipment. After being informed of the rebels crossing the Ugandan border, Gaddafi pledged support to his ally Amin, and ordered an intervention force to be sent to Uganda.