The 1941 formation of the 160th Rifle Division was an infantry division of the Red Army, originally formed as the 6th Moscow Militia Division (Dzerzhinskii) in early July 1941. The division gradually completed its formation in the 24th Army of Reserve Front east of Smolensk but was not committed to combat until after it was renumbered as the 160th on September 26. This renumbering was based on a misunderstanding that the original 160th had been encircled and destroyed earlier that month; as a result for the next 18 months there were two 160th Rifle Divisions serving concurrently.
The 1941 formation was swept up in Operation Typhoon in October and came so close to being destroyed itself that it disappeared from the Red Army order of battle at the start of November. It returned to the fighting as part of 33rd Army in late January 1942 but was still so under strength that two of its rifle regiments had to be reformed by wholesale replacements from other divisions and it was not until the late spring that it was fully combat-capable. The 160th played minor roles in the battles around the Rzhev salient into early 1943 and then a more active part in the summer offensive toward Smolensk, under 33rd Army until September when it was transferred to 49th Army, both in Western Front. When that Front was disbanded in early 1944 the division was transferred to 2nd Belorussian Front where it joined 70th Army; it would remain under this army almost continually for the duration of the war, from April as part of the 114th Rifle Corps. Prior to Operation Bagration that Army was reassigned to 1st Belorussian Front and during its latter stage the 160th was awarded the Order of the Red Banner for its part in the breakthrough of the German defenses west of Kovel and at the end of August earned the honorific "Brest", along with one of its rifle regiments, for the liberation of that city. Near the end of the year the division transferred back to 2nd Belorussian Front and under that command served in the Vistula-Oder Offensive and the East Pomeranian Offensive; during the latter operation two of its subunits were awarded the honorific "Gdańsk". During the Berlin operation the 160th fought across the Oder River and northward to the Baltic, ending the war in northern Germany. As it was surplus to requirements postwar it was disbanded in June 1945.
6th Moscow Militia Division (Dzerzhinskii) The division began forming on July 2, 1941 as part of a wave of volunteer enthusiasm that swept Moscow immediately after the German invasion.Rodric Braithwaite, Moscow 1941, Vintage Books, New York, NY, 2007, pp. 95, 106-07 It was composed of volunteers from the Dzerzhinskii district in the north-central part of the city. It was intended to have the following order of battle: 16th (Militia) Rifle Regiment 17th (Militia) Rifle Regiment 18th (Militia) Rifle Regiment Artillery Battalion (76mm) Artillery Battalion (45mm) Tank, Sapper, Signal, Reconnaissance Companies Maj. Gen. Nikolai Mikhailovich Dreier was appointed to command the day the division started forming but was replaced on July 7 by Col. Aleksei Ivanovich Shundeev. By July 11 the division had 7,456 personnel assigned, but no equipment. Later that month it was assigned to 24th Army in Reserve Front along the defense line that was being constructed at Mozhaysk but it was still extremely short of weapons and was kept out of the front lines.Charles C. Sharp, "Red Volunteers", Soviet Militia Units, Rifle and Ski Brigades 1941 - 1945, Soviet Order of Battle World War II, vol. XI, Nafziger, 1996, p. 115 The writer Konstantin Simonov encountered some of these militiamen:On August 14 it had 599 officers, 808 NCOs, and 5,607 enlisted personnel, but still had only 6,335 rifles, 62 light and 208 heavy machine guns, and only four 76mm guns for its heavy weapons. By the end of the month the division was finally beginning to take shape as a combat unit. On August 31 it consisted of 9,791 men, including 405 officers, 1,035 NCOs, and 8,054 enlisted men armed with 7,358 rifles, 574 semi-automatic rifles, 43 HMGs, 81 50mm, 54 82mm, and six 120mm mortars, 12 76mm guns, 20 T-27 tankettes in the tank company, 144 trucks of all kinds, 15 motorcycles, and 26 radios.Sharp, "Red Volunteers", Nafziger, p. 115 At this time the volunteers were issued proper uniforms and took the military oath and each division was given its battle flag in a ceremony of great solemnity.Braithwaite, Moscow 1941, p. 112 However, since the 6th still had almost no artillery and the T-27s had actually been retrofitted after serving as tractors it remained in the reserves of 24th Army.
Redesignation At the beginning of September the 1940 formation of the 160th was part of Group Akimenko in Bryansk Front stationed west of Rylsk. The 17th Panzer Division captured Glukhov on September 9, shattering the communications between the armies of the Front.David M. Glantz, Barbarossa Derailed, Vol. 2, Helion & Co., Ltd., Solihull, UK, 2012, pp. 474, 490 The division was caught up in this fighting and largely encircled. In the effort to break out it took heavy casualties and on September 18 its commander was taken prisoner. In the prevailing chaos it was believed the division had been destroyed leaving its number available to be reallocated. However, by the beginning of October the 1940 formation had a new commander and was rebuilding in Bryansk Front.Combat Composition of the Soviet Army, 1941, p. 52
When the 6th Moscow Militia Division was redesignated its order of battle, based on the shtat (table of organization and equipment) of July 29, became as follows: 1293rd Rifle Regiment 1295th Rifle Regiment 1297th Rifle Regiment 973rd Artillery RegimentSharp, "Red Tide", Soviet Rifle Divisions Formed From June to December 1941, Soviet Order of Battle World War II, vol. IX, Nafziger, 1996, p. 22 290th Antitank Battalion 186th Reconnaissance Company 462nd Sapper Battalion 547th Signal Battalion (later 861st Signal Battalion, 861st Signal Company, then reverted to 547th) 191st Medical/Sanitation Battalion (later 495th) 262nd Chemical Defense (Anti-gas) Company 194th Motor Transport Company 149th Field Bakery 276th Divisional Veterinary Hospital (later 160th) 1469th Field Postal Station 1141st Field Office of the State Bank (later 149th) Several of the rear-echelon subunits, such as the medical/sanitation battalion, took over numbers that had been allocated to the 1940 formation, although some of these were later changed. Col. Fyodor Mikhailovich Orlov took over command from Colonel Shundeev on the day the division was redesignated as the 160th. The latter officer would die in battle on October 9.
Battle of Moscow By late in September it was becoming clear that the German High Command was planning a new offensive aimed at Moscow before the start of the autumn rasputitsa. Reserve Front was by now under command of Marshal S. M. Budyonny and controlled six armies. The 24th and 43rd Armies with 10 divisions were deployed in the first echelon between the Western and Bryansk Fronts on a front of 108 km from the area of Yelnya to the RoslavlKirov railroad. 33rd Army was in second echelon backing the 24th and 43rd and both of the latter were poorly equipped and weakened from fruitless attacks to improve their positions. The sector of 24th Army was up to 40 km wide with four divisions in first echelon and one in the second. The 160th was part of a combined-arms reserve with the 144th and 146th Tank Brigades, and the 879th and 880th Antitank Artillery Regiments.Lev Lopukhovsky, The Vias'ma Catastrophe, 1941, ed. & trans. S. Britton, Helion & Co., Ltd., Solihull, UK, 2013, Kindle ed., part 2
Operation Typhoon The 24th Army's intelligence summary from September 26 directly stated:The offensive by 4th Army and 4th Panzer Group began on this sector on October 2 and within days the 160th was in serious difficulties. The German VII and XX Army Corps quickly drove in the left (south) flank of 24th Army and began pushing northeastward, encircling and destroying several Soviet formations in their paths by October 5.David Stahel, Operation Typhoon, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2013, pp. 63, 72 The chief of the political section of 24th Army, Division-Commissar K. K. Abramov, reported:The withdrawal was covered by the 8th and 139th Rifle Divisions. In comparison to the retreats of the 19th and 20th Armies it was conducted in much more difficult circumstances and was less organized. The withdrawal routes became densely congested with vehicles, wagons, tanks, towed guns and other combat equipment; now and then traffic jams arose. Antiaircraft defenses were disorganized and almost completely ineffective due to ammunition shortages. Abramov reported that the 160th, along with the two rearguard divisions along with the Army-level units and divisional rear elements withdrew along the road from Volochek to on the morning of October 7. German forces had seized the YelniaMarkhotkino road through Yaroslavets, threatening the 24th Army headquarters in the Volochek area. Communications were only possible by radio.
A massive logjam of artillery, pack trains and vehicles formed at the crossing over the Osma at Dorogobuzh but despite German air attacks organization was maintained and there were few signs of panic as the retreat continued toward Vyasma. Later the same day German forces took control of Dorogobuzh and Volochek and began attacking toward Semlyovo from the south. This attempt to cut the path of retreat constituted the greatest danger to 24th Army; the Army was effectively pulling back into a trap that had been set for it. By that night it was clear to at least the command elements of the Army that it had been encircled and its chief-of-staff proposed a joint breakout in the direction of Vyasma to the military council of 32nd Army, but this was rejected. During the evening of October 8 orders came via the headquarters of 20th Army to organize a breakout by itself and the 24th with the 24th advancing on a front from Volosta to Piatnitsa to Ugra Station. Abramov considered this much too broad a front to be effective, which turned out to be the case. By the morning of October 9 the remnants of 24th Army, including the 160th, had begun to arrive in the area of Panfilovo and to the south.Lopukhovsky, The Vias'ma Catastrophe, 1941, Kindle ed., parts 4, 5
The army commanders were to choose the specific routes of escape or breakout sectors based upon the situation each faced. None had any clear idea of what forces they opposed (at this point roughly five panzer divisions) which were rapidly contracting the pocket. Abramov reported:Kondratev reached friendly lines on October 18 in the Dorokhovo region, together with a group of up to 180 men. By the end of October 9 the headquarters of Western Front had learned that German forces were now blocking all the escape routes for the 20th and 24th Armies. From this point the circumstances of the trapped forces continued to deteriorate. The 17th Rifle Division (former 17th Moscow Militia) reached friendly lines on October 12 with 17 officers and NCOs and 94 soldiers carrying 123 rifles, two sub-machine guns and one light machine gun. The 160th was in similar state. A surviving squad leader, E. S. Olshanikov, brought out of the encirclement the divisional banner and two regimental banners; this, along with the survival of Colonel Orlov and some of his command cadre, ensured that the division was not disbanded.Lopukhovsky, The Vias'ma Catastrophe, 1941, Kindle ed., part 5 Five other former Moscow militia divisions (2nd, 8th, 29th, 139th and 140th Rifle Divisions) were eventually written off and about 70,000 volunteers had perished.Braithwaite, Moscow 1941, p. 197
Rebuilding and Winter Counteroffensive