In February 2021, the state of Texas suffered a major power crisis, which came about during three severe winter storms sweeping across the United States on February 10–11, 13–17 (known as Winter Storm Uri), and 15–20. The storms triggered the worst energy infrastructure failure in Texas state history, leading to shortages of water, food, and heat. More than 4.5 million homes and businesses were left without power, some for several days. At least 246 people were killed directly or indirectly, with some estimates as high as 702 killed as a result of the crisis.
State officials, including Republican governor Greg Abbott, initially incorrectly blamed the outages on frozen wind turbines and solar panels. Data showed that failure to winterize traditional power sources, principally natural gas infrastructure but also, to a lesser extent, wind turbines, had caused the grid failure, with a drop in power production from natural gas more than five times greater than that from wind turbines. Texas's power grid has long been separate from the two major national grids to avoid federal oversight, though it is still connected to the other national grids and Mexico's; the limited number of ties made it difficult for the state to import electricity from other states during the crisis.Multiple sources:
Deregulation of its electricity market beginning in the 1990s resulted in competition in wholesale electricity prices but also cost-cutting for contingency preparation.
The crisis drew much attention to the state's lack of preparedness for such storms,Multiple sources:
and to a report from U.S. federal regulators ten years earlier that had warned Texas that its power plants would fail in sufficiently cold conditions. Damages due to the cold wave and winter storm were estimated to be at least $26.5 billion, one of the most expensive disasters in the state's history. According to the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), the Texas power grid was four minutes and 37 seconds away from complete failure when partial grid shutdowns were implemented. During the crisis, some energy firms made billions in profits, while others went bankrupt, due to some firms being able to pass extremely high wholesale prices ($9,000/MWh, typically $50/MWh) on to consumers, while others could not, with this price being allegedly held at the $9,000 cap by ERCOT for two days longer than necessary, creating $16 billion in unnecessary charges.
Background
In 2011, Texas was hit by the Groundhog Day blizzard between February 1 and 5, resulting in rolling blackouts across more than 75% of the state. Many roads around Houston were impassable, and boil-water advisories were issued in several areas. Following this disaster, the North American Electric Reliability Corporation made several recommendations for upgrading Texas's electrical infrastructure to prevent a similar event occurring in the future, but these recommendations were ignored due to the cost of winterizing the systems. At the time the blackouts and failures in the power grid were likened to those that occurred in December 1989, after which similar recommendations were made to the state government and ERCOT, which were similarly ignored. On August 16, 2011, a 357-page report was released by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in response to the February 2011 power outage in Texas.
In mid-February 2021, a series of severe winter storms swept across the United States. This outbreak was due to the polar jet stream dipping particularly far south into the U.S., stretching from Washington to Texas, and running back north along the East Coast, allowing a distortion in the polar vortex to bring very cold air across the country and spawning multiple storms along the jet stream track as a result. This weather phenomenon resulted in record low temperatures throughout Texas, with temperatures in Dallas, Austin, Houston, and San Antonio falling below temperatures in Anchorage, Alaska.
On February 10, a winter storm formed north of the Gulf Coast, dropping significant amounts of sleet and ice on many states in the Deep South and the Ohio Valley, including Texas, Georgia, Louisiana, Arkansas, Tennessee, as well as states on the East Coast. A second storm developed off the Pacific Northwest on February 13 and began to gradually develop into an organized storm as it tracked southward toward Texas. It grew even more organized as it turned toward the northeast U.S. before splitting in half — one half continuing into Quebec and the other moving out over the Atlantic Ocean.
This storm, along with various other storms from the previous two weeks, resulted in over 75% of the contiguous U.S. being covered in snow. This storm was directly responsible for nearly 10 million people losing power, with 5.2 million in the U.S. and 4.7 million in Mexico. A third winter storm caused an additional 4 million power outages, and 29 deaths, with 23 in the U.S. and 6 in Mexico. At least 246 people lost their lives during the winter storms.
Causes
Immediate weather and power plant failures
The winter storm caused a record low temperature at Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport of on February 16, the coldest in North Texas in 72 years. Power equipment in Texas was not winterized, leaving it vulnerable to extended periods of cold weather. Natural gas power generating facilities had equipment freeze up and faced shortages of fuel. Texas Governor Greg Abbott and some other politicians initially said renewable energy sources were the cause for the power outages, citing frozen wind turbines as an example of their unreliability.
Viral images of a helicopter de-icing a wind turbine said to be in Texas were actually taken in 2015 in Sweden. However, wind energy accounts for only 23% of Texas power output. Moreover, equipment for other energy sources such as natural gas power generating facilities either freezing up or having mechanical failures were also responsible. Governor Abbott later acknowledged that coal, natural gas, and nuclear plants had played a role. Five times more natural gas than wind power had been lost. When power was cut, it disabled some compressors that push gas through pipelines, knocking out further gas plants due to lack of supply.
ERCOT was aware on February 13 that blackouts would be likely and the grid would have to shut off more than 10% of its demand. The next day, electricity demand exceeded 67.2 gigawatts, higher than what the grid operator had ever planned for in extreme winter weather. Overnight ERCOT ordered utilities to drop several thousand megawatts of load, but the grid frequency continued to drop as demand exceeded supply. The grid came within minutes of overloading and shutting down completely, which would have required a slow and costly black start.
Systemic issues During the 2011 Groundhog Day blizzard, Texas had faced similar power outages due to frozen power equipment, after which the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission reported that more winterization of power infrastructure was necessary. ERCOT said that some generators since then implemented new winter "best practices," but these were on a voluntary basis and mandatory regulation had not been established. This is likely due to ERCOT's independence of the FERC therefore not having the necessary budget to upgrade the power grid to withstand colder weather after the recommendation during efforts to increase renewable energy sources.
Unlike other power interconnections, Texas does not require a reserve margin of power capacity beyond what is expected. A 2019 North American Electric Reliability Corporation report found that ERCOT had a low anticipated reserve margin of generation capacity and was the only part of the country without sufficient resources available to meet projected peak summer electricity demand.Summer Reliability Assessment, North American Electric Reliability Corporation (June 2019).
Gov. Abbott's appointees to the Public Utility Commission of Texas ended a contract with the Texas Reliability Entity in November 2020, reducing oversight of the grid. In July, Abbott's commissioners disbanded its Oversight and Enforcement Division, dropping pending cases that ensure reliability. While not a direct cause, the commission's minimal oversight of utility companies, limited budget, and voluntary standards restricted its ability to secure consistent performance.
There was not only insufficient power generation capacity online, but also insufficient natural gas supply to the power plants. The failure of some gas distribution infrastructure, which had not been adequately winterized, resulted in exceedingly high prices for natural gas. Some gas compressor stations lost power when utilities began shutdowns, and overall gas supply fell by 85%. University of Texas professor Michael Webber said, "This is the moral hazard of the market which is when wind or solar or coal or nuclear underperforms, they lose money. And when gas power plants underperform they lose money. But when the gas producers underperform, they made money. And this is why the gas system gets a pass, which is it's very lucrative for it to fail, and that lucrative return shows up as political donations that curries favor that really gets the statewide officials to turn a blind eye to it."
Impact By February 17, at least 21 people died from causes related to the winter storm. By February 19, the number was updated to at least 32 people who died, with deaths linked to carbon monoxide poisoning, car crashes, drownings, house fires and hypothermia. On February 21, the death toll had increased to 70. As of January 2, 2022, the total loss of life was reported to be 246, with deaths in 77 counties. Victims included children less than a year old to elderly up to 102 years old. Reports found that almost two-thirds died of hypothermia and that 148 deaths were directly caused by the storm, 92 deaths were indirectly caused by the storm, and 6 deaths were found as possibly caused by the storm.
Power outages In addition to equipment problems, demand for electricity in Texas hit a record 69,692 megawatts (MW) on February 14 — 3,200 MW higher than the previous record set in January 2018 and 12,329 MW higher than its current capacity. The Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) initiated rotating outages at 1:25am on February 15. However, a retrospective Houston Chronicle article a year later said peak demand was even higher: 76,819 megawatts on Feb. 16, 2021.Houston Chronicle, "How devastating was 2021's deadly Texas freeze, exactly? Here's what the numbers say", Erice Dexheimer, Jeremy Blackman (Austin Bureau), Feb. 11, 2022.
The rotating outages prevented electricity demand from overwhelming the grid, a scenario which could have caused equipment to catch fire and power lines to go down, potentially resulting in a much more severe blackout. At the peak, over 5 million people in Texas were without power, with 11 million experiencing an outage at some point, some for more than 3 days.
During the period of outages, the wholesale electric price was set to $9,000/megawatt-hour which was the "system cap" set by ERCOT, compared to a more typical $25/MWh. Customers with pricing plans based on wholesale prices who had power faced large bills. Some Griddy customers signed up for wholesale variable rates plans allowed by the Texas deregulated electricity market found themselves facing over $5,000 bills for five days of service during the storm.