Elections to the European Parliament saw declining voter turnout between 1979 and 2014. However, voter turnout in 2019 European elections increased by 5 points compared to 2014 and remained as high in 2024, which some attribute to the politicisation of EU politics in domestic political arenas. In spite of this participatory increase, the degree of electoral mobilization remains weak compared to the national parliamentary elections. Moreover, turnout significantly differs from one country to another in Europe and across a time: in 2019 Belgium citizens participated the most with 88.47% and Slovaks the least with 22.74%. The potential factors that might influence these trends and their implications have attracted great scholarly attention. Identifying and analysing the factors that determine the relative low turnout at European elections is therefore critical, as it is one element that weakens the democratic legitimacy of the European Parliament.
Individual factors Socio-demographic Gender While the gender-equal turnout at the national elections in established democraciesNorris, Pippa (2002). ‘Women’s Power at the Ballot Box’, in Rafael López Pintor and Maria Gratschew (eds.), Voter Turnout from 1945 to 2000: A Global Report on Political Participation. Stockholm: IDEA, 95–104 has been mostly reached "as new cohorts of women entered the electorate", men are still slightly more inclined than women to participate at the European elections. Indeed, in 2019, a gap of 3 points (-1 pp compared to 2014) was still observed between women (49%, +8 pp) and men turnout (52%, +7pp).
This gender gap does not seem to be rooted neither in gender per se nor in institutional features as the European Parliament present a "more egalitarian representation of women than that of its member countries' lower houses". The literature rather emphasises that, because of their "political socialisation", women are less likely to turnout because they express lower levels of interest and knowledge in politicsMalpas, Nicole, Eurobarometre 41.0 & 41.1 : Les femmes et l'élection du parlement européen pour la commission européenne dg x.a.7, Rapport final, INRA (europe) European coordination office, 1994, 96p. in elections considered as less important (e.g. at the European level).
Age and generation In spite of the 2004 enlargements that have considerably "lowered the voting age", younger people have always participated less in the European elections than their elders. An important part of the literatureFieldhouse, E., Tranmer, M., Russell, A., 2007. Something about young people or something about elections? Electoral participation of young people in Europe: evidence from a multilevel analysis of the European social survey. European Journal of Political Research 46 (6), 797–822. emphasises the effect of "age" or "life-cycle" according to which young people are less likely to vote because they are still in "transition to adulthood", building their professional career and family. Through ageing, individuals acquire more "resources and political experiences", and face "fewer time constraints" and stronger "conformist behaviour of voting" pushing them to cast their vote.
Another part of the literature stresses that these trends might not be "due to age per se" but to "socialisation experiences" through which individuals "acquire the habit of voting to a greater or lesser extent" than the previous and the next generation. Smets considers "later maturation" of "young adults these days (...) less inclined to vote than their parents or grandparents in their younger years". While, until 2014, these explanations have found supporting evidence at the European elections, the unexpected turnout increase in 2019 has been noticeably driven by greater mobilisation of younger people, reducing the generational gap compared to 2014. Indeed, while individuals "aged 55 or over" still represent the majority of the electorate (54%, +3 pp), the participation of "people aged under 25 (42%) and aged 25–39 (47%)", have grown respectively of 14 and 12 pp compared to 2014.
Socio-economic status and type of community As for national elections, scholars mainly agree that individuals with higher levels of education, income and socio-economic status are more likely to vote. In 2019, the participation of highly educated individuals (who have "left education at the age of 20 or above") grew from 36% to 39% compared to 2014, while turnout of people who did not continue school after 15 years old has decreased from 14 to 18%. Similarly, the positive relationship between socio-economic status and turnout has also increased through time : employed individuals (especially "managers, other white collar and manual workers") were more likely in 2019, than unemployed people to cast their vote. While a comparable positive relationship has been found with financial situation, (i.e. 54% of voters have in general no difficulties to pay bills) people who have more financial difficulties are also more inclined to vote than in 2014 (38%, +6 pp). Moreover, voter profile was in 2019 more urban than in 2014.
Although these sociological factors are strong predictors per se of political engagement, they only depict one part of the picture. First, while levels of "education and incomes have steadily increased in industrialized democracies during the past 50 years",MARK GRAY and MIKI CAUL, 'Declining Voter Turnout in Advanced Industrial Democracies, 1950 to 1997: The Effects of Declining Group Mobilization' (2000) 33(9) Comparative Political Studies 1091-1122. electoral participation have generally declined in both national and European elections (except in 2014). Additionally, Mattila consider these analyses as "more descriptive than explanatory", as they are limited in explaining the process by which turnout is fostered. Besides, these have been considered to fail to explain why turnout decline occurred while education level or the share of the middle classes increased in European democracies.Goswami, Haridhan. (2015). Socio-demographic factors and participation of the European youth: A multilevel analysis. Przegląd Socjologiczny / Sociological Review. 64. 137-156.
Attitudinal
Political awareness High levels of knowledge and interests in politics,Franklin, M., van der Eijk, C. & Oppenhuis, E. (1996). The institutional context: Turnout, in: C. van der Eijk, M. Franklin et al. (eds.), Choosing Europe? The European electorate and national political processes (Ch. 19). Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press sense of duty to vote and "regular consumption news media engage in political discussions" have been commonly considered as significant predictors of turnout. If the explanatory power of political interest increased at the last European elections where individuals with "a strong political interest" were 4% more likely to vote than in 2014 (20 to 24%), a similar increase have been observed among abstainers. However, Stockemer and Blais argue that when related to national politics only "good knowledge", strong interest and a strong sense of duty to vote "might not be sufficient" to explain participation at the European elections.
National political Culture Stockemer and Blais found that someone expressing a "sense of duty to vote" only at the national level has 10% less chance vote at both national and European elections than someone that also perceives this duty at the EU level. The last European elections have been "boosted by a greater sense of civic duty" compared to 2014.
Other attitudes towards domestic politics might matter. People affiliating themselves with right or left on the political scale are continuously more inclined to vote in the European elections than those individuals in "the centre of the political scale". Another focus is made on government approval, trust of national institutions, and perceived corruption at the national level. Although a stronger government disapproval clearly does not encourage people to go to the polls, no clear correlation between strong confidence towards national institutions and greater turnout at the European elections has been enlightened so far.
Affiliation to the European Union The effect of EU-related attitudes on the participation at the European elections is somehow debated. While some have emphasised pro-European attitudes as more efficient to foster voting participation at European elections, than Eurosceptic ones;Schmitt, H. and Van der Eijk, C. (2007) ‘Non-voting in European Parliament Elections and Support For European Integration’. In van der Brug, W. and van der Eijk, C. (eds) European Elections and Domestic Politics: Lessons from the Past and Scenarios for the Future (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press), 145–67 others have argued that the significance of such attitudes was negligible if not non-existent when controlling for the sociodemographic and attitudinal variables mentioned above. Accounting for attachment to European identity, Studlar et al. found a positive relationship between stronger attachment to that notion among voters and turnout. In the same vein, analysing the European elections from 1979 to 2009, Stockemer found that those who "consider country's membership in the EU ‘a good thing’ have a higher likelihood of voting in EP elections than those who reject it". Not only the 2019 post election survey has confirmed this trend, but also [compared to 2014] "more respondents (...) voted because they were in favour of the EU and declared this support to be their main voting motivator". Similarly, the literature stresses that distrust in European institutions and their politicians has also been considered as strong motivation for individuals do decide to abstain.Muxel, A (2005) Les abstentionnistes: Le premier parti européen. In: Perrineau, P (ed.) Le vote européen: De l’élargissement au référendum français Paris: Sciences Po.
Overall, EU related attitudes focus has also been considered as over-simplistic, treating "public attitudes towards the EU as one-dimensional (...) taking only positive or negative values" disregarding existing "ambivalent or indifferent feelings". Studying 2004 and 2009 elections, Kentmen‐Cin shows that ambivalent individuals - "who simultaneously hold positive and negative [EU] attitudes" are more likely to cast their vote "compared to both negative and indifferent attitudes". Therefore, while bearing contradictory "views of European integration", ambivalent people prefer to raise their voice rather than exiting, seeing vote as an opportunity to improve the EU systems.
Accounting for ambivalence and indifference is even more relevant in views of the "second order" status European elections have for many electors (see institutional factors).
Institutional factors
At the national level
Electoral system Cross-national analyses emphasises institutional factors related to the electoral system. Increasing the financial and moral costs of abstention, the role of compulsory voting in explaining general turnout decline is widely recognised in the literature.Franklin, M. (2002) ‘Electoral Participation’. In Leduc, L., Niemi, R. and Norris, P. (eds) Comparing Democracies: New Challenges in the Study of Elections and Voting (London: Sage), pp. 148–168. Indeed, while in 1979 "40 percent of participating countries" has compulsory voting, in 2019 that system remained active only in Belgium and Luxembourg "so the effects of this variable have become increasingly diluted"