American diplomat Henry Kissinger (1923–2023) played an important and controversial role in the Vietnam War. Starting out as a supporter, Kissinger came to see it as a drag on American power. In 1968, Kissinger leaked information about the status of the peace talks in Paris to the Nixon campaign and was rewarded with being appointed National Security Advisor under Richard Nixon. As National Security Advisor, Kissinger sought initially to find a way to end the war on American terms. During his tenure, Kissinger came to differ with Nixon as Kissinger was more in favor of seeking an end to war as expeditiously as possible with minimum damage to American prestige. In October 1972, Kissinger reached a draft agreement that Nixon at first rejected, leading to the Christmas bombings of December 1972. The agreement that Kissinger signed in January 1973—which led to the American withdrawal from Vietnam in March of that year—was very similar to the draft agreement rejected the previous year. As National Security Advisor and Secretary of State, Kissinger favored continued American support for South Vietnam right until the collapse of that state in April 1975, which Kissinger blamed on Congress.
Academic amateur diplomat As an instructor at Harvard, Kissinger published his 1957 book Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, whose popularity established his reputation as one of America's leading thinkers on foreign policy. Kissinger's involvement in Indochina started prior to his appointment as National Security Advisor to Nixon. While still at Harvard, he had worked as a consultant on foreign policy to both the White House and State Department. Kissinger says that "In August 1965 ... [Henry Cabot Lodge Jr.], an old friend serving as Ambassador to Saigon, had asked me to visit Vietnam as his consultant. I toured Vietnam first for two weeks in October and November 1965, again for about ten days in July 1966, and a third time for a few days in October 1966 ... Lodge gave me a free hand to look into any subject of my choice". He became convinced of the meaninglessness of military victories in Vietnam, "... unless they brought about a political reality that could survive our ultimate withdrawal". Lodge allowed Kissinger to go anywhere he wanted, and to meet the ruling duumvirate of Air Marshal Nguyễn Cao Kỳ and General Nguyễn Văn Thiệu. In a gaffe, Kissinger spoke frankly to an American reporter, Jack Foisie, who had arrived late to the press conference and was not aware that the press conference was "off-the-record". Kissinger called both Air Marshal Kỳ and General Thiệu immature men of low intelligence, remarks that Foise published and which drew the ire of President Lyndon B. Johnson. In November 1965, when asked to comment by Time after the number of Americans killed in Vietnam passed 1,000, Kissinger praised Johnson for having to make "difficult and lonely decisions". Kissinger compared Johnson to the sheriff played by Gary Cooper in the 1952 film High Noon, depicting Johnson as a heroic figure making necessary, but unpopular decisions.
In a 1967 peace initiative, he would mediate between Washington and Hanoi. In June 1967, at an academic conference in Paris, Kissinger met a French biologist, Herbert Marcovitch, who mentioned that one of his friends was Raymond Aubrac, a Communist hero of the French resistance, who in turn was one of the few Westerners who were friends with Ho Chi Minh. Ho had something of an aversion to Westerners and tried to avoid meeting them as much as possible, and Aubrac was unique in being allowed to correspond with Ho. Wanting to play a role in diplomacy, Kissinger contacted the State Department with a plan for Marovitch and Aubrac to go to Hanoi with a peace offer. The Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, was opposed to Kissinger's plan. However, W. Averell Harriman of the "peace shop" was interested and got President Johnson to approve the approach, which was code-named Operation Pennsylvania. In July 1967, Aubrac and Marcovitch went to Hanoi to see Ho, who told him that he was willing to open peace talks with the United States, provided that the Americans "unconditionally" stopped bombing North Vietnam. Before Ho had insisted that the United States had to "unconditionally and finally" stop the bombing, and this slight change in phrasing was seen as a hopeful sign. Harriman sent his deputy, Chester Cooper, to join Kissinger in the unofficial peace talks in Paris, which seemed promising. However, Aubrac stated that Ho had wanted the United States to cease bombing North Vietnam for a short period of time as a sign of good faith, but the National Security Advisor, W.W. Rostow, persuaded Johnson to increase the bombing of North Vietnam at the same time. On 22 August 1967, Aubrac and Marcovitch were refused visas to visit North Vietnam as the inability of Kissinger to achieve the promised bombing pause had disillusioned Ho.
In August 1968, Kissinger wrote to Harriman, who was leading the American delegation at the Paris peace talks: "My dear Averell...I am through with Republican politics. The party is hopeless and unfit to govern". On 17 September 1968, Kissinger arrived in Paris and served as an unofficial consultant to the American delegation. At the time, Kissinger spoke of his disgust with the Republican candidate, Richard Nixon, saying: "Three days of the week I think I'll vote for Hubert. The other days I think I won't vote at all". But at the same time, Kissinger was in contact with the Nixon campaign and began to share information about the progress of the peace talks. Kissinger began to call Richard Allen, Nixon's foreign policy adviser, from a public telephone booth, offering information in exchange for which he wanted a senior position if Nixon won the election. On 12 October 1968, Kissinger told Allen that Harriman persuaded Johnson to order a bombing halt of North Vietnam. Allen called John Mitchell, Nixon's campaign manager, who agreed that this was most important information. As a reward, Mitchell told Allen that Kissinger would receive the senior post he craved, with Allen saying the office of National Security Advisor would suit Kissinger the best. At the same time, Kissinger was in contact with the Democratic candidate, Vice President Hubert Humphrey, lobbying for a senior post if Humphrey won the election.
Kissinger had served as the foreign policy adviser to the Republican governor of New York, Nelson Rockefeller, during his failed bids to win the Republican nomination in the elections of 1960, 1964 and 1968. He had a low opinion of Nixon during this time, speaking of his "shallowness" and of his "dangerous misunderstanding" of foreign policy. Many were surprised when Kissinger accepted Nixon's offer to serve as his National Security Advisor. Nixon said of Kissinger: "I don't trust Henry, but I can use him".
Involvement in Vietnam War decision making (1969) Arrival in Washington Nixon had been elected in 1968 on the promise of achieving "peace with honor" and ending the Vietnam War. By promising to continue the peace talks which Johnson began in May 1968 in Paris, Nixon admitted that he had ruled out "a military victory" in Vietnam. Nixon wanted a diplomatic settlement similar to the armistice of Panmunjom that ended the Korean War and frequently stated in private he had no intention of being "the first president of the United States to lose a war". To force the North Vietnamese to sign an armistice, Nixon favored a two-pronged approach of the "madman theory" of seeking to act rashly to intimidate the North Vietnamese while at the same time trying using the strategy of "linkage" to improve relations with the Soviet Union and China in order to persuade both these nations to stop sending arms to North Vietnam. In office, Nixon implemented a policy of Vietnamization that aimed to gradually withdraw U.S. troops while expanding the combat role of the South Vietnamese Army so that it would be capable of independently defending its government against the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, a Communist guerrilla organization, and the North Vietnamese army (Vietnam People's Army or PAVN). Kissinger was opposed to Vietnamization.
In an article published in Foreign Affairs in January 1969, Kissinger criticized General William Westmoreland's attrition strategy because the Vietnamese Communists were willing to accept far higher losses on the battlefield than the United States and could therefore "win" as long as they did not "lose" by merely keeping the war going. In the same article, he argued that losses endured by the Vietnamese Communists in the Tet Offensive were meaningless as the Tet Offensive had turned American public opinion against the war, ruling out the possibility of a military solution, and the best that could be done now was to negotiate the most favorable peace settlement at the Paris peace talks. Kissinger, when he came into office in 1969 favored a negotiating strategy under which the United States and North Vietnam would sign an armistice and agreed to pull their troops out of South Vietnam while the South Vietnamese government and the Viet Cong were to agree to a coalition government. Kissinger had doubts about Nixon's theory of "linkage", believing that this would give the Soviet Union leverage over the United States and, unlike Nixon, was less concerned about the ultimate fate of South Vietnam. One of Kissinger's first acts as National Security Advisor in early 1969 was to seek opinions of the Vietnam experts within the CIA, the military and the State Department. The lengthy volume that emerged contained a diverse collection of opinions, with some stating the South Vietnamese were making "rapid strides," while others doubted that the government in Saigon would "ever constitute an effective political or military counter to the Vietcong". The "bulls" estimated that American troops would need to fight on in Vietnam for 8.3 years before the South Vietnamese would be able to fight on their own while the "bears" estimated it would take 13.4 years of American troops fighting in Vietnam before the South Vietnamese would be able to fight on their own. Kissinger passed the volume on to Nixon with the comment that there was no consensus within the expert community with the implied conclusion that he should be free to act on his own without consulting the experts. Nixon's key decision maker On 17 February 1969, Nixon then told the Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin that all matters of substance were to go through Kissinger rather than the Secretary of State William Rogers. Shortly afterwards, Kissinger met with Dobrynin to tell him that Nixon would not accept any settlement that looked like a defeat nor did he want any change in the regime in Saigon, though "evolution" of the Saigon regime was acceptable. Dobrynin, who served in Washington for many years, had a favorable impression of Kissinger, who was not dogmatic and rigid like his predecessor W.W. Rostow nor dull and unimaginative like Dean Rusk. Kissinger then set about undermining Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., the head of the American peace delegation in Paris, as he asked Dobrynin to set up a secret meeting in Paris between him and Le Duc Tho, the most important member of the North Vietnamese delegation in Paris.
On 22 February 1969, the Viet Cong launched an offensive in South Vietnam, which Kissinger called "an act of extraordinary cynicism". Nixon, on a trip to Europe, took the offensive as a personal insult and wanted to bomb Cambodia in retaliation. Kissinger persuaded Nixon to wait until his European trip was over.