The 68th Guards Rifle Division was reformed as an elite infantry division of the Red Army in February 1943, based on the 1st formation of the 96th Rifle Division,The 96th was originally formed as a mountain rifle division and became the 14th Guards Rifle Division in January, 1942. It was reformed as a regular rifle division in March; this is referred to as the 1st or 2nd formation depending on the source. See Bibliography. and served in that role until after the end of the Great Patriotic War. It originally served in the Stalingrad Group of Forces, mopping up in the ruins of that city after the Axis surrender there before eventually being assigned to the 4th Guards Army and moving north to the Kursk area in the Steppe Military District. It entered combat with its Army during the Belgorod-Kharkov Offensive in August and continued fighting toward the Dniepr River and Kiev during the autumn and early winter. From late September until early November it was involved in the fighting around the Bukrin bridgeheads which ultimately ended in a stalemate. The 68th Guards was part of 1st Ukrainian Front until September, 1944 but was subordinated to numerous army and corps commands during this period and won an honorific in western Ukraine during March; subsequently it was also awarded the Order of the Red Banner for its part in the liberation of Lvov. After being removed to the Reserve of the Supreme High Command for much-needed rebuilding its combat path shifted into the Balkans. While rebuilding its antitank battalion had its towed pieces replaced with self-propelled guns and at the beginning of November the entire division was temporarily motorized to take part in an unsuccessful attempt to seize the city of Budapest via a mechanized thrust. The 68th Guards spent the remainder of the war fighting in Hungary and Austria; its regiments would all receive recognition for their roles in the battles for Budapest. The division was finally assigned to the 30th Rifle Corps of 26th Army in January, 1945 and remained under these headquarters for the duration of the war. Despite a solid record of service the 68th Guards was disbanded within two years.
Formation The 96th was redesignated as the 68th Guards on February 6, shortly after the German surrender at Stalingrad, and officially received its Guards banner on March 19. Once the division completed its reorganization its order of battle was as follows: 198th Guards Rifle Regiment (from 1381st Rifle Regiment) 200th Guards Rifle Regiment (from 1384th Rifle Regiment) 202nd Guards Rifle Regiment (from 1389th Rifle Regiment) 136th Guards Artillery Regiment (from 1059th Artillery Regiment)Charles C. Sharp, "Red Guards", Soviet Guards Rifle and Airborne Units 1941 to 1945, Soviet Order of Battle World War II, Vol. IV, Nafziger, 1995, p. 72 72nd Guards Antitank Battalion (later 72nd Guards Self-Propelled Artillery Battalion) 508th Guards Antiaircraft Battery (until April 20, 1943) 70th Guards Reconnaissance Company 78th Guards Sapper Battalion 98th Guards Signal Battalion (as of December 2, 1944, 98th Guards Signal Company) 75th Guards Medical/Sanitation Battalion 71st Guards Chemical Defense (Anti-gas) Company 74th Guards Motor Transport Company 67th Guards Field Bakery 69th Guards Divisional Veterinary Hospital 1871st Field Postal Station 1190th Field Office of the State Bank Col. Georgii Petrovich Isakov, who had commanded the 96th since October 9, 1942 remained in command; he would be promoted to the rank of major general on February 22. The division had been in the 57th Army on February 1 but was then transferred to 21st Army and shortly after to the Stalingrad Group of Forces where it remained until March 1.David M. Glantz, Endgame at Stalingrad, Book Two, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, 2014, p. 575
Into Ukraine After leaving the Stalingrad Group the 68th Guards was reassigned to the 24th Army in the Reserve of the Supreme High Command. In April it was subordinated to the new 21st Guards Rifle Corps along with the 69th Guards and 84th Rifle Divisions as the 24th became the 4th Guards Army within the Steppe Military District. The division remained under these commands and in roughly the same area east of the Kursk salient until early August.Combat Composition of the Soviet Army, 1943, pp. 73, 96, 121, 147, 175, 206 In June it was noted that nearly all the personnel of the division were Siberian or of Turkmen nationality and that roughly 50 percent were from the 1918 - 1924 year groups (19-25 year-olds).Glantz, Colossus Reborn, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, 2004, p. 596
Following the defeat of the German Zitadelle offensive the 4th Guards Army, under command of Lt. Gen. G. I. Kulik and still in reserve, was concentrating in the area of Chernyanka, Orlik and Loznoe on July 23. By August 17 the Army had been assigned to Army Gen. N. F. Vatutin's Voronezh Front and was now concentrated in the area from Yamnoye to Novaya Ryabina to Yablochnoye. As the Front pressed on towards Kharkov panzer forces of Army Group South counterattacked in the area of Akhtyrka and Vatutin received orders to eliminate this grouping to ward off the possible isolation of 27th Army. These orders were passed to the 27th, the 4th and 6th Guards and 1st Tank Armies. 4th Guards initially committed two divisions of its 20th Guards Rifle Corps to this effort and by August 20 the German riposte was brought to a halt. The Army was tasked with attacking toward Kotelva the following day; by August 27 it had reached the Vorskla River and captured Kotelva.Soviet General Staff, The Battle of Kursk, ed. & trans. R. W. Harrison, Helion & Co., Ltd., Solihull, UK, 2016, Kindle ed., Book 2, ch. 2
Battle of the Dniepr During September the 68th Guards was transferred to the 52nd Rifle Corps of 40th Army, still in Voronezh Front.Combat Composition of the Soviet Army, 1943, p. 250 As of September 20 the division had 4,418 personnel on strength, armed with a total of 37 guns and 82 mortars. During the last week of the month it was approaching Bukrin on the Dniepr north of Kaniv. On September 23 the Army commander, Col. Gen. K. S. Moskalenko, wrote to his 47th and 52nd Corps: "The Dnepr River must be forced in the most favorable places, without regard for boundary lines and available crossing equipment." On the same day units of the 52nd Corps, including the division, began crossing northwest and southeast of Rzhyshchiv near Staiki, Grebeni and Shchuchinka but only with infantry and at a slow pace. Overnight two airborne brigades were dropped in the Kanev area but had little effect on the overall operation. Despite this failure by September 25 the Bukrin bridgehead was about 6 km in depth and 10–12 km wide and by the next day the crossing of 40th Army's infantry was basically completed.Soviet General Staff, The Battle of the Dnepr, ed. & trans. R. W. Harrison, Helion & Co., Ltd., Solihull, UK, 2018, pp. 35-36, 175-77John Prados and Jack Radey, Kanev - Parachutes Across the Dnepr, September 1943, People's War Games, Oakland, CA, 1981, p. 6 In recognition of his leadership in the successful crossing, on October 23 General Isakov would be made a Hero of the Soviet Union.http://www.warheroes.ru/hero/hero.asp?Hero_id=7008. In Russian; English translation available. Retrieved August 14, 2020.
Shchuchinka Bridgehead On September 27–29 fierce fighting was waged for the bridgeheads from Staiki as far south as Kaniv as German forces converged on this sector. The Front reserve, 27th Army, was ordered to relieve units of the 40th Army on the sector from Yanivka to Shandra on September 30; meanwhile on the 29th the 52nd Corps was still fighting to expand its bridgeheads on each side of Rzhyshchiv which were now between 11 and 16 km wide and up to 4 km deep. It was facing the German 34th Infantry and 10th Motorized Divisions while the 2nd SS Panzer-Grenadier Division Das Reich was approaching the area. German counterattacks followed on October 2 and by the 5th the northwest bridgehead had been effectively abandoned while the 68th Guards was pushed back somewhat in the southeastern lodgement near Shchuchinka. Otherwise the several bridgeheads from Rzhyshchiv to Kaniv held firm as the counterattackers suffered significant losses in men and tanks.Soviet General Staff, The Battle of the Dnepr, pp. 36-37, 39, 51-52
From October 6–11 a period of quiet settled along this front. The Soviet forces prepared to go back to the offensive but were hampered by the ongoing shortage of crossing means and therefore ammunition and heavy equipment; as of October 10 the Shchuchinka bridgehead had just one eight-tonne and one 30-tonne ferry available and a bridge was under construction. In the plan for the offensive the 68th Guards and 309th Rifle Divisions were to attack to the south and southeast on the first day to assist the 47th Rifle Corps in the Khodorov area and then to develop the offensive the next day and roll up the German defenses along the west bank of the river. The offensive began at 0700 hours on October 12 with a 40-minute artillery preparation, followed by the direct fire of tanks, regimental and antitank guns until 1100 hours. The 68th Guards attacked from Shchuchinka but despite this support and airstrikes by 2nd Air Army the German forces put up stubborn resistance, in large part because reconnaissance of their defenses and fire systems had been inadequate. By the end of the day the 52nd Corps had advanced less than 1000 metres and units of the 2nd SS were being shifted east to help defend other sectors of the several Bukrin bridgeheads.Soviet General Staff, The Battle of the Dnepr, pp. 52-54, 64 During this fighting General Isakov was seriously wounded and evacuated to hospital; following his recovery he was sent to the Voroshilov Academy from which he graduated in September, 1944 before taking command of the 18th Guards Rifle Division. He was replaced in command of the division by Maj. Gen. Vladimir Filippovich Stenin on October 25.http://www.generals.dk states that Isakov also commanded the 281st Rifle Division in 1943-44 but this officer was a colonel of the same name; see Commanders of Corps and Divisions, p. 243.
General Vatutin continued to press the offensive until October 16 despite very limited progress. Four days later his Front was redesignated as 1st Ukrainian. The next day, following a one-hour artillery preparation, the 47th Corps penetrated 3 km into the German defenses and linked up with 52nd Corps at Shchuchinka. By October 23 Vatutin had changed his plan to focus all his Front's efforts on the sectors held by 40th Army and the right flank of 27th Army, but this was cancelled by the STAVKA late on October 24; it had concluded that further efforts to break out of the Bukrin bridgeheads would be futile, largely owing to the difficult terrain. A new offensive was planned to begin on November 3 with the intention to advance instead from the Lyutezh bridgehead north of Kiev. The 68th Guards and 309th Divisions were to launch a supporting attack along a 9 km-wide front from their bridgehead. This diversion began on November 1 with 40 minutes of artillery and airstrikes. The two divisions managed to capture the first, and in places the second line of German trenches but advanced no more than 1,500 metres. The fighting continued into November 5 and achieved little more than drawing the 2nd SS out of reserve but by the next day it was clear that Kiev was about to be liberated from Lyutezh and the 40th and 27th Armies were ordered to maintain the impression of a coming attack with false troop concentrations and dummy tanks.Soviet General Staff, The Battle of the Dnepr, pp. 64, 71-73, 93-94, 109-11
Into Western Ukraine