In 1964, a major split occurred in the Communist Party of India (CPI). The split was the culmination of decades of tensions and factional infighting. When India became independent in 1947, differences arose of how to adapt to the new situation. As relations between prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru's government and the Soviet Union improved, a faction that sought cooperation with the dominant Indian National Congress (INC) emerged within CPI. This tendency was led by S. A. Dange, whose role in the party hierarchy became increasingly controversial. When the Sino-Indian War broke out in 1962 Dange's opponents within CPI were jailed, but when they were released they sought to challenge his leadership. In 1964 the party was finally divided into two, with the left faction forming the Communist Party of India (Marxist). The split had a lot of regional variations. It also impacted other organizations, such as trade union and peasant movements. The split has been studied extensively by scholars, who have sought to analyze the various domestic and international factors involved.
Overview Research on the split Many scholarly and journalistic works have been dedicated to the split. Scholars that have studied the split include Overstreet and Windmiller, Gelman (Indian Communism in Turmoil, 1963), Wood (Observations on the Indian Communist Party Split, 1965), Devlin (Boring from Within, 1964), Ray (Peking and the Indian CP, 1966), Feuer (Marxisms—How Many?, 1966), Fic (Kerala: Yenan of India, 1969), Ram (Indian Communism: Split Within a Split, 1969), Franda (Radical Politics in West Bengal, 1971), Sen Gupta (Communism in Indian Politics, 1972), Kaviraj Sudipta (1979), Thomas Nossiter (1982; 1988) and Singh (1994).
There is a commonly held perception that the split in CPI was merely an extension of the Sino-Soviet split. The viewpoint that the split was primarily caused by international factors and the role of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been upheld by a sector in CPI after the split.Lahiri, A. Currents and cross currents in the relation between the CPI and the CPI(m) during 1964-85 Some scholars have sought to portray the split as directly linked to divisions in the world communist movement, whilst others have emphasized indigenous causes. Rao (1983) argues that the narrative that CPI supported the Soviet Union and CPI(M) supported China is an oversimplification. Per Mitra el at. (2004) the circumstances leading up to the split were complex, with local, national and international factors intertwined.
Per Nossiter (1982) the Sino-Soviet split had repercussions in CPI, but that the 'fundamental cleavage' in the party predated the rupture between Moscow and Peking. According to him, the two key-issues debates in CPI in the 1950s were on one hand the relations with the national bourgeoisie, Nehru and the Indian National Congress, and on the other hand the possibilities to work within the limits of the Indian constitution. These differences were compounded by close links with Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the shifts in CPSU policies (improved Soviet-Nehru relations and peaceful transition to socialism). Furthermore, Nossiter affirms that the Sino-Indian border issue led to the enmeshment of the preexisting internal divisions in CPI and the Sino-Soviet Split.
Per Adamson (1966) the split in 1964 represented a mere formalization of profound and longstanding cleavages within the Communist Party of India. Wood (1965) states that the split in CPI was in many ways atypical for the world communist movement, and shouldn't be reduced to just a confrontation between pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions. Per Wood the splits in most other communist parties originated in the 1960 International Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties whilst the history of the CPI split is more profound, running back to the foundation of the party.
Per Gunther (2001) international issues like the Sino-Soviet split, the Soviet line of peaceful coexistence with the Western world, improved Soviet relations with Nehru government and the 1962 Sino-Indian war were factors in the split, the most important factor was the domestic situation, i.e. the stance of CPI towards the Indian National Congress.
According to Sharma (1978) split took place in backdrop of the Sino-Soviet split, the 1962 war and differences on how to assess the economic and political situation India. As a result of the latter, the party failed to articulate a strategic-tactical line of revolution acceptable for both leftist and rightist factions, in particular on how to relate to the Indian National Congress and the right-wing opposition parties like the Swatantra Party and Jan Sangh. Per Sharma most studies on the split have ascribed the split to a combination of these 3 factors, albeit in varying degrees. Whilst Sharma agrees that these three factors 'accelerated' the split he seeks to point to other factors often overlooked by commentators, namely the stark regional variations in which CPI operated, leadership rivalry and personality-oriented factionalism. Sharma argues that the role of Dange in the party had been a source of contention even in the 1940s, that tensions grew between his supporters and opponents as he steadily arose in the party hierarchy in the years that followed. In particular in the midst of the April 1964 split ideological and strategic issues were put to the back-burner, and rivalries of personality and power struggles came to the forefront. Mohanty (1977) also indicates that personal and factional rivalries were factors in the lead-up to the split.
Factions and nomenclature Different commentators use different ways to describe the factions within CPI in the lead-up to the split. Sharma (1978), for example, portrays a division into in two factions before the split, leftists and rightists. Per his account Dange, Z.A. Ahmed, M.N. Govindan Nair, Sharma, Bhupesh Gupta were rightist leaders and E.M.S. Namboodiripad, P. Sundarayya, Jyoti Basu, Harkishan Singh Surjeet, Hare Krishna Konar were leftist leaders. Sharma notes that Gupta vacillated, not taking a clear stand for neither side. Writers like Crouch (1966) and Mallick (1994) describes three factions; leftists, centrists and rightists. The publication Thought used the labels 'Rucos' ('Russian Communists'), 'Chicos' ('Chinese Communists') and 'Cencos' ('Centrist Communists') to identity the CPI factions.
Following the 11 April 1964 CPI National Council meeting the centrist trend was divided into a 'left-centrist' trend, led by Namboodiripad and Basu, and a 'right-centrist' trend led by Gupta. The former sided with the leftists in the split, the latter with the rightist. But per the RSP organ The Call there was also a 'centralist centrist' trend in West Bengal, who appealed for party unity and refused to pick a side in the split.
After the emergence of two separate parties in 1964, some authors began using the names 'CPI(Right)'/'Right Communist Party' or 'CPI(Left)'/'Left Communist Party'.Indian Communist Party, 082, in Janda, Kenneth. Political Parties: A Cross-National Survey. Both parties insisted that they were the authentic CPI, and simply called themselves 'CPI'. The CPI(Left) approached the Election Commission of India ahead of the March 1965 Kerala Legislative Assembly election, requesting to contest the elections under the name of the Communist Party of India. The ECI refused the petition, as CPI(Left) represented a minority of the parliamentary faction of the undivided CPI. In response the CPI(Left) registered itself as the 'Communist Party of India (Marxist)' with the ECI, and the ECI awarded it the hammer and sickle as its election symbol. The CPI(Left) would henceforth be known as the CPI(M).
Background
Turbulent years: 1947-1953
Independence of India
Namboodiripad, himself one of the main protagonists in the split, argued that the split had its roots with the transfer of power in 1947 as different leaders developed different views on the new situation. On the eve of the Independence of India, CPI was led by P.C. Joshi. Under Joshi's tenure as CPI general secretary legal struggles was the main tactical line of the party but the party also led militant mass struggles, most notably the Telangana Rebellion and the Tebhaga movement. And as a result, the party was divided on the issue of how to characterize the new political situation after the transfer of power in 1947. Joshi, the party general secretary, argued that Independence was genuine and represented an achievement of the national bourgeoisie. But the two other members of the CPI politburo - B.T. Ranadive and Gangadhar Adhikari - argued that the transfer of power was a sham measure by orchestrated by British imperialism.
Second Party Congress and the Zhdanov Doctrine At the 2nd Party Congress, held in Calcutta in 1948, there was an abrupt change leadership and political line. The moderate Joshi was replaced by Ranadive as the new general secretary of the party and people's democratic revolution through class struggle and mass upsurge became the new party line. The new party line drew inspiration from the Zhdanov Doctrine. However the attempt to organize a mass upsurge failed and the party leaders were either jailed or forced to go underground. Between 1949 and 1951 factional conflict virtually paralyzed the party. By mid-1949 Andhra communists had begun advocating that a 'Maoist' strategy for revolution was apt for India, based on their experience from the Telangana armed struggle. In 1950 Ranadive was deposed from his role as general secretary, and the Andhra cadres led by C. Rajeshwara Rao took over the leadership of the party.
From armed struggle to parliamentary politics CPI Central Committee electedat 1951 Calcutta Party ConferenceGeneral SecretaryAjoy GhoshPolitburoMuzaffar AhmedJyoti BasuS.A. DangeE.M.S. NamboodiripadP. RamamurthiOther members ofthe Central CommitteeZ.A. AhmedRomesh ChandraA.K. GopalanBhupesh GuptaSohan Singh JoshRanen SenY.D. SharmaP. SundarayyaS.S. YusufSource: The following year the political line was reversed once again. The CPSU instructed CPI to cancel the Telangana struggle. Notably the CPSU had begun to see Nehru as increasingly independent from the US. The party gathered for a convention in Calcutta which changed the party line to opt for peaceful methods of struggle, rejecting the legacy of Ranadive (who had sought to imitate the Russian revolution) and Rao (who had sought to imitate the Chinese Communist Revolution).PADMANABHAN, V. K. "COMMUNIST PARTIES IN TAMILNADU." The Indian Journal of Political Science, vol. 48, no. 2, 1987, pp. 225–250. . Accessed 2 August 2020. The convention adopted a new party program, which identified India as 'dependent and semi-colonial country' The 1951 program characterized the Nehru government as a "[g]overnment of landlords and princes and the reactionary big bourgeoisie collaborating with the British imperialists" It outlined that the national bourgeoisie was not part of the governing bloc. The 1951 program temporarily settled the factional conflict inside the party. Subsequently, after the 1951 Calcutta convention CPI began preparations for participating in 1951–52 Indian general election. The 1951 convention restructured the Central Committee of the party, reducing its membership from 31 (as elected at the 2nd Party Congress) to 21. A new general secretary was named. Ajoy Ghosh was a compromise candidate who was accepted by all factions in the party. But in the years to come Ghosh would frequently be absent on medical leave, and factional rivalries would re-emerge.