The Hwasong-11A (), also known as KN-23 under the United States naming convention and other names, is a North Korean single-stage, solid-fueled short-range ballistic missile (SRBM). Unveiled in February 2018 and first test-fired in May 2019, Hwasong-11A is the most notable variant of Hwasong-11 series of solid-fueled SRBMs. Analysts believe the missile, with its quasi-ballistic trajectory and a range of up to , may be able to penetrate South Korean missile defenses. It can be launched from road-mobile platforms, railway car and silo. Variants of the Hwasong-11A include a larger warhead version, a smaller version and an underwater-launched version. The missile has been reported to be used by Russian forces during the Russo-Ukrainian war.
Description The Hwasong-11A bears an external resemblance to the Russian Iskander-M and South Korean Hyunmoo-2B short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), being distinguished by its elongated cable raceway, different jet vane actuators and smooth base. Like the Iskander-M, it flies in a quasi-ballistic trajectory, flattening out below an altitude of about where the atmosphere is dense enough so the missile's fins can change course along its flight path. However, it is significantly larger than the Iskander, with estimated length and diameter to be and , respectively. The mass estimation of Hwasong-11A is also different, with the Center for Strategic and International Studies giving a mass of , while a 2026 assessment published by 38 North estimates it to be for flight simulations. The missile is painted army green, as well as likely uses the same diameter motor as the Pukguksong-1. The motor is somewhat lengthened, having only one stage, compared to the Pukguksong-1. The motor has a very different structure, compared to the Iskander. Its TEL has more space for the missile, as it lacks the structure immediately after the cab.
Data from test-fires shows a minimum range of using depressed trajectory, with the maximum range being assessed as , putting all of South Korea within range. It is believed that Hwasong-11A's maximum flight altitude is . With a warhead, the missile has an estimated range of . The missile's warhead section has enough space for up to of high explosives compared to for Hwasong-5 (Scud-B) and of 9K720 Iskander. It can be conventional, likely unitary, nuclear, or submunition, which can devastate large areas with high firepower. The Hwasong-11A is also capable of carrying the Hwasan-31 tactical nuclear warhead. Its active steering capability could make it accurate to within CEP, depending whether the missile uses satellite guidance or INS alone.
The Hwasong-11A's launch platform is diverse. It can be launched from a wheeled, four-axle transporter erector launcher (TEL), or a tracked one. Both are capable of carrying two missiles. However, the four-axle truck used in test-fires is different from the truck used to carrying the missile during 8 February 2018 military parade. Hwasong-11A also has railway-based mobile launch platform, as well as silo-based launcher.
The missile is likely to replace older liquid-fueled North Korean SRBMs, like the Hwasong-5 and Hwasong-6. Being solid-fueled and capable of rapid firing from mobile launchers, Hwasong-11A is difficult for an opposing force to locate and target, meaning it is ideal for fast and precise tactical attacks. Once launched, it is very hard to detect and be intercepted by traditional missile defense systems, as the missile can fly at low altitude, conduct a terminal "pull-up" maneuver, and have a short overall flight time. For example, Hwasong-11A's trajectory is too low or too high for THAAD and MIM-104 Patriot to intercept reliably, respectively. Its increased accuracy also reduces the number of missiles that would be needed to destroy a single target. It is capable of following non-ballistic trajectories, including depressed ballistic trajectories, pitch down to approach target from directly above, and range-extension using aerodynamic lift.
The Hwasong-11A is likely to feature some form of foreign involvement such as parts, as when compared to the later developed Hwasong-11B (KN-24), the Korean Central News Agency focuses mainly on the deployment of the missile, with little coverage on its research. While the Hwasong-11B are called "Juche projectiles", it is never mentioned for the Hwasong-11A. The focus on the combat-readiness of the system suggests that it had been deployed for a while but not tested, like the Hwasong-10. It still bears significant differences from the 9K720 Iskander.
Naming As of 2026, North Korean state media refers to Hwasong-11A as Hwasongpho-11 Ka () and classified it as a tactical ballistic missile. It was first mentioned directly during a test in May 2025. Formerly, when the official designation of Hwasong-11A was revealed, its Korean name was "" (), sometimes romanized as Hwasong-11Ga, with the letter "Ga" being the first letter of the Korean alphabet. The official designation can also be alternatively romanized as Hwasongpho-11Ga or Hwasong-11Ka. However, as the missile and KN-02 Toksa, whose official designation is "Hwasong-11", are totally different missiles, the Hwasong-11A (and its subsequent variants) can not be called Hwasong-11.
In its earlier launches, occurred between 2019 and 2023, North Korea called Hwasong-11A by generic descriptive terms instead of the official designation, such as "tactical guided weapon", "tactical guided missile" and "tactical ballistic missile".
External designations and nicknames of Hwasong-11A include the alphanumeric codes of KN-23 and 19-1 SRBM, used by the United States and South Korea respectively. Analysts also call the missile Kimskander (a portmanteau of Kim Jong Un and Iskander), given its similarities to the Russian counterpart.
History In mid-October 2017, North Korea apparently tested a solid-fueled engine in Hamhung, possibly a static test of Hwasong-11A's engine.
North Korea first displayed the Hwasong-11A publicly in a military parade on 8 February 2018, when it was mounted on Taebaeksan wheeled launchers. More than a year later, on 4 May 2019, North Korea publicly tested Hwasong-11A for the first time. Five days later, North Korea test-fired another two missiles. On 17 May 2019, the missile was designated by the United States Forces Korea as KN-23. Further test-fires were carried out on 25 July and 6 August 2019, as well as in 2021, 2022 and 2023.
The official name of KN-23 was first suggested as Hwasong-11A in October 2021, after the confirmation of KN-24's official name. During the "Weaponry Exhibition-2023" military exhibition held in July 2023, North Korea confirmed this designation.
According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), as of 2025, North Korea is possessing more than 17 Hwasong-11A launchers, in road- and rail-mobile variants.
Another launch of Hwasong-11A occurred on 8 May 2025, during a military drill that also involved KN-25. It was the first known Hwasong-11A launch since 2023. Further launches of this missile occurred in April and September 2026.
Mass production In November 2024, satellite imagery revealed that the buildings at the February 11 Plant (Hamhung), used to manufacture ballistic missiles (including Hwasong-11A), were expanded, likely related to increased production.
Images published by North Korean state media during Kim Jong Un inspection to missile factories in December 2025 and June 2026 suggested Hwasong-11A had been entered mass production for conventional warfare, with approximately 90 non-warhead Hwasong-11A missiles showed in December 2025 visit and around 80 missile bodies in June 2026 visit.
Russian use in Ukraine The Hwasong-11A has been identified to be used since at least December 2023 by Russian forces and possibly, one of North Korean missile units for a time, during the Russo-Ukrainian war. An unknown number of North Korean ballistic missiles were transferred to Russia in October 2023, according to declassified US intelligence informations. Based on debris left by Russian attacks on Ukrainian targets on 30 December 2023, the ring housing the control vanes have been identified as the characteristics of Hwasong-11A and Hwasong-11B missiles. The barometer on the missile was found to have a Hangul character, and various parts of the missile were stamped with the possible factory name.
According to the Conflict Armament Research (CAR), 75% of components in the guidance control system for the Hwasong-11A fired at Kharkiv are based on American parts. They also indicated that some of the missiles were newly produced.
During the Kharkiv strikes of 2 January 2024, Ukrainian authorities noted that the missiles used were of North Korean origin, noting that the shape and design were different than that of Iskander missiles. On 29 April 2024, the UNSC confirmed that the munitions used during the strike were that of Hwasong-11A missiles.
On 7 May 2024, Ukrainian sources reported that the missiles have a high failure rate. According to these officials, half of the North Korean missiles lost their programmed trajectories and exploded in the air. In August 2024, the CAR documented the debris of four additional North Korean ballistic missiles that landed in Ukraine. These debris, retrieved in Bila Tserkva, Vitrova Balka and Rozhivka, were identified as debris from North Korean missiles, likely from Hwasong-11A. In December 2024, during an interview, Ukrainian military official Andrii Cherniak claimed that Russia had used around 60 Hwasong-11A missiles in their attacks against Ukraine.
According to Ukraine, at the start of 2025, North Korea had supplied Russia 148 Hwasong-11A and 11B missiles. In February 2025, it was also reported the Hwasong-11A missiles used by Russia in Ukraine had an improved CEP of . Ukraine also claimed that Russia launched Hwasong-11A in the 23 April 2025 Russian attack on Kyiv. Information from a Ukrainian source obtained by Reuters indicated that the Hwasong-11A missiles were armed with a warhead.
In May 2025, the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT) published images of Hwasong-11A's debris collected in Ukraine.
In April 2026, a Ukrainian report revealed that North Korean ballistic missiles (including Hwasong-11A) used by Russia in 2024 were made using commercial electronics with outdated manufacturing methods (up to 50 years old) and used less energy-efficient fuel, requiring North Korean missiles to use larger engines to achieve the same range as Russian counterpart. Ukraine also confirmed that Hwasong-11A is not a direct copy or licensed production of Russia's Iskander. Four months later, Ukraine claimed that North Korea had supplied another batch of 40 Hwasong-11A and 11B missiles to Russia and would deploy a missile unit that could be equipped with six launchers and additional 120 missiles (including Hwasong-11A).
List of tests Confirmed tests