The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, codenamed Project 17, began on 2 August 1990 and marked the beginning of the Gulf War. After defeating the State of Kuwait on 4 August 1990, Iraq went on to militarily occupy the country for the next seven months. The invasion was condemned internationally, and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted numerous resolutions urging Iraq to withdraw from Kuwaiti territory. The Iraqi military, however, continued to occupy Kuwait and defied all orders by the UNSC. After initially establishing the "Republic of Kuwait" as a puppet state, Iraq annexed the entire country on 28 August 1990; northern Kuwait became the Saddamiyat al-Mitla' District and was merged into the existing Basra Governorate, while southern Kuwait was carved out as the all-new Kuwait Governorate. By November 1990, the adoption of UNSC Resolution 678 officially issued Iraq an ultimatum to withdraw unconditionally by 15 January 1991 or else be removed by "all necessary means" from Kuwaiti territory. In anticipation of a war with Iraq, the UNSC authorized the assembly of an American-led military coalition.
After Iraq failed to meet the UNSC's deadline, the coalition pursued the directive to forcefully expel Iraqi troops from Kuwait by initiating the Gulf War aerial bombardment campaign on 17 January 1991. As the bombardment campaign continued over the next month, Iraq fired missiles at Israel; the Iraqi government had hoped that an Israeli retaliation would prompt the coalition's Muslim-majority states to rescind their support for the campaign against Iraq. However, no such retaliation took place, and the coalition began a ground invasion of Iraqi-occupied Kuwait and parts of Iraq on 23 February 1991. As Iraqi troops retreated from Kuwait, they set fire to over 700 Kuwaiti oil wells, but this strategy was ultimately unsuccessful in thwarting the coalition's advance. By 28 February 1991, the Iraqi military had been devastated and Kuwaiti independence was restored.
Though the true intent behind Iraq's decision to attack Kuwait is disputed, a variety of speculations have been made. One possible motive concerned Iraq's inability to repay the that it had borrowed from Kuwait during the Iran–Iraq War. Proponents of this theory point to Kuwait's surge in petroleum production, which kept Iraq's revenues down; Kuwait's oil production levels were above the mandatory quota that was specified by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which had consequently urged the country to moderate production amidst a sharp decrease in global oil prices. Iraq interpreted the Kuwaiti government's refusal to decrease oil production as an act of aggression against the Iraqi economy. In early 1990, Iraq accused Kuwait of slant drilling to steal Iraqi petroleum across the Iraq–Kuwait border, though some Iraqi sources indicated that Saddam Hussein had already made the decision to attack Kuwait a few months before the actual invasion. Within two days of the invasion, most Kuwaiti military units had been overrun by the Iraqis and most Kuwaiti officials had gone into exile in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.
Background
Iran–Iraq War and Iraqi debt to Kuwait When the Iran–Iraq War broke out, Kuwait initially stayed neutral and also tried mediating between Iran and Iraq. In 1982, Kuwait along with other Arab states of the Persian Gulf supported Iraq to curb the Iranian Revolutionary government. In 1982–1983, Kuwait began extending significant financial loans to Iraq. Kuwait's large-scale economic assistance to Iraq often triggered hostile Iranian actions against Kuwait. Iran repeatedly targeted Kuwaiti oil tankers in 1984 and fired weapons at Kuwaiti security personnel stationed on Bubiyan island in 1988."Iran reportedly fires on Kuwaiti island", Lakeland Ledger, 30 March 1988. During the Iran–Iraq War, Kuwait functioned as Iraq's major port once Basra was shut down by the fighting. However, after the war ended, the friendly relations between the two neighbouring Arab countries turned sour for several economic and diplomatic reasons that culminated in an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
By the time the Iran–Iraq War ended, Iraq was not in a financial position to repay the US$14 billion it had borrowed from Kuwait to finance its war and requested that Kuwait forgive the debt. Iraq argued that the war had prevented a possible rise of Iranian hegemony over Kuwait. Kuwait's unwillingness to write off the debt strained the relationship between the two countries. In late 1989, several official meetings were held between Kuwaiti and Iraqi leaders, but did not result in an agreement.
Kuwaiti economic warfare and alleged slant drilling In 1988, Iraq's Oil Minister, Issam Al-Chalabi, strove for a reduction in the crude oil production quota of Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) members to end the 1980s oil glut."Iraq strains OPEC consensus", New Straits Times, 8 October 1988 Chalabi argued that higher oil prices would help Iraq to pay back its US$60 billion debt by increasing its revenues. However, given its large downstream petroleum industry, Kuwait was less concerned about the prices of crude oil and in 1989, Kuwait requested OPEC to increase the country's total oil production ceiling by 50% to per day."OPEC pressures Kuwait to moderate quota demand", New Straits Times, 7 June 1989 Throughout much of the 1980s, Kuwait's oil production had already been considerably above its mandatory OPEC quota and this had prevented a rise of crude oil prices. A lack of consensus among OPEC members undermined Iraq's efforts to end the oil glut and consequently prevented the recovery of its war-crippled economy. According to former Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, "every US$1 drop in the price of a barrel of oil caused a US$1 billion drop in Iraq's annual revenues, triggering an acute financial crisis in Baghdad". Iraq interpreted Kuwait's refusal to decrease its oil production as an act of aggression.
The increasingly tense relations between Iraq and Kuwait were further aggravated when Iraq alleged that Kuwait was slant-drilling across the border into Iraq's Rumaila field. The dispute over the Rumaila field started in 1960 when an Arab League declaration marked the Iraq–Kuwait border north of the southernmost tip of the Rumaila field. During the Iran–Iraq War, Iraqi oil drilling operations in Rumaila declined while Kuwait's operations increased. In 1989, Iraq accused Kuwait of using "advanced drilling techniques" to exploit oil from its share of the Rumaila field. Iraq estimated that US$2.4 billion worth of Iraqi oil was "stolen" by Kuwait and demanded compensation. According to oil workers in the area, Iraq's slant drilling claim was fabricated, as "oil flows easily from the Rumaila field without any need for these techniques."
On 26 July 1990, only a few days before the Iraqi invasion, OPEC officials said that Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates had agreed to a proposal to limit their oil output to per day, "down from the nearly 2 million barrels a day they had each been pumping", thus potentially settling differences over oil policy between Kuwait and Iraq.
Iraqi irredentism
Iraq had a history of irredentist claims to Kuwait. After gaining independence in 1932, the Kingdom of Iraq immediately declared that the Sheikhdom of Kuwait was rightfully a territory of Iraq, claiming it had been part of an Iraqi territory until being created by the British.Duiker, William J; Spielvogel, Jackson J. World History: From 1500. 5th edition. Belmont, California, USA: Thomson Wadsworth, 2007. Pp. 839. The Iraqi Republic under Abd al-Karim Qasim also held irredentist claims to Kuwait.Raymond A. Hinnebusch. The international politics of the Middle East. Manchester, England, UK: Manchester University Press, 2003 Pp. 209.
The Saddam government also believed this and justified the invasion by claiming that Kuwait had always been an integral part of Iraq and only became an independent state due to the interference of the British government. After signing the Anglo-Ottoman Convention of 1913, the British government planned to split Kuwait from the Ottoman territories into a separate sheikhdom, but this agreement was never ratified. The Iraqi government also argued that the Kuwaiti Emir was a highly unpopular figure among the Kuwaiti populace. By overthrowing the Emir, Iraq claimed that it granted Kuwaitis greater economic and political freedom.R. Stephen Humphreys, Between Memory and Desire: The Middle East in a Troubled Age, University of California Press, 1999, p. 105.
Kuwait had been loosely under the authority of the Ottoman vilâyet of Basra, and although its ruling dynasty, the Al Sabah family, had concluded a protectorate agreement in 1899 that assigned responsibility for its foreign affairs to Britain, it did not make any attempt to secede from the Ottoman Empire. For this reason, its borders with the rest of Basra province were never clearly defined or mutually agreed upon.
Following the proclamation of the puppet state, the 'Republic of Kuwait', the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council released a statement stating, "The free provisional Kuwaiti government has decided to appeal to kinsfolk in Iraq, led by the knight of Arabs and the leader of their march, President Field Marshal Saddam Hussein, to agree that their sons should return to their large family, that Kuwait should return to the great Iraq—the mother homeland—and to achieve complete merger unity between Kuwait and Iraq."Quoted in Lawrence Freedman. A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East. New York: PublicAffairs. 2008. pp. 217–218. See also Rabinovich and Shaked, pp. 403–404.
Iraq–United States correspondence On 25 July 1990, April Glaspie, the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, asked the Iraqi high command to explain the military preparations in progress, including the massing of Iraqi troops near the border. In turn, Saddam attacked American policy with regard to Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE):"CONFRONTATION IN THE GULF; Excerpts From Iraqi Document on Meeting With U.S. Envoy", The New York Times, 23 September 1990
Glaspie replied:
The American ambassador declared to her Iraqi interlocutor that Washington, "inspired by the friendship and not by confrontation, does not have an opinion" on the disagreement between Kuwait and Iraq, stating "we have no opinion on the Arab–Arab conflicts". Glaspie also indicated to Saddam Hussein that the United States did not intend "to start an economic war against Iraq". These statements may have caused Saddam to believe he had received a diplomatic green light from the United States to invade Kuwait."Confrontation in the Gulf" , The New York Times, 25 September 1990. Saddam and Glaspie later disputed what was said in this meeting. Saddam published a transcript but Glaspie disputed its accuracy before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in March 1991."Did the U.S. Encourage Iraq to Invade?", The Baltimore Sun, 24 March 1991.
According to Richard E. Rubenstein, when Glaspie was later asked by British journalists why she had said that, her response was "we didn't think he would go that far" meaning invade and annex the whole country. Although no follow-up question was asked, it can be inferred that what the U.S. government thought in July 1990 was that Saddam Hussein was only interested in pressuring Kuwait into debt forgiveness and to lower oil production."Leonard Lopate Show", WNPR, Why Americans Choose War 11 November 2010