Anthonie Heinsius (23 November 1641 – 3 August 1720) was a Dutch statesman who served as Grand Pensionary of Holland from 1689 to his death in 1720. Heinsius was an able negotiator and one of the greatest and most obstinate opponents of the expansionist policies of Louis XIV of France. He was one of the driving forces behind the anti-French coalitions of the Nine Years' War (1688–1697) and the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714).
Even during the life of King William III, he was seen as the preeminent statesman in Europe outside of France. After the death of William III in 1702, Heinsius' hold on the Dutch States General diminished, but he remained Grand Pensionary of Holland, and replaced William as the main policy maker in the field of foreign affairs of the Dutch Republic. In this he was supported by a Cabinet noir under the direction of his private secretary Abel Tassin d'Alonne.
Early life Anthonie Heinsius was born in Delft on 23 November 1641, from the marriage of Adriaan Heinsius and Maria Dedel. His father belonged to the governing families of Delft, where Anthonie completed his education at the Latin school. He later attended the University of Orléans, earning a doctorate in both civil and canon law in 1662. Upon returning to Delft, he practiced law there until his appointment as the city's pensionary in 1679.
In the States of Holland, during these years, the Delft government generally aligned with Amsterdam in opposition to the foreign policy of William III of Orange. Heinsius, as the city's pensionary, leaned in this direction, prompting some to see his assignment in 1682 to Paris as a means to remove him. His task was to address the acts of violence orchestrated by Louis XIV in the Principality of Orange. Before his departure, William III predicted a reception in Paris that would not be unfriendly but would yield no results, a prophecy that proved accurate. Heinsius resistance to the encroachments of Louis XIV, however, escalated to the extent that Louvois went as far as threatening him with imprisonment in the Bastille.
This mission seemingly contributed to convincing Heinsius that the power and politics of Louis XIV were indeed perilous and rightfully opposed by William III. In early 1685, he departed for England with several other delegates to negotiate difficulties between the Dutch (VOC) and English (EIC) East India Companies. In England he practiced his English, a language he understood, unlike his most of his compatriots. By the spring of 1686, the commission returned without achieving its goal, but in 1687 he became a member of the board of the Delft chamber of the Dutch East India Company. Correspondence between him and the Grand Pensionary Gaspar Fagel during this time clearly indicates that he no longer belonged to the adversaries of Prince William and the Grand Pensionary and Fagel came to trust him. Their relationship had even improved to the extent that, as Fagel's health deteriorated, Heinsius was approached regarding his willingness to take over Fagel's position.
Grand Pensionary
Nine Years' War Upon Fagel's death at the end of 1688, the position of Grand Pensionary was temporarily assumed by Michiel ten Hove, the pensionary of Haarlem. However, Ten Hove died on 24 March 1689. Subsequently, Heinsius was entrusted with the interim performance of the office. Initially hesitant to accept an appointment, he yielded to the insistence of William, who, after the Glorious Revolution, now also was the King of England. On May 26, 1689, he was elected as the Grand Pensionary by the States of Holland and was subsequently reappointed every five years. During this time the Dutch Republic was involved in the Nine Years' War.
The Dutch had long been concerned with the fate of the Spanish Netherlands, viewing it as a strategic buffer against France. This perception endured even during periods of alliance with France, in the time of Johan de Witt. Evidenced by the popularity of the motto "Gallicus amicus non vicinus" ('France is a good friend, but not a good neighbour') within the Dutch Republic. The War of Devolution (1667–68) and the Franco-Dutch War (1672–78) showed the Spanish could not defend the Southern Netherlands. The Dutch hoped to create a barrier that would provide the strategic depth needed to protect their commercial and demographic heartlands around Amsterdam against attack from the south. The Ryswick peace negotiations which ended the Nine Years' War, allowed, among other things, the Dutch to place garrisons in eight Spanish key cities. Heinsius appeared among the Dutch delegates that concluded the peace.
Early years of the War of the Spanish Succession
During the War of the Spanish Succession it is often argued that Heinsius, along with the Duke of Marlborough and Prince Eugene, formed the triumvirate that governed the Grand Alliance. Heinsius directed much of the political strategy of the Grand Alliance and, despite not being a military leader, had an important role in planning many military campaigns.
With the help of Maximilian of Bavaria, the governor of the Spanish Netherlands, the Dutch garrison troops had been replaced by French troops by 1701. Dutch priorities were to and strengthen the Barrier fortresses, retain control of the economically vital Scheldt estuary, and gain access to trade in the Spanish Empire. When Dutch forces operated outside the Spanish Netherlands this was often a concession to their English allies.
The first objective was, however, to secure the Dutch frontiers, threatened by the alliance between France, Bavaria, and Joseph Clemens of Bavaria, ruler of Liège and Cologne. In the early months Dutch Field Marshal, the Prince of Nassau-Usingen, captured Kaiserswerth, while an assault on Nijmegen, a very important Dutch city, was only barely repelled, by the Earl of Athlone.
Although Dutch Republic had many experienced generals, none of them were considered qualified enough for supreme command in the Low Countries. The Duke of Marlborough was instead appointed commander-in-chief of the joint Anglo-Dutch army. The trust William III had placed in him and the expectation that the appointment would ensure close cooperation between London and The Hague were the deciding factors.
However, Marlborough was considered an unknown quantity among the Dutch. He had never before commanded a large army and comparatively limited military experience. Moreover, he was a foreigner and the States General wanted to prevent English political and military interests from being prioritised over those of the Dutch. The States General thus put severe limits on his power, which were defined in 12 articles. The most notable articles stated that:
(Article 2) Marlborough was only allowed to command the Dutch troops that were part of the combined field army. (Article 3) Marlborough always had to formulate his operational plans in consultation with the highest Dutch general, who was also authorised to ask his subordinates for advice. (Article 4) Marlborough had to take all his decisions in agreement with the Dutch commander and the field deputies. (Article 6) Marlborough was not allowed to give orders to the Dutch troops independently of the Dutch senior officers.
Marlborough had to rely on his powers of tact and persuasion, and gain the consent of accompanying Dutch field deputies, the political representatives of the States General. Because of this Marlborough's good relationship with Heinsius would prove immensely beneficial to him.
The rest of the 1702 campaign went relatively well and Marlborough's army took Venlo, Roermond, Stevensweert and Captured Liège along the Meuse. The 1703 campaign was, instead, marred by Allied conflicts over strategy. Despite capturing Bonn, they failed to take Antwerp, while a Dutch contingent narrowly escaped disaster at Ekeren in June. In that same year, the strategic position of the Emperor continued to worsen. To relieve the pressure, Marlborough marched up the Rhine, joined forces with Louis of Baden and Prince Eugene, and crossed the Danube on 2 July. The Allied victory at Blenheim on 13 August forced Bavaria out of the war and the Treaty of Ilbersheim placed it under Austrian rule. Allied efforts to exploit their victory in 1705 foundered on poor co-ordination, tactical disputes and command rivalries. A diplomatic crisis between the Dutch Republic and England was only averted by the dismissal of General Slangenburg. Heinsius played a significant role in this.
Years of Success
In 1706, when the French court made some secret peace proposals, the advice of the Grand Pensionary and the government of Amsterdam was sought. The dutch-born French diplomat Adrianus Engelhard Helvetius, the son of the renowned physician, arrived from Paris under the pretext of visiting his father. While here, he engaged in several discussions with Heinsius on this subject, delivering letters and messages from President Rouillé. Furthermore, he sent a draft, approved by the Amsterdam government, to English statesmen. Heinsius then elaborated on the points, totaling 40, contained in this proposal. However, these negotiations did not result in peace. Heinsius received a letter from the French statesmen filled with bitter complaints about the conduct of the delegates involved in those negotiations.
From 1706, the war in the Spanish Netherlands took an unexpectedly favorable turn for the Allied army. At the Battle of Ramillies, a French army was decisively defeated, leading to a substantial portion of the Spanish Netherlands falling into the hands of the Anglo-Dutch forces. From July 1706 until Februari 1716, the Spanish Netherlands transitioned into an Anglo-Dutch condominium. The sovereignty of Charles was theoretically recognized, yet governance would be administered by a Council of State comprising Belgians, acting on his behalf under the regency of the Maritime Powers. The immediate threat to the Republic had diminished, sparking hope in Paris and anxiety in London and Vienna that Heinsius might seek a separate peace. However, it was overlooked that most strong fortified cities - like Tournai, Lille, Mons and Namur - were still not under Allied control. If they were to become part of the Dutch barrier, the war had to continue.
In the following years, the Allies slowly advanced towards and beyond the borders of France. Victories in the battles of Oudenarde and Malplaquet and the capture of Lille, Tournai, and Mons were notable successes for the Allies. Despite the soaring costs, which also greatly burdened the Republic, the imminent humiliation of France seemed undeniable. During the peace negotiations in 1709 and 1710, Louis appeared willing to make significant concessions.
However, the demands posed by the Allies to Louis XIV proved to be a step too far for him. Heinsius insisted that the king should deploy his own troops to expel his grandson from Spain. According to Heinsius and the other Dutch negotiators, this demand was necessary due to the French king's unreliability in the past. Louis had shown little respect for international treaties in the past when they were not in his favour. Heinsius feared that the Allies would still have to make great efforts to win the war in Spain and that France, after a pause in which it could recover, would restart the war. If the Allied troops had been moved to Spain to secure victory there, they would no longer be present in the Southern Netherlands, leaving the region open to the French armies. The peace negotiations of 1709 and 1710 thus collapsed.
Later life and death