The 41st Guards Rifle Division was formed as an elite infantry division of the Red Army in August 1942, based on the 1st formation of the 10th Airborne Corps, and served in that role until after the end of the Great Patriotic War. It was the last of a series of ten Guards rifle divisions formed from airborne corps during the spring and summer of 1942. It was briefly assigned to the 1st Guards Army in Stalingrad Front, then to the 24th Army in Don Front, and suffered heavy casualties north of Stalingrad before being withdrawn to the Reserve of the Supreme High Command for a substantial rebuilding. Returning to 1st Guards Army in Southwestern Front in November it took part in Operation Little Saturn as part of 4th Guards Rifle Corps and then advanced into the Donbas where it was caught up in the German counteroffensive in the spring of 1943. During the summer and fall the division fought its way through eastern Ukraine as part of the 6th, and later the 57th Army under several corps commands. It would remain in the southern part of the front for the duration of the war. By February 1944 it was in the 7th Guards Army and took part in the battle for the Korsun Pocket, winning its first battle honor in the process. Shortly after it was transferred to the 4th Guards Army, where it would remain for the duration, still moving through several corps headquarters. The 41st Guards saw limited service in the first Jassy-Kishinev offensive in the spring, but considerably more in August's second offensive and several of its subunits received battle honors or decorations. The division itself won a second honorific during the offensive into Hungary in January 1945 and was later decorated for its role in the capture of Budapest. After the fall of Vienna in April it did garrison duty in the city for a short time before being directed west into lower Austria where it linked up with U.S. forces in the last days of the war. In October, while still in Austria, it was converted to the 18th Guards Mechanized Division.
Formation The 10th Airborne Corps had been formed for the first time in September 1941 in the Volga Military District but did not officially finish forming its brigades and headquarters until December 5 after which it was moved to the Moscow Military District. The STAVKA employed the Corps to conduct air assault operations west of Moscow during its winter counteroffensive and it suffered heavy losses in the process.David M. Glantz, Colossus Reborn, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, 2005, p. 187 Airborne corps were roughly divisional-sized units made up of three brigades of about 3,000 men each. Since they were considered elite light infantry the STAVKA decided they could be assigned Guards status upon reformation. The artillery regiment and many of the other subunits had to be formed from scratch. From March to July 1942 the Corps was engaged in rebuilding and training in the Moscow area before being redesignated as the 41st Guards on August 6 and departing for the front 48 hours later.Charles C. Sharp, "Red Guards", Soviet Guards Rifle and Airborne Units 1941 to 1945, Soviet Order of Battle World War II, Vol. IV, Nafziger, 1995, pp. 2-3, 11 After the subunits received their designations the division's order of battle was as follows: 122nd Guards Rifle Regiment (from 23rd Airborne Brigade) 124th Guards Rifle Regiment (from 24th Airborne Brigade) 126th Guards Rifle Regiment (from 25th Airborne Brigade) 89th Guards Artillery RegimentSharp, "Red Guards", p. 60 44th Guards Antitank Battalion 52nd Guards Antiaircraft Battery (until April 20, 1943) 37th Guards Reconnaissance Company 44th Guards Sapper Battalion 174th Guards Signal Battalion (later 55th Guards Signal Company) 45th Guards Medical/Sanitation Battalion 43rd Guards Chemical Defense (Anti-gas) Company 38th Guards Motor Transport Company 40th Guards Field Bakery 34th Guards Divisional Veterinary Hospital 2144th Field Postal Station 570th Field Office of the State Bank Col. Nikolai Petrovich Ivanov, who had led 10th Airborne since the previous year, remained in command of the unit when it was redesignated. He would be promoted to the rank of major general on January 19, 1943. On the morning of August 4 the STAVKA had issued a directive to split the existing Stalingrad Front in two: a truncated Stalingrad and a new Southeastern Front. The latter was to contain the newly created 1st Guards Army which was formed from the last five of the airborne-derived Guards divisions. A further order late the next day directed these divisions with supporting artillery to proceed to the Stalingrad area by rail post haste.Glantz, To the Gates of Stalingrad, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, 2009, pp. 282-83
Battle of Stalingrad By mid-month it was becoming apparent that the German 6th Army would soon be in a position to launch a general advance on the city by way of Kalach. In planning his defense the commander of Southeastern Front, Col. Gen. A. I. Yeryomenko, directed 1st Guards Army:On the night of August 18/19 Yeryomenko issued new orders for multiple counterattacks by his forces to tie down 6th Army, including the 41st, 38th and 40th Guards Rifle Division to attack from the Kremenskaia and Shokhin line southwards. Due to Yeryomenko's underestimate of the strength of 6th Army (his order required the three divisions to attack a German force almost twice their combined size), the short time available to prepare, and the lack of artillery, armor and air support the counterattack had no chance to succeed, although some territory was gained. Despite this, by holding the Kremenskaia and Sirotinskaia bridgeheads south of the Don the 1st Guards Army helped set the stage for important developments later in the campaign. The counterattacks ended on August 22 and on the 31st the 1st Guards handed over the bridgeheads and the three divisions to the 21st Army.Glantz, To the Gates of Stalingrad, pp. 304-05, 328-29, 391-93
Kotluban Offensives
The order reassigning the 41st and 38th Guards to 21st Army was quickly rescinded and both returned to 1st Guards Army by September 3. The Army was now under command of Stalingrad Front and during these days it moved east from Kletskaia across the Don to Sadki, 25 km northeast of Kotluban.The forces of 6th Army that had reached Stalingrad in late August were still reliant on a narrow corridor from the Don to the Volga for supplies and the new Deputy Supreme Commander, Army Gen. G. K. Zhukov, was determined to sever the corridor and link up with 62nd Army to the south. Maj. Gen. K. S. Moskalenko, the 1st Guards commander, had received orders from Zhukov on August 30 to begin the offensive on September 2, but found this impossible to achieve. Among other issues, the 41st and 38th Guards (plus the supporting 7th Tank Corps) had to make a redeployment march of up to 200 km. In the end, due to fuel shortages the attack had to be postponed until 0500 hours on September 3. The Army faced the 3rd and 60th Motorized Divisions of XIV Panzer Corps on its attack sector east of Kuzmichi.Glantz, Armageddon in Stalingrad, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, 2009, pp. 34, 38-39, 43
The 4th Tank Army had attacked the corridor farther west on September 2, a move that was intended to support Moskalenko's assault but which failed miserably. 1st Guards Army struck at 0530 hours after a weak and ineffective artillery preparation; the 41st and 38th Guards, still moving up, were in second echelon with the 84th Rifle Division. Attacking across flat and treeless terrain in the face of well-prepared German positions the Soviet tanks and riflemen penetrated as much as 4 km deep and cut the width of the corridor in half before becoming bogged down among German strongpoints after suffering significant losses. By 1700 hours the division had concentrated in Sukhaya Karkagon Balka - Hill 132.9 - Hill 126.0 region. The 38th Guards and 84th Divisions were committed to the offensive the next day, but the 41st remained in reserve. It went into action when the offensive was renewed on September 5 and by 1500 hours was fighting along the northwestern slopes of Hill 143.6 and the southeastern slopes of Hill 145.1. By now it was clear that the offensive, which had been joined by the new 24th and 66th Armies, had stalled, although under pressure from Stalin Zhukov persisted until September 13.Glantz, Armageddon in Stalingrad, pp. 41-45, 49-50
Over the next few days a major regrouping took place among the Soviet forces and the division came under the command of 66th Army to the east. When the second Kotluban offensive began on September 18 it formed a shock group with the 38th Guards and 116th Rifle Divisions on a roughly 8 km sector on the Army's right wing west of the Sukhaia Mechetka River and north of Hill 139.7. This force of about 18,000 men and a few infantry support tanks faced two regiments from the 3rd and 60th Motorized, about 5,000 men backed by 30-40 tanks. The outcome was not much in doubt:During the fighting over this day and the next the Army had no success whatsoever at a cost of about 20,000 casualties. Given the initial strength of the shock group this was a devastating blow to all three divisions. In preparation for a third offensive, which began on September 23, the remnants of the 41st Guards were shifted west to 24th Army but that Army was also stymied by German resistance from the outset and lost 6,305 men up to September 26.Glantz, Armageddon in Stalingrad, pp. 168-69, 172-75, 177, 179-80, 182 On October 11 the division was withdrawn to the 4th Reserve Army in the Reserve of the Supreme High Command, where it was assigned to the 4th Guards Rifle Corps.Combat Composition of the Soviet Army, 1942, p. 224
Operation Little Saturn As part of the planning for a strategic counteroffensive against the German forces at Stalingrad, on October 22 the STAVKA ordered that the Southwestern Front be re-formed by October 31, north of the Don and in the bridgeheads south of it. The next day it further ordered the formation of a new 1st Guards Army, based on 4th Reserve, to form up 150–190 km north of Serafimovich and be combat ready by November 10 under the command of Maj. Gen. I. M. Chistyakov. At this time 4th Guards Corps contained the 41st and 35th Guards and the 195th Rifle Divisions. On November 1 the Army took up the positions of the 63rd Army along the Don and took over command of its three divisions.Glantz, Armageddon in Stalingrad, pp. 441-44
Operation Uranus had successfully encircled the 6th Army and part of 4th Panzer Army in the Stalingrad area by late on November 22. By now the STAVKA was planning its follow-on offensive, tentatively named Operation Saturn, with the goal of liberating Rostov and trapping all the Axis forces in the Caucasus region. On the 28th an operational group under command of Lt. Gen. V. I. Kuznetsov was formed on the 1st Guards Army's right (west) wing consisting of the 4th and 6th Guards Rifle Corps, 18th Tank Corps, 22nd Motorized Rifle Brigade and supporting artillery. Its principal mission was to form the right pincer of the planned operation that was to envelop and destroy the Italian 8th Army.Glantz, Endgame at Stalingrad, Book One, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, 2014, p. 470