The six-party talks were a series of multilateral discussions between 2003 and 2007, held between six states and hosted in Beijing, aimed at finding a peaceful resolution to the security concerns as a result of the North Korean nuclear weapons program. The states involved were: China Japan North Korea South Korea Russia United States
These talks were a result of North Korea withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003. Apparent gains following the fourth and fifth rounds were reversed by outside events. Five rounds of talks from 2003 to 2007 produced little net progress until the third phase of the fifth round of talks, when North Korea agreed to shut down its nuclear facilities in exchange for fuel aid and steps towards the normalization of relations with the United States and Japan. Responding angrily to the United Nations Security Council's Presidential Statement issued on April 13, 2009, that condemned the North Korean failed satellite launch, the DPRK declared on April 14, 2009, that it would pull out of the six-party talks and that it would resume its nuclear enrichment program in order to boost its nuclear deterrent. North Korea also expelled all nuclear inspectors from the country.
Content of the six-party talks
The main points of contention were: Security guarantee – this issue has been raised by North Korea since the Bush administration (2001–2009) took office. North Korea labeled the Bush administration as hostile and accused it of planning to overthrow the North Korean government by force. This concern was elevated when President George W. Bush named North Korea as part of an "axis of evil" in his 2002 State of the Union Address. After the North Korean refusal to participate in the six-party talks in 2005, South Korea, the United States, and Japan declared that all issues of concern including security guarantees would be on the table if North Korea engaged in discussions within the six-party talks. The construction of light water reactors – under the 1994 Agreed Framework two light-water reactors would be built in return for the closure of North Korea's graphite-moderated nuclear power plant program at Yongbyon. This agreement broke down after both sides defaulted, especially since 2002. Peaceful use of nuclear energy – whilst the NPT allows states the right to use nuclear energy for civilian purposes, this was thought to have been used by North Korea as a cover for their nuclear weapons program. South Korea was amenable to a peaceful use of nuclear energy provided the IAEA will be allowed to inspect the North's facilities. Diplomatic relations – North Korea wanted normalization of diplomatic relations as part of the bargain for giving up its nuclear weapons program. The United States has at times disagreed and at times agreed to this condition, providing North Korea irreversibly and verifiably disarms its nuclear weapons program. Financial restrictions / Trade normalization – The United States placed heavy financial sanctions on North Korea for what they see as an uncooperative attitude and unwillingness to dismantle its nuclear weapons program. In addition, other parties such as China took actions such as the freezing of North Korean assets in foreign bank accounts, such as the US$24 million in Macau's Banco Delta Asia. With the nuclear test on October 9, 2006, UNSCR 1718 was passed, which included a ban on all luxury goods to North Korea. These funds were unfrozen by the United States on March 19, 2007, to reciprocate actions by their North Korean counterparts. The United States removed North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism in October 2008. Verifiable and Irreversible disarmament – Members of the six-party talks disagreed on this. Japan and the United States demanded that North Korea completely dismantle its nuclear program so that it may never be restarted, and that it can be verified by the six members of the talks before aid is given. By the second round of the six-party talks, South Korea fully endorsed this position. China and Russia agreed on a milder, step-by-step solution which involves the members of the six-party talks giving a certain reward (e.g. aid) in return for each step of nuclear disarmament. North Korea wanted the United States to concede some of the conditions first before it will take any action in disarming their weapons program, which they see as the only guarantee to prevent a United States attack on their soil.
1st round (27–29 August 2003)
Representatives: : Lee Soo-hyuck, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade : Kim Yong-il, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs : James Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs : Wang Yi, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs : Mitoji Yabunaka, Director-General of Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau : Alexander Losyukov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Outcomes A Chairman's Summary agreed upon for a further round of talks. No agreement between parties made. See "Why the 6-party talks will fail" (in Korean), the Dong-A Ilbo, 27 August 2003, by Pierre Chabal
2nd round (25–28 February 2004) Representatives: : Lee Soo-hyuck, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade : Kim Kye-gwan, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs : James Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs : Wang Yi, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs : Mitoji Yabunaka, Director-General of Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau : Alexander Losyukov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Outcomes A Chairman's Statement announced with seven articles, including: Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula Peaceful Coexistence of Participating States, stressing the use of mutually coordinated measures to resolve crises. Agreement to hold the third round of talks with full participation during the second quarter of 2004.
3rd round (23–26 June 2004) Representatives : Lee Soo-hyuck, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade : Kim Kye-gwan, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs : James Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs : Wang Yi, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs : Mitoji Yabunaka, Director-General of Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau : Alexander Alexeyev, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Outcomes A Chairman's Statement announced with eight articles, including: Reaffirming the commitment to denuclearising the Korean Peninsula, stressing specification of the scope and time, interval (between steps of) and method of verification Agreement to hold fourth round of talks in Beijing before September 2005
4th round
1st phase (26 July – 7 August 2005) Representatives : Song Min-soon, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade : Kim Kye-gwan, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs : Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs : Wu Dawei, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs : Sasae Kenichiro, Deputy Director-General of Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau : Alexander Alexeyev, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Outcomes U.S. and North Korea cannot agree on 'peaceful' use of nuclear energy Three-week recess of talks due to ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting
2nd phase (13–19 September 2005) Representatives : Song Min-soon, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade : Kim Kye-gwan, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs : Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs : Wu Dawei, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs : Sasae Kenichiro, Deputy Director-General of Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau : Alexander Alexeyev, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Outcomes Agreement on a Joint StatementJoint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks Beijing, September 19, 2005 of six articles, including: Verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula Observe and realize the 1992 Korean Peninsula Denuclearization Declaration North Korea to agree to abandon all nuclear weapons and nuclear programs and return to the NPT as soon as possible However, the states still respect North Korea's stated right to peaceful use of nuclear energy. The issue of the light water reactors will be discussed "at an appropriate time" U.S. and the South Korea to formally declare that they have no nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula U.S. affirmed it has no intention to attack or invade North Korea and will provide a security guarantee to this effect U.S. and North Korea will work to normalize ties, respect each other's sovereignty, exist peacefully together. Japan and North Korea will work to normalize relations, in accordance with the Pyongyang Statement by settling historical disputes. The other five Parties undertook to promote economic cooperation through strengthening bilateral/multilateral economic cooperation in energy, trade and investment. South Korea reaffirmed its proposal of 7/12/05 concerning the provision of 2 million kilowatts of electricity if the DPRK abandoned its nuclear arms program. The Korean Peninsula peace treaty to be negotiated separately. 'Words for words'; 'actions for actions' principle to be observed, stressing 'mutually coordinated measures'. Agreement to hold fifth round of talks in early November, 2005.
5th round
1st phase (9–11 November 2005) Representatives : Song Min-soon, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade : Kim Kye-gwan, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs : Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs : Wu Dawei, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs : Sasae Kenichiro, Deputy Director-General of Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau : Alexander Alexeyev, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Outcomes Joint Statement issued with six points. This is essentially the same as the previous round's statements, except for: Modifying the 'words for words' and 'actions for actions' principle to 'commitment for commitment, action for action' principle. No agreement on when the next talks will be held, though March 2006 looked likely at the time.
Events between phases 1 and 2 In April 2006, North Korea offered to resume talks if the U.S. releases recently frozen North Korean financial assets held in a bank in Macau. The U.S. treats the nuclear and financial issues as separate; North Korea does not. North Korea then announced on October 3, 2006, that it was going to test its first nuclear weapon regardless of the world situation, blaming 'hostile U.S. policy' as the reason for the need for such a deterrent. However, it pledged a no-first-strike policy and to nuclear disarmament only when there is worldwide elimination of such nuclear weapons On October 9, 2006, North Korea announced a successful nuclear test, verified by the U.S. on October 11. In response, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1718 unanimously condemning North Korea, as well as passing Chapter VII, Article 41. Sanctions ranged from the economic to the trade of military units, WMD-related parts and technology transfer, and a ban on certain luxury goods. Both the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation were quick to stress that these were not military-enforceable sanctions. The Resolution also gave the right to other nations to inspect any North Korean vessel's cargo, although the People's Republic of China has held reservations about this move, saying it wanted to avoid any military confrontation with North Korea's navy.