Propaganda is used by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and historically by the Kuomintang (KMT), to sway domestic and international opinion in favor of its policies. In the People's Republic of China (PRC), this includes censorship of proscribed views and active promotion of views that favor the government. Propaganda is considered central to the operation of the CCP and the PRC government, with propaganda operations in the country being directed by the CCP's Publicity Department.
Terms to denote propaganda in Chinese have typically had broader and less negative connotations than understandings of the word "propaganda" in the West. Aspects of propaganda can be traced back to the earliest periods of Chinese history, but modern propaganda has been most effective in the 20th and 21st centuries owing to mass media and an authoritarian government. Propaganda was an important tool in legitimizing the Nationalist government, which retreated to Taiwan in 1949. Propaganda during the Mao era was known for its constant use of mass campaigns to legitimize the CCP and the policies of leaders, using modern mass propaganda techniques, adapted to the needs of a country with a largely rural and illiterate population. Contemporary propaganda in the PRC is usually depicted through cultivation of the economy and Chinese nationalism. Under the general secretaryship of Xi Jinping, propaganda in media has become more prevalent and homogeneous.
Terminology
While the English word usually has a pejorative connotation, the Chinese word xuānchuán (宣传 "propaganda; publicity", composed of xuan "declare; proclaim; announce" and chuan or "pass; hand down; impart; teach; spread; infect; be contagious") is generally neutral. The term is not used for censorship, as it might connote in other parts of the world.
Xuānchuán first appeared in the 3rd-century historical text Records of the Three Kingdoms where its usage referred to the dissemination of military skills. In pre-modern times, the term was used to refer to dissemination of ideas and information by ruling elites. The meaning of "to explain something to someone, or to conduct education" might first appeared in Ge Hong's (c. 320) Baopuzi criticism of effete scholars who Emperor Zhang of Han (r. 75–88) extravagantly rewarded. These various gentlemen were heaped with honors, but not because they could breach walls or fight in the fields, break through an enemy's lines and extend frontiers, fall ill and resign office, pray for a plan of confederation and give the credit to others, or possess a zeal transcending all bounds. Merely because they expounded an interpretation [xuanchuan] of one solitary classic, such were the honors lavished upon them. And they were only lecturing upon words bequeathed by the dead. Despite their own high positions, emperors and kings deigned to serve these teachers.
The term xuānchuán was chosen to translate the Marxist-Leninist concept of Russian propagánda in the early 20th-century China. Within the broader context of Marxism-Leninism, "propaganda" has neither dismissive nor negative connotations.
According to academic Anne-Marie Brady, in her book Marketing Dictatorship, the terms propaganda and "thought work" () traditionally had a much broader notion of the public sphere than is usually defined in the West by media specialists. Some xuanchuan collocations usually refer to "propaganda" (e.g., xuānchuánzhàn 宣传战 "propaganda war"), others to "publicity" (xuānchuán méijiè 宣传媒介 "mass media; means of publicity"), and still others are ambiguous (xuānchuányuán 宣传员 "propagandist; publicist").Translations from John DeFrancis, ed. (2003), ABC Chinese-English Comprehensive Dictionary, University of Hawaii Press, p. 1087. The term xuanchuan also conveys the meaning of education, whereas the English word propaganda does not.
During the 20th century, use of the term propaganda in China approximated its meaning in early modern Europe, "to propagate what one believes to be true." Operating according to this terminology, the CCP is open about the importance of its propaganda work, which it views as having a positive impact on informing the Chinese people and promoting social harmony. David Shambaugh, a scholar of Chinese politics and foreign policy, describes "proactive propaganda" in which the Chinese Communist Party Propaganda Department writes and disseminates information that it believes "should be used in educating and shaping society". In this particular context, xuanchuan "does not carry negative connotations for the CCP, nor, for that matter, for most Chinese citizens." The sinologist and anthropologist Andrew B. Kipnis says unlike English propaganda, Chinese xuanchuan is officially represented as language that is good for the nation as a whole. However, the CCP is also sensitive to the negative connotations of the English word propaganda, and the commonly used Chinese term xuanchuan acquired pejorative connotations. In 1992, CCP general secretary Jiang Zemin asked one of the CCP's most senior translators to come up with a better English alternative to propaganda as the translation of xuanchuan for propaganda targeting foreign audiences. Replacement English translations include publicity, information, and political communication domestically, or media diplomacy and cultural exchange internationally.
History Republican era By the 1930s and 1940s, both the KMT and the CCP used documentary films as a form of propaganda.
Mao era
The origins of the CCP propaganda system can be traced to Yan'an Rectification Movement and the rectification movements carried out there. Following which it became a key mechanism in the Party's campaigns. Mao Zedong explicitly laid out the political role of culture in his 1942 "Talks at the Yan'an Forum on Art and Literature". The propaganda system, considered a central part of CCP's "control system", drew much from Soviet, Nazi, imperial China, Nationalist China, and other totalitarian states' propaganda methods. It represented a quintessential Leninist "transmission belt" for indoctrination and mass mobilization. David Shambaugh observes that propaganda and indoctrination are considered to have been a hallmark of the Maoist China; the CCP employed a variety of "thought control" techniques, including incarceration for "thought reform," construction of role models to be emulated, mass mobilization campaigns, the creation of ideological monitors and propaganda teams for indoctrination purposes, enactment of articles to be memorized, control of the educational system and media, a nationwide system of loudspeakers, among other methods. While ostensibly aspiring to a "Communist utopia," often had a negative focus on constantly searching for enemies among the people. The means of persuasion was often extremely violent, "a literal acting out of class struggle."
Starting in the early 1940s, the CCP emphasized the use of "local flavor" in propaganda, including Mao's advocacy that the party should use "national forms," including "old forms," to promote its ideology. The CCP used local customs like yangge and nianhua to mobilize people, promote its ideology, and to implement its cultural policy.
Beginning in March 1947, a series of campaigns commemorated and promoted the legacy of Liu Hulan, widely remembered as the youngest martyr of the Chinese Communist Revolution, through propaganda posters and art.
Chinese propagandists used every possible means of communication available in China after Mao's 1949 proclamation of the People's Republic of China, including electronic media such as film and television, educational curriculum and research, print media such as newspapers and posters, cultural arts such as plays and music, oral media such as memorizing Mao quotes, as well as thought reform and political study classes. During the Mao era, a distinctive feature of propaganda and thought work was "rule by editorial," according to academic Anne-Marie Brady. Political campaigns would be launched through editorials and leading articles in People's Daily, which would be followed by other papers. Work units and other organizational political study groups utilized these articles as a source for political study, and reading newspapers in China was "a political obligation". Mao used Lenin's model for the media, which had it function as a tool of mass propaganda, agitation, and organization.
In arts like painting, the early PRC had promoted Soviet art styles over traditional Chinese forms. By the mid-1950s, relations between China and the Soviet Union were deteriorating, and Mao became increasingly interested in promoting China's own national path. As part of this effort, propaganda campaigns encouraged re-adoption of traditional Chinese art styles.
To promote the Marriage Law of 1950 and its prohibitions on "mercenary marriage," propaganda denounced the sale of and purchase of brides. Propaganda also promoted free-choice marriage, emphasizing that love was an important component of successful marriage.
One trend in 1950s propaganda was the promotion of economic development, depicting people enjoying material benefits of socialist society like furniture, clothing, watches, bicycles, and other goods.
In rural China, traveling drama troupes did propaganda work and were particularly important during land reform and other mass campaigns. In 1951, a directive to develop a nationwide propaganda network designated individuals in each school, factory, and work unit as propaganda workers. CCP propaganda sought to promote model workers and soldiers whose productive examples were promoted to the public via radio, and other media. In 1955, the Ministry of Culture sought to develop rural cultural networks to distribute media like other performances, lantern slides, books, cinema, radio, books, and to establish newspaper reading groups. Salaried workers at rural cultural centers toured the countryside distributing propaganda materials, teaching revolutionary songs, and the like.
In the early 1950s, China increased its anti-imperialism propaganda campaigns. This propaganda often emphasized Japanese war crimes.
In the 1960s, Chinese propaganda sought to portray contrasting images of the United States government and the United States public. Propaganda sought to criticize the government for its war in Vietnam while praising the public for anti-war protests. As part of propaganda efforts during the 1965 Resist America, Aid Vietnam Campaign, the CCP organized street demonstrations and marches and promoted campaign messages using cultural media like film and photography exhibitions, chorus contests, and street performance.
Cultural Revolution Background and ideological foundations During the Cultural Revolution, CCP propaganda was crucial to intensification of Mao Zedong's cult of personality, as well as mobilizing popular participation in national campaigns. Past propaganda also encouraged the Chinese people to emulate government approved model workers and soldiers, such as Lei Feng, Chinese Civil War hero Dong Cunrui, Korean War hero Yang Gensi, and Dr. Norman Bethune, a Canadian doctor who assisted the CCP Eighth Route Army during the Second Sino-Japanese War. It also praised Third World revolutionaries and close foreign allies such as Albania and North Korea while vilifying both the American "imperialists" and the Soviet "revisionists" (the latter of whom was seen as having betrayed Marxism–Leninism following the Sino-Soviet split).
The propaganda of the Cultural Revolution incorporated strong anti-imperialist rhetoric, particularly in the context of the Vietnam War. However, as domestic political struggles intensified in the early Cultural Revolution, international messaging became less emphasized.
In the 1960s and 1970s, propaganda on science presented scientific inquiry as a "great revolutionary movement" which would remove distinctions between experts and the masses and the division between mental and manual labor.