China's stockpile of nuclear weapons is the world's third-largest, estimated at 620 nuclear warheads . China was the fifth country to develop nuclear weapons, conducting its first test in 1964 and its first thermonuclear test in 1966. One of the five nuclear-weapon states recognized by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), China conducted 45 nuclear tests before signing the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 1996. China is significantly expanding its arsenal, projected to reach 1,000 warheads by 2030 and up to 1,500 by 2035. Compared to the arsenals of the United States and Russia, China's warheads are believed to have a similar technological level, with a much smaller proportion deployed on delivery systems, and the remainder stored separately.
Since 2020, the People's Liberation Army has operated a nuclear triad. An estimated 509 warheads are assigned to Dongfeng ballistic missiles, 72 to JL-3 missiles on Type 094 submarines, and 20 to Xi'an H-6 strategic bombers. China is upgrading its triad with the development of the Xi'an H-20 stealth bomber, Type 096 submarine, hypersonic glide vehicles, and larger missile silo fields. Its early warning systems include at least three satellites, and four large phased array radars. China's anti-ballistic missiles include HQ-29, HQ-19, and S-400 systems.
Since 1964, China has declared a no-first-use policy and called for an international no-first-use treaty. It has not fielded tactical nuclear weapons. Prior to the 21st century, China held to a minimal deterrence policy focused on countervalue targets. Officially, China's nuclear command and control requires the Politburo and Central Military Commission to jointly authorize the alerting and use of nuclear weapons. In the 2020s, some of China's nuclear forces are believed to have adopted a launch on warning posture.
China consistently rejects official bilateral arms control talks with the US, on the grounds of its much smaller stockpile. In the early Cold War's Korean War and Taiwan Strait Crises, China confronted US nuclear threats, which were partially deterred by the Soviet nuclear arsenal. The Soviet Union transferred nuclear and missile technology from 1955 until the early Sino-Soviet split in 1960. The Rocket Force has operated most Chinese nuclear delivery systems since its 1966 founding as the Second Artillery Corps. Following the Sino-Soviet border conflict, China viewed the Soviet Armed Forces as its greatest threat, until a détente in 1989. China's nuclear weapons planning refocused on the US in the early 2000s, with relations strained by the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis and US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade.
China's civilian and military nuclear industries are operated by China National Nuclear Corporation, formerly the Second Ministry of Machine Building. All documented nuclear tests, 23 atmospheric and 22 underground, were conducted at Lop Nur Nuclear Test Base in Xinjiang. China is believed to have halted weapons-grade nuclear material production in 1990. China substantially aided Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, and influenced the programs of India and Taiwan. Like other CTBT adherents, China is believed to use supercomputers and inertial confinement fusion in a program analogous to stockpile stewardship. China is also reported to have operated chemical and biological weapons programs during the Cold War and possibly beyond.
History Pre-program Chinese Communist Party (CCP) chairman Mao Zedong referred to nuclear weapons as a paper tiger which, although they would not determine the outcome of a war, could still be used by great powers to scare and coerce. Four days after the atomic bombing of Nagasaki, Mao first argued against overstating the military significance of nuclear weapons, writing "Why didn't Japan surrender when the two atom bombs were dropped on her and why did she surrender as soon as the Soviet Union sent troops?" In 1946 comments to American journalist Anne Louise Strong, he stated, "The atom bomb is a paper tiger which the US reactionaries use to scare people. It looks terrible, but in fact it isn't. Of course, the atom bomb is a weapon of mass slaughter, but the outcome of a war is decided by the people, not one or two new types of weapon."
During the Korean War, the US prepared contingency plans to use nuclear weapons against China, but feared doing so would result in Soviet attacks on US-occupied Japan. Even prior to China's entry into the war, mobilized forces in northeast China that would become the People's Volunteer Army (PVA) were deeply demoralized by potential US nuclear attacks, with political commissar Du Ping reporting psychological debilitation in 10% of troops. The May 1953 US Upshot–Knothole Grable nuclear test of a nuclear artillery system is sometimes considered a contributing factor to the July Korean Armistice Agreement, to which China's People's Volunteer Army was a signatory.
After 1952, the Eisenhower administration pursued the New Look policy through which nuclear weapons would be viewed as a "virtually conventional" force. United States nuclear weapons were deployed to Guam in 1951, Japan in 1954, the Philippines in 1957, and South Korea and Taiwan in 1958. In 1962, British nuclear weapons were deployed to Singapore. Some scholars write that the Eisenhower administration's threats during the First Taiwan Strait Crisis to use nuclear weapons against military targets in Fujian province prompted Mao to begin China's nuclear program. Mao favored China's development of nuclear weapons because "In today's world, if we don't want to be bullied by others, we should have atomic weapons by all means."
Mao's attitude toward nuclear weapons sometimes strained relations with the Soviet Union, which regarded his statements as cavalier, particularly his 1955 assertion that: During this Strait Crisis, Mao and Zhou Enlai informed the Soviets they were willing to risk a US nuclear attack, while Soviet and Chinese archives make clear the Chinese leadership had no expectation of a Soviet nuclear retaliation on their behalf.
However, during the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, the US Central Intelligence Agency and Departments of Defense and State all concluded that US nuclear attacks on Fujian province, opposite the Republic of China-controlled Kinmen and Matsu Islands, risked Soviet nuclear attacks on US bases, the Navy's Seventh Fleet, and possibly general war with the Soviet Union. Gerard C. Smith, Assistant Secretary of State to John Foster Dulles, warned him that the US would likely have to choose between defeat or large-scale Strategic Air Command attacks on China that risked general war with the Soviet Union.
Early program and Soviet assistance
From the inception, China's central government gave the nuclear program the highest priority in materials, finances, and manpower.
In July 1954, one Soviet expert began working with the Chinese on uranium ore exploration. The discovery of uranium in Guangxi in fall 1954 provided further impetus to China's desire to develop nuclear weapons.
On 15 January 1955, China began its nuclear weapons program.
In 1955, the Soviet Union began the granting of student visas for nuclear physics courses to Chinese students. Qian Sanqiang, Jiang Nanxiang, and Yu Wen selected 350 students to study in the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries, in benefit of Chinese nuclear research. From 1955, the two countries began signing nuclear-related treaties.
In November 1956, China established the Third Ministry of Machine Building (which was in February 1958 renamed the Second Ministry of Machine Building) to oversee its nuclear program.
As a result of the Anti-Party Group incident in the Soviet Union, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's position within the Eastern Bloc became insecure for a time, thus necessitating the support of the CCP and Mao. The CCP subsequently traded its support for Khrushchev for Soviet technology of nuclear weapons. In October 1957, concluded the "", which allowed for nuclear-weapons technology transfer. This involved two R-2 theatre ballistic missiles, and the unrealized transfer of a model nuclear weapon along the lines of the RDS-27.In January 1958, China established the Ninth Bureau to be responsible for nuclear weapons research and design. It began developing its research and design base (Base 221, renamed Plant 221 in 1965) in Haiyan, Qinghai province. In July 1958, the Second Ministry of Machine Building approved plans for a transitional research institute in Beijing while Base 221 was being built. That research institute (first named the Huayuan Road Project and later renamed the Beijing Ninth Institute) was where most of the development work on China's first atomic bomb occurred and was where researchers received and studied initial data provided by the Soviet Union.
Construction of a uranium refinement plant in Baotou and enrichment plant in Lanzhou began in 1958, and a plutonium production facility in Jiuquan and the Lop Nur nuclear test site by 1960. The Soviet Union provided assistance in the early Chinese program by sending advisers to help in the facilities devoted to fissile material production. In return, China exported raw uranium ore to the USSR.
Scholar Jeffrey Lewis noted in China's 1958 nuclear program guidelines its explicit rejection of tactical nuclear weapons and view of nuclear weapons as primarily political tools influencing the decision towards a small strategic arsenal.
In 1958, the National Defense Science and Technology Commission (NDSTC) was established with Nie Rongzhen as its director to oversee the Second Ministry of Machine Building, the Lop Nur Nuclear Weapon Test Base, and the Fifth Academy of the Defense Ministry (which focused on missile programs). In July 1958, along with Nie, Chen Yun and Bo Yibo were assigned to a "three persons" group to oversee nuclear development.
In July 1958, three Soviet experts visited Beijing to share limited technical details on an atomic weapon. Intended as an introductory lecture, the Soviet experts did not share any information more recent than 1951. It was the only meeting of its kind before the Soviet Union reneged on the New Defense Technical Accord.
In 1958, Khrushchev told Mao that he planned to discuss arms control with the United States and Britain. China was already opposed to Khrushchev's post-Stalin policy of peaceful coexistence. Although Soviet officials assured China that it was under the Soviet nuclear umbrella, the disagreements widened the emerging Sino-Soviet split. The Soviet Union failed to comply with the New Technical Accord and in June 1959 sent a letter formally stating that it would not provide a nuclear bomb prototype. That same month, the two nations formally ended their agreement on military and technology cooperation, and in July 1960, all Soviet assistance with the Chinese nuclear program was abruptly terminated and all Soviet technicians were withdrawn from the program. As the Soviets backed out, Chinese officials realized that they had to develop hydrogen bomb technology without any Soviet assistance and would need to begin the work immediately, without waiting for successful results from a fission bomb.
Independent program
Chinese researchers viewed June 1959 as the rebirth of the nuclear program, with the Second Ministry and the Ninth Bureau commemorating the date of Soviet withdrawal of support in the codename for China's first atomic bomb, "596" (i.e., the sixth month of 1959).
In spring 1960, the Ninth Institute reverse engineered the 1951 model presented by Soviet experts in 1958. The Chinese model used a core of uranium-235 instead of the plutonium in the Soviet model.
In July 1960, all Soviet advisers were withdrawn from the Lanzhou enrichment plant, at the time China's only active project for a fissile material production.