The trial of Oldenbarnevelt, Grotius and Hogerbeets was the trial for treason of Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, Land's Advocate of Holland, Hugo Grotius, pensionary of Dordrecht, Rombout Hogerbeets, pensionary of Leiden, and their co-defendant Gilles van Ledenberg, secretary of the States of Utrecht by an ad hoc court of delegated judges of the States General of the Netherlands that was held between 29 August 1618 and 18 May 1619, and resulted in a death sentence for Oldenbarnevelt, and sentences of life in prison for Grotius and Hogerbeets. The trial was and is controversial for political and legal reasons: political, because it put the crown on the coup d'etat of stadtholder Maurice, Prince of Orange and his partisans in the States General of the Dutch Republic that ended the previous Oldenbarnevelt regime and put the Orangist party in power for the time being; legal, because the trial deprived the defendants of their civil rights that would have been contemporary in a trial there, and the judges changed both the "constitutional" and more dinary laws of the Republic in an exercise of ex post facto legislation.
Background The constitutional "maxims" of the Oldenbarnevelt regime The Dutch Republic was formed when a number of the polities (mostly duchies, counties, and heerlijkheden) constituting the former Habsburg Netherlands concluded the defensive Union of Utrecht in 1579. This treaty preceded the actual "declaration of independence" (the Act of Abjuration of 1581) of the new country, which partially explains why most of the governmental institutions, like the States General, the Council of State, the States ("parliaments") of the several provinces, the stadtholderates, the courts (like the Hof van Holland and the Hoge Raad van Holland en Zeeland), the local administrations, and most of the laws and legal structure were simply continued as if nothing had happened. But soon these old institutions received new roles, which implied a change in their constitutional and legal relationships, and in their political and power relationships. After 1587 (when the last foreign Governor-General, Robert Dudley, 1st Earl of Leicester, returned to England, leaving a constitutional vacuum), the still young Land's Advocate of the States of Holland and West Friesland, Johan van Oldenbarnevelt took the lead in promoting a number of constitutional reforms in his own province (and through its preponderant role in the Republic also on the confederal level) that changed the "constitution" (in the sense of written and unwritten fundamental legal and political arrangements) of the country in a radical way. It may be useful to describe the new regime in a number of "maxims":These "maxims" would become the bones of contention during the crisis that led up to the trial and would be changed during the trial, but before these events they were generally accepted; Cf. Uitterhoeve, p. 186
Sovereignty in the hands of the StatesThis word is a plurale tantum in both Dutch (Staten) and English and refers to the medieval representations of the estates of the Realm before their feudal lords. It should not be confused with the concept of State (polity) of the several provinces of the Republic, and therefore not in the hands of the States General, or of the stadtholders of the several provinces (of which at this time there were two: Maurits in five of the seven provinces, and William Louis, Count of Nassau-Dillenburg, in Friesland and Groningen); the stadtholders subordinated to the States of their provinces, who appointed them and issued the Instruction that defined their powers and duties; under art. XIII of the Union of Utrecht authority of the States of the provinces over the public church (the Dutch Reformed Church) in their provinces and solely competent to regulate matters of religion, like Freedom of Worship, according to the principle of Cuius regio, eius religio, without interference of other States, or the States General, but always respecting the basic right of Freedom of Conscience; matters of external defense (and foreign affairs) delegated to the States General with their Captain general (of the Dutch States Army) and Admiral General, but without this delegation implying subordination of the provincial States to the States General, or the (partial) transfer of provincial sovereignty to the States General; maintenance of public order (internal defense) a matter for local authorities, regulated by their province's States, and the local and provincial courts, aided by the schutterijen in the cities, with the authority for local authorities to hire waardgelders (auxiliary mercenary troopsSuch auxiliary mercenary troops were generally referred to as waardgelders (after the German word Wartegelt, retainer). They were usually employed when the States Army was away on campaign from its usual garrison duty) in case of need; the right to political decision-making reserved for the oligarchy of the Regenten and nobility.Uitterhoeve, p. 186
"Truce Quarrels"
Oldenbarnevelt and stadtholder Maurice had been operating hand in glove during the first decades of the Republic's existence, but this changed when Oldenbarnevelt decided to start negotiations with the Habsburg government in Brussels about a cessation of hostilities, after the Eighty Years' War entered a stalemate around 1607. Maurice was opposed to these peace feelers, and so were the city of Amsterdam and the province of Zeeland. This difference of opinion caused a breach between the erstwhile allies, especially after Oldenbarnevelt prevailed and concluded the Twelve Years' Truce in 1609. The conflict about the negotiations was accompanied by much popular political unrest which occasioned a pamphlet war during which Oldenbarnevelt's opponents accused him of secretly colluding with the enemy. These accusations (which Maurice seemed to have believed up to a point) resurfaced during the later trialIsrael, pp. 399-405
After external hostilities ceased, an already raging internal conflict escalated. This led to the so-called Bestandstwisten (Truce Quarrels), as the episode is known in Dutch historiography. Partisans of two professors of theology at Leiden University, Jacobus Arminius and Franciscus Gomarus, who disagreed about the interpretation of the dogma of Predestination, brought the academic polemic to the attention of the Holland authorities by issuing a so-called "Remonstrance" from the Arminian side, followed by a "Counter-Remonstrance" from the Gomarist side in 1610. The authorities indeed had a responsibility for the good order in the Dutch Reformed Church and under the influence of the doctrine of Erastianism took up that responsibility with alacrity. Their main concern, however, was not to take sides in the doctrinal conflict, but to avoid a schism in the Reformed Church. When attempts at reconciliation failed the Oldenbarnevelt regime in Holland embarked on a policy of "forced toleration". This policy (of which Grotius was the main author) was embedded in the placard (statute) "For the Peace of the Church" of January 1614, which was adopted by the States of Holland with a minority, led by Amsterdam (a bastion of the Counter-Remonstrants) opposed. The Counter-Remonstrants demanded a National Synod of the Reformed Church to decide the doctrinal conflict. But Oldenbarnevelt and Grotius opposed this, because they feared this could only lead to a schism, and also because a National Synod might impose on the privilege of Holland to regulate religious matters without interference from other provinces.Israel, pp.421-432
The "Tolerance placard" meanwhile led to popular unrest, because it was enforced only in towns with Remonstrant magistrates, and therefore only used against Counter-Remonstrant preachers who disobeyed the prohibition of preaching about the conflict from the pulpit.The placard did not prohibit all discussion about the controversy, but limited it to the universities and learned treatises written in Latin; Cf. Den Tex, p. The preachers were dismissed from their livings (paid for by the local authorities), but then simply moved to neighboring congregations where they attracted large audiences of church-goers with the same doctrinal convictions. Instead of averting the feared schism the placard therefore seemed to promote it, also because opposing preachers refused to recognize each other's qualification to administer the Lord's Supper. Soon the followers of either side demanded their own churches, whereas the authorities wanted them to use the same ones. This eventually led to Counter-Remonstrants using mob violence to occupy their own churches, like the Cloister Church in the capital of Holland and the Republic, The Hague in the Summer of 1617. As far as Oldenbarnevelt was concerned this defiance of the authority of the civil authorities could not be tolerated, and he promoted the adoption of the so-called Sharp Resolution of 4 August 1617 by the States of Holland.Israel, pp. 433-441
This resolution authorized civil authorities in Holland cities to recruit waardgelders to maintain public order. This was objectionable to Maurice as de facto Captain-General of the States Army,Maurice had not been formally appointed as Captain--General of the Union, however; cf. Israel, p.305 because the new troops would only swear an oath of allegiance to their city magistrates, and not to the States General and himself, as was usual for similar mercenary troops. This opened the possibility that these waardgelders would come into armed conflict with his own States Army troops. To make matters worse in his view, the Resolution also ordered States Army troops that were paid for by the Holland repartitie (contribution to the confederal budget) to follow the orders of their Holland paymasters in case of conflict between his orders and theirs. Maurice, supported by the opposition to Oldenbarnevelt in the States of Holland, led by Amsterdam, protested vehemently against the Resolution, and when the recruitment of waardgelders nevertheless was implemented in several Remonstrant cities, and also in Utrecht (where the States had taken a similarly worded Resolution), he started to mobilize the opposition against Oldenbarnevelt.Israel, pp. 441-443
Though many expected an immediate military coup, Maurice moved with deliberation, and embarked on a policy of intimidation of the magistracies of cities supporting Oldenbarnevelt in Holland and in other provinces, causing them to change their vote in the States and in the States General. He also started to support the policy of the Counter-Remonstrants to convoke a National Synod by the States General. This more and more isolated Oldenbarnevelt and his allies like Grotius and the pensionaries of Leiden (Hogerbeets) and Haarlem (Johan de Haen) in the States of Holland and in the States General. Maurice's maneuvers were reciprocated by the Oldenbarneveltians where they could. An example was the episode in June, 1618, of the deputation of the States of Utrecht that had been sent to negotiate an accommodation with Maurice (in his capacity of Captain-General) in which the Utrecht States would dismiss their waardgelders in exchange for the replacement of French confederal city-garrison troops with more amenable Dutch nationals. When the Utrecht deputation arrived in The Hague they were "waylaid" by Grotius and Hogerbeets at the home of the Remonstrant preacher Johannes Wtenbogaert in a successful attempt to convince them to keep their message for Maurice to themselves, and return to Utrecht. This was later construed as a treasonous conspiracy.Israel, pp. 443-447Motley, pp. 41-43