The Jacobite Army, sometimes referred to as the Highland Army,Pittock, Murray (2013) Material Culture and Sedition, 1688-1760: Treacherous Objects, Secret Places, p.88 was the military force assembled by Charles Edward Stuart and his Jacobite supporters during the 1745 Rising that attempted to restore the House of Stuart to the British throne.
Starting with less than 1,000 men at Glenfinnan in August 1745, the Jacobite army won a significant victory at Prestonpans in September. A force of about 5,500 then invaded England in November and reached as far south as Derby before successfully retreating into Scotland. Reaching a peak strength of between 9,000 and 14,000, they won another victory in January 1746 at Falkirk, before defeat at Culloden in April. While a large number of Jacobites remained in arms, lack of external and domestic support combined with overwhelming government numbers meant they dispersed, ending the rebellion.
Once characterised as a largely Gaelic-speaking force recruited from the Scottish Highlands using traditional weapons and tactics, modern historians have demonstrated this was only partially accurate. The army also included a large number of north-eastern and lowland Scots, along with substantial Franco-Irish and English contingents, who were drilled and organised in line with contemporary European military practices.
Formation and leadership
Charles left France on 15 July aboard Du Teillay, supplies and 70 volunteers from the Irish Brigade transported by Elizabeth, an elderly 64-gun warship. Four days out, they were intercepted by HMS Lion which engaged Elizabeth; after a four hour battle, both were forced to return to port, while Du Teillay continued to Eriskay. This meant Charles arrived with few weapons, accompanied only by the "Seven Men of Moidart," among them the elderly Marquess of Tullibardine and John O'Sullivan, an Irish-born officer in the French army.
Many of those contacted on arrival told Charles to return to France but Lochiel's commitment persuaded enough for the Rebellion to be launched at Glenfinnan on 19 August.Riding, pp=98–99 O'Sullivan estimated initial numbers as around 1,000, with 700 Camerons plus several hundred men from Lochaber led by Keppoch.Pittock, Murray. (2016) Culloden, Oxford University Press, p.21
Though physically fit, they lacked discipline and were poorly armed, accentuating the loss of Elizabeth with its weapons and the regulars intended to provide the core of the Jacobite army.O'Sullivan wrote that Lochiel had "700 good men, but ill armed; Kapock [Keppoch] arrived the same day, with about 350 clivor fellows". Narrative of O'Sullivan in Tayler (ed) (1938), 1745 and After, Nelson, p.60 Although Charles was in nominal command, his inexperience meant O'Sullivan acted as adjutant-general and quartermaster-general, handling personnel, training and logistics.McDonnell, Hector (1996) The Wild Geese of the Antrim MacDonnells, Irish Academic Press, p.102
O'Sullivan created an army organised along conventional European lines and his use of the then-novel divisional structure is viewed as a major factor in the Jacobites' speed of movement.Reid, Stuart (2012) The Scottish Jacobite Army 1745–46, Bloomsbury, pp.90-92 Further recruits came in as they marched on Edinburgh; by the time of Prestonpans on 21 September, numbers had increased to around 2,500.
One of these recruits was Tullibardine's younger brother, Lord George Murray, who took part in the failed Risings of 1715 and 1719. Despite this, his acceptance of a pardon in 1725 and swearing an Oath of Allegiance to George II in 1739 made some suspicious, including Charles' chief Scottish advisor, Murray of Broughton. Although primarily driven by Broughton's political ambitions, others recorded Murray's genuine military talents were undermined by a quick temper, arrogance and inability to take advice.Riding, pp. 124–125
Co-operation with O'Sullivan was essential but failed to develop, Murray arguing Highland customs better suited the bulk of their recruits and it was unrealistic to expect them to execute weapons drill or carry out written orders. Others considered these views outdated, including Sir John MacDonald, an Irish exile who acted as Inspector-General of Cavalry. There was some truth in both positions; plenty of Scots served in European armies but the military aspects of clan society had been in decline for decades and most Highland levies were illiterate agricultural workers.
Even for regular troops, training was a concern as infantry drill became increasingly complex; before and after 1746, peacetime inspections consistently noted an alarmingly high number of British regiments as 'Not fit for service.' This had many causes, one of the most significant being lack of live firing practice and the Jacobites were short of both weapons and ammunition. The exiles also failed to appreciate the Highland obligation to provide military service assumed short periods of warfare, not continuous service for six months or a year. After Prestonpans and Falkirk, the clan chiefs could not prevent large numbers of their levies returning home; when Charles wanted to attack Cumberland in early February 1746, he was told the army was in no state to fight a battle.Riding, pages=356-357
Charles considered his 'Lieutenant-Generals' subordinates, whose duty was to comply with his orders; Murray disagreed and matters were not helped by a furious row between the two prior to Prestonpans. Lord Elcho later wrote the Scots were concerned from the beginning by Charles' autocratic style and fears he was overly influenced by his Irish advisors.
At their insistence, Charles established a "Council of War" to agree military strategy but deeply resented what he viewed as an imposition by subjects on their divinely appointed monarch.Riding, pp.175-176 Consisting of 15-20 senior leaders, it was dominated by the Highlanders who provided most of the manpower and decisions reflected their priorities.McCann (1963) pp.107-8 The civilian equivalent or 'Privy Council' had a higher proportion of Lowland gentry, thus dividing leadership between competing power centres.
Viscount Strathallan was appointed commander in Scotland and continued recruiting, while the field army of roughly 5,500 invaded England in early November.Duffy (2009), 555 Command was split between the three lieutenant-generals: Murray, Tullibardine, and James Drummond, titular Duke of Perth. In theory, the three rotated command on a daily basis, but Tullibardine's poor health and Perth's inexperience meant in practice it was exercised by Murray.Reid (2012) pp.43-45
Charles' relationship with the Scots began to deteriorate during pre-invasion discussions in Edinburgh and worsened when Murray resigned at Carlisle prior to being reinstated. After Derby, the War Council met only once more, an acrimonious session at Crieff in February 1746. Disappointment and heavy drinking resulted in repeated accusations by Charles that the Scots were traitors, reinforced when Murray advised abandoning plans to invade England. Instead, he proposed an insurgency in the Highlands that would "...oblige the Crown to come to terms, because the war rendered it necessary...English troops be occupied elsewhere".Elcho in Tayler (ed) (1948) A Jacobite Miscellany: Eight Original Papers on the Rising of 1745-1746, p.202
In late November, Perth's brother John Drummond landed in Scotland and replaced Strathallan but his arrival introduced another element of division into the Jacobite leadership. He and Charles previously clashed in France and his first act was to countermand instructions new recruits be sent into England; as an officer in the French army, he had orders not to leave Scotland until all fortresses held by British government troops had been taken. Since he brought money, weapons, siege artillery and 150 Scots and Irish regulars, he could not be ignored; at Falkirk and Culloden, O'Sullivan exercised effective command, with Murray, Perth and Drummond as brigade commanders but the different factions viewed each other with suspicion and hostility.
Recruitment
Areas of recruitment
In contrast to 1715, many joined the Jacobites in 1745 for reasons other than Stuart loyalism. While 46% of the Jacobite army came from the Highlands and Islands, there is no evidence this was any more common in the Highlands post-1715 than elsewhere in Scotland.McCann, Jean E (1963) The Organisation of the Jacobite Army (PHD thesis) Edinburgh University, OCLC 646764870, xix.
A key factor in recruiting was the feudal nature of clan society, which obliged tenants to provide their landlord with military service; the majority of Highland recruits came from a small number of western clans whose leaders joined the rebellion, like Lochiel and Keppoch.McCann (1963), p.20 This obligation was based on traditional clan warfare, which was short-term and emphasised raiding, rather than set piece battles; even experienced Highland generals like Montrose in 1645 or Dundee in 1689 struggled to keep their armies together and it continued to be a problem in 1745.Riding, pp. 356-357
With the exception of the strongly Presbyterian south-west, the Jacobites also recruited outside the Highlands, although inevitably some were coerced.Plank, Geoffrey. (2006) Rebellion and Savagery: the Jacobite Rising of 1745 and the British Empire Univ. of Pennsylvania, p.81 Jacobite leaders Lord George Murray, the Duke of Perth and Tullibardine had close links to Perthshire, which supplied around 20% of total recruits.McCann (1963), xvi-xvii Another 24% came from the north-east, where John Gordon of Glenbucket was one of the first to join the Rising; support was focused around Auchmedden, Pitsligo and Fyvie, areas Royalist and Episcopalian since the 1639 Bishops War.Pittock, Murray (1998) Jacobitism, Macmillan, p.99
The northeastern ports in particular provided significant numbers; by some estimates, up to a quarter of the adult male population of Montrose saw Jacobite service.Pittock (1994) Poetry and Jacobite Politics in Eighteenth Century Britain and Ireland, Uni. of Cambridge, p197 Long after the Rising was over, the region continued to feature in Government reports as a centre of Jacobite 'disaffection', with the shipmasters of Montrose, Stonehaven, Peterhead and other ports involved in a two-way traffic of exiles and recruits for French service.
However, recruiting figures did not necessarily reflect majority opinion; even among 'Jacobite' clans like the MacDonalds, major figures like MacDonald of Sleat refused to join. The commercial centres of Edinburgh and Glasgow remained solidly pro-government, while in early November there were anti-Jacobite riots in Perth.Riding, p. 201 This extended outside Scotland; after Prestonpans, Walter Shairp, a merchant from Edinburgh working in Liverpool, joined a local pro-government volunteer force known as the 'Liverpool Blues,' which participated in the second siege of Carlisle.
Recruiting methods and motivation
Jacobite recruiting methods in Scotland varied across the country. Adherence was fundamentally decided by personal or local factors,McCann (1963), xxi and often differed between officers and the rank and file.
Volunteers While many volunteered simply for adventure, Stuart loyalism played a part, as did attempts by Charles to follow his predecessors in appealing to disenfranchised groups in general, whether religious or political.
The single most common issue for Scots volunteers was opposition to the 1707 Union between Scotland and England; after 1708, the exiled Stuarts explicitly appealed to this segment of society.Szechi, Daniel (1994) The Jacobites: Britain and Europe 1688-1788, MUP, p.32 They included James Hepburn of Keith, a fierce critic of both Catholicism and James II who viewed Union as 'humiliating to his country....'Riding, p.141