The Unification Decree was a political measure adopted by Francisco Franco in his capacity of Head of State of Nationalist Spain on April 19, 1937. The decree merged two existing political groupings, the Falangists and the Carlists, into a new party - the Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista (FET y de las JONS). As all other parties were declared dissolved at the same time, the FET became the only legal party in Nationalist Spain. It was defined in the decree as a link between state and society and was intended to form the basis for an eventual totalitarian regime modeled after Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. The head of state – Franco himself – was proclaimed party leader, to be assisted by the Junta Política and Consejo Nacional. A set of decrees which followed shortly after appointed members to the new executive.

The merger was imposed upon the Falange Española de las JONS and the Carlist Traditionalist Communion. Leaders of both parties – Manuel Hedilla of the Falange and Manuel Fal Conde of the Carlists – were outmaneuvered by Franco, who divided, deceived, and misled them and finally left them no option but to comply with unification on his own terms, and they along with other political opponents were subsequently marginalized. The Unification Decree ensured Franco's total political dominance and secured at least a formal political unity within the Nationalist zone, albeit not one of genuine affection. It in reality represented the absorption of Carlist offshoots into a subsequently domesticated and subordinated Falange. Most scholars consider unification to have been a stepping stone towards a semi-fascist state. This augmented Falange served as Spain's sole legal party for the next 38 years, becoming one of the instrumental pillars of Franco's regime.

Background

The military conspirators of 1936 did not produce any clear vision of a political regime which would follow the coup; in the short run, some administrative powers were to stay with provincial civil committees, composed of most representative or most committed individuals.“compuesto por un número de miembros variables elegidos entre los miembros de orden, milicias afectas a la causa y personas representativas de las fuerzas o entidades económicas de composición lo más reducida posible” according to Instrucción reservada número uno, issued by general Mola, quoted after Badajoz y Guerra Civil blogspot, available here The key right-wing factions in Spain were rather loosely involved in the plot, and almost none of them concluded a political agreement with the generals.Stanley G. Payne, First Spanish democracy, Madison 1993, , pp. 364-365. For Falange Española see José Luis Rodríguez Jiménez, Historia de Falange Española de las JONS, Madrid 2000, , pp. 223-226 The only party which did close a deal, the Carlists, secured an ambiguous agreement with the head of the conspiracy, General Emilio Mola; it specified terms of access to the coup rather than a future political regime.Martin Blinkhorn, Carlism and Crisis in Spain 1931-1939, Cambridge 2008, , pp. 228-250 Initial statements issued by various generals during the first days of the following rebellion remained politically vague; on territories controlled by the rebels local commanders appointed mayors or auxiliary civilian bodies composed mostly of locally recognized right-wing personalities, typically those associated with CEDA, Alfonsism, Carlism, or the defunct Spanish Patriotic Union. The top executive body of the rebel government, the Junta de Defensa Nacional, was set up on July 23 as an instrument of administration and intendancy rather than politics.Javier Tusell, Franco en la guerra civil, Madrid 2002, , p. 35, Javier Tusell, Historia de España en el siglo XX, vol. 3, Madrid 2007, , p. 406 On July 30 the Junta declared martial law, which theoretically prevented any political activity.the martial law prohibited all rallies and public meetings; even private meetings involving more than few persons were subject to official approval On September 13 the Junta issued a decree which dissolved all Popular Front parties and those opposed to "the patriotic movement".theoretically the decree permitted activity e.g. of Lerroux and his Partido Radical Soon afterwards it condemned "political partisanship" though not "specific ideologies", stating that the future government would introduce "the only politics and the only unionization possible"Tusell 2002, p. 37 and prohibited all political or trade union activities.Tusell 2002, pp. 37-8

This ban on political activity was not rigorously enforced on rightist organizations,the first time the decree was enforced by security was February 1937, when employed against some Falangist activities, Tusell 2002, p. 77 but each of their fates differed significantly. The largest grouping, CEDA, which held 88 seats in the Cortes, had been gradually disintegrating since the February elections; its structures had partially collapsed, having been abandoned by militants disappointed with the movement's legalist strategy. In addition, its leader José María Gil-Robles y Quiñones declared the suspension of all CEDA political activity.declaration that Gil-Robles made to Franco in a letter, dated November 2, 1936, Paul Preston, Franco, London 1995, , p. 251 Though some of CEDA heavyweights remained politically active,e.g. in December 1936 a few Alfonsist politicians secured support of Secretaría General del Gobierno del Estado (and personally Nicolás Franco) to take over the Madrid publishing house Editorial Católica once Madrid is taken by the Nationalists, Tusell 2002, p. 87 Juventudes de Acción Popular (JAP), CEDA's youth wing and formerly its most dynamic organ, reorganized in September 1936 as a paramilitary force with few thousand members.the JAP sources claimed that their militia amounted to 6,000 people, the figure doubted by historians. On September 4, 1936 Luciano de Calzada was nominated Jefe Nacional de las Milicias de CEDA y de la JAP, José Báez Pérez de Tudela, Movilización juvenil y radicalización verbalista: La Juventud de Acción Popular, [in:] Historia Contemporánea 11 (1994), p. 104 Renovación Española (13 mandates) and Partido Agrario (11 mandates) were also in decay, with the Alfonsists of RE in particular being preoccupied with engineering schemes related to Infante Juan, Count of Barcelona.Tusell 2007, p. 409 The two groups on the right which did experience growth, and at a dramatic rate, were the Carlist Comunión Tradicionalista and the Falange Española de las JONS. Comunión Tradicionalista (10 mandates) openly operated its national and provincial war councils, its key asset being volunteer militia units, the Requetés, which in the first months of the war claimed 20,000 men.Julio Aróstegui, Combatientes Requetés en la Guerra Civil española, 1936-1939, Madrid 2013, , p. 808 The Falange, which in February obtained only 0.4% of the votes and lost its previously held one seat in the Cortes,in total Falange gathered 46,466 votes, Rodríguez Jiménez 2000, p. 213 experienced enormous growth in subsequent months and would come to be the most dynamic of party on the right. Its party structures functioned without restriction; its Primera Línea militias recruited 35,000 volunteers in a short period.Stanley G. Payne, Fascism in Spain, Madison 2000, , p. 242

In early October 1936 supreme power in the rebel zone was assumed by Francisco Franco, who set up an executive administration named the Junta Técnica del Estado. The civilians appointed to head specific sections of this quasi-government "resembled the traditional Right"Tusell 2007, p. 408 and were recruited from Alfonsist, Carlist, and other generic conservative ranks, with no specific party background prevailing.this was the case also of some bodies set up by Jefe del Estado like Secretaría General, Secretaría de Guerra and Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, Tusell 2007, p. 408 The regime permitted limited political proselytizing but kept politicians in check; CEDA head Gil-Robles was forced to remain in Portugal,Tusell 2002, p. 85 Infante Juan, championed by the Alfonsists, was asked to leave Spain,Tusell 2007, p. 409 Prince Xavier of Bourbon-Parma, the Carlist pretender to the throne, was permitted only a brief stay in Spain, and the leader of the Comunión Tradicionalista, Fal Conde, was exiled with inflated charges advanced.Juan Carlos Peñas Bernaldo de Quirós, El Carlismo, la República y la Guerra Civil (1936-1937). De la conspiración a la unificación, Madrid 1996, , pp. 241-243 Military censorship prevented dissemination of pieces deemed excessively related to party propaganda and encouraged these kept within limits of general adhesion to the regime, e.g. Gil-Robles' order that JAP must fully follow military commandStanley G. Payne, The Franco Regime, Madison 1987, , p. 163 or RE head Antonio Goicoechea's call for a "patriotic front".Tusell 2002, p. 103, Blinkhorn 2008, p. 281 Franco himself kept meeting with right-wing politicians, usually ignoring the intransigent ones and speaking only to these deemed tractable. No political plans were discussed. In general, his guests were expected to mobilize civilian support for the regime with no political commitment offered in return, except that in an unspecified future "the people" would be free to decide the future regime of Spain.early September 1936 when interviewed in Cáceres by the German press Franco said that he was merely a military men, that his objective was to defeat bolchevism, and once done he would return power to any national movement (movimiento nacional) supported by the people, Tusell 2002, p. 36

Falangists and Carlists

Few months into the civil war it was already evident that the balance of power among right-wing parties underwent a major shake-up. The decomposed CEDA, Renovación and Agrarians were dwarfed by Comunión Tradicionalista and Falange Española, two groupings responsible for some 80% of volunteers in ranks of the Nationalist party militias.in October 1936 there were 46,794 volunteers registered in ranks of the frontline Nationalist militias; 23.307 were Falangists, 12,213 were Carlists and 9,724 were other, like JAP or Legionarios de Albiñana, Aróstegui 2013, p. 808 It was their efficiency as recruitment structures which mattered to Franco and the military.Preston 1995, p. 248 Initially volunteers constituted 38% of all troops available to the Nationalists on the peninsula; as conscription was getting implemented by November this figure went down to 25%.in late July 1936 out of 90,140 Nationalist militants some 35,000 were militiamen; in October 1936 out of 188,581 Nationalist militants there were 46,794 militiamen, Aróstegui 2013, p. 808 Both groupings were increasingly viewing themselves as future masters of new Spain. The Carlists considered themselves exclusive political partners of the military as agreed back in July 1936; they saw the Nationalist faction as basically a Carlist-military alliance. The Falangists saw the Nationalist effort very much in terms of a syndicalist revolution, with Falange the only genuine live political force amidst remnants of old, pathetically antiquated other parties.Rodríguez Jiménez 2000, pp. 229-236 Both CT and FE considered the army – even though viewed with some suspicion as respectively liberal or reactionary – a necessary tool to gain control of all Spain, but they expected the army to be politically passive and each claimed exclusive right to define political content of the future state.