Germany entered into World War I on August 1, 1914, when it declared war on Russia. In accordance with its war plan, it ignored Russia and moved first against France–declaring war on August 3 and sending its main armies through Belgium to capture Paris from the north. The German invasion of Belgium caused the United Kingdom to declare war on Germany on August 4. Most of the main parties were now at war. In October 1914, the Ottoman Empire joined the war on Germany's side, becoming part of the Central Powers. Italy, which was allied with Germany and Austria-Hungary before World War I, was neutral in 1914 before switching to the Allied side in May 1915.
Historians have vigorously debated Germany's role. One line of interpretation, promoted by German historian Fritz Fischer in the 1960s, argues that Germany had long desired to dominate Europe politically and economically, and seized the opportunity that unexpectedly opened in July 1914, making Germany guilty of starting the war. At the opposite end of the moral spectrum, many historians have argued that the war was inadvertent, caused by a series of complex accidents that overburdened the long-standing alliance system with its lock-step mobilization system that no one could control. A third approach, especially important in recent years, is that Germany saw itself surrounded by increasingly powerful enemies – Russia, France and the UK – who would eventually crush it unless Germany acted defensively with a preemptive strike.Mark Hewitson. Germany and the Causes of the First World War (2004) pp. 1–20.
Background
As the war started, Germany stood behind its ally Austria-Hungary in a confrontation with Serbia, but Serbia was under the protection of Russia, which was allied to France. Germany was the leader of the Central Powers, which included Austria-Hungary at the start of the war as well as the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria; arrayed against them were the Allies, consisting chiefly of Russia, France, and Britain at the beginning of the war, Italy, which joined the Allies in 1915, and the United States, which joined the Allies in 1917.
There were several main causes of World War I, which broke out unexpectedly in June–August 1914, including the conflicts and hostility of the previous four decades. Militarism, alliances, imperialism, and ethnic nationalism played major roles. However, the immediate origins of the war lay in the decisions taken by statesmen and generals during the July Crisis of 1914, which was sparked by the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary, by a Serbian secret organization, the Black Hand.Christopher Clark, The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 (2012)
Since the 1870s or 1880s all the major powers had been preparing for a large-scale war, although none expected one. Britain focused on building up its Royal Navy, already stronger than the next two navies combined. Germany, France, Austria, Italy and Russia and some smaller countries set up conscription systems whereby young men would serve from one to three years in the army, then spend the next 20 years or so in the reserves with annual summer training. Men of higher social status became officers.F. H. Hinsley, ed. The New Cambridge Modern History, Vol. 11: Material Progress and World-Wide Problems, 1870–98 (1962) pp 204–42, esp 214–17.
Each country devised a mobilisation system whereby the reserves could be called up quickly and sent to key points by rail. Every year the plans were updated and increased in complexity. Each country stockpiled arms and supplies for an army that ran into the millions. Germany in 1874 had a regular professional army of 420,000, with an additional 1.3 million reserves. By 1897, the regular German army was 545,000 strong and the reserves 3.4 million. The French in 1897 had 3.4 million reservists, Austria 2.6 million, and Russia 4.0 million. All major countries had a general staff which designed war plans against possible enemies.Paul M. Kennedy, ed., The War Plans of the Great Powers, 1880–1914 (1979) All plans called for a decisive opening and a short war.Hinsley (1962) pp 204–42. Germany's Schlieffen Plan was the most elaborate; the German Army was so confident that it would succeed that they made no alternative plans. It was kept secret from Austria, as well as from the German Navy, the chancellor and the foreign ministry, so there was no coordination–and in the end the plan failed.Craig, "The World War I Alliance of the Central Powers in Retrospect: The Military Cohesion of the Alliance" Indeed there was no joint planning with Vienna before the war started—and very little afterwards.Richard W. Kapp, "Bethmann-Hollweg, Austria-Hungary and Mitteleuropa, 1914–1915." Austrian History Yearbook 19.1 (1983): 215-236.Richard W. Kapp, "Divided Loyalties: The German Reich and Austria-Hungary in Austro-German Discussions of War Aims, 1914–1916." Central European History 17.2-3 (1984): 120-139.
Leadership Historians focus on a handful of German leaders, as was the case for most countries in 1914.T.G. Otte, July Crisis (2014) pp. xvii–xxii for a list. For Germany special attention focuses on the Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, thanks to the discovery of the very rich, candid diary of his top aide Kurt Riezler.Konrad H. Jarausch, "The Illusion of Limited War: Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg's Calculated Risk, July 1914" Central European History 2.1 (1969): 48–76. online
Wilhelm II, German Emperor, the Kaiser, was given enormous publicity by both sides and signed off on major decisions, but he was largely shunted aside or persuaded by others.Lamar Cecil, Wilhelm II: Emperor and Exile, 1900–1941 (1996).
Helmuth von Moltke, the Chief of the German General Staff, was in charge of all planning and operations for the German army. He kept his plans quiet. He had the Kaiser's approval but did not share any details with the Navy, the Chancellor, or his allies. Increasingly as a crisis grew, Moltke became the most powerful man in Germany.Craig, Gordon A. The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640–1945 (1955) pp 292–95.
Public opinion Public opinion and pressure groups played a major role in influencing German politics. The Army and Navy each had their nationwide network of supporters, with a million members in the German Navy League, founded in 1898,Geoff Eley, "Reshaping the right: Radical nationalism and the German Navy League, 1898–1908." Historical Journal 21.2 (1978): 327–40 online. and 20,000 in the German Army League, founded in 1912.Marilyn Shevin Coetzee, The German Army League: Popular Nationalism in Wilhelmine Germany (1990) The most articulate and aggressive civilian organization was the "Pan-German League".Roger Chickering, . We men who feel most German: a cultural study of the Pan-German League, 1886–1914 (1984). The agrarian interest was led by large landowners who were especially interested in exports and was politically well organized. Major corporations in the steel and coal industries were effective lobbyists. All of these economic groups promoted an aggressive foreign policy. Bankers and financiers were not as pacifistic as their counterparts in London, but they did not play a large role in shaping foreign policy.
Pacifism had its well-organized groups, and the labor unions strongly denounced war before it was declared. In the 1912 elections, the Socialists (Social Democratic Party or SPD), based in the labor unions, won 35% of the national vote. Conservative elites exaggerated the implicit threats made by radical Socialists such as August Bebel and became alarmed. Some looked to a foreign war as a solution to Germany's internal problems; others considered ways to suppress the Socialists.Dieter Groh, "The 'Unpatriotic Socialists' and the State." Journal of Contemporary History 1.4 (1966): 151–177. online. SPD policy limited antimilitarism to aggressive wars—Germans saw 1914 as a defensive war. On 25 July 1914, the SPD leadership appealed to its membership to demonstrate for peace and large numbers turned out in orderly demonstrations. The SPD was not revolutionary and many members were nationalistic. When the war began, some conservatives wanted to use force to suppress the SPD, but Bethmann Hollweg wisely refused. The SPD members of parliament voted 96–14 on 3 August to support the war. There remained an antiwar element, especially in Berlin. They were expelled from the SPD in 1916 and formed the Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany.V. R. Berghahn, Germany and the Approach of War in 1914 (1974) pp 178–85
Newspaper editorials indicated that the nationalist right wing was openly in favor of war, even a preventive one, while moderate editors would only support a defensive war. Both the conservative press and the liberal press increasingly used the rhetoric of German honor and popular sacrifice and often depicted the horrors of Russian despotism in terms of Asiatic barbarism.Margaret MacMillan, The war that ended peace p. 605.Jeffrey Verhey, The Spirit of 1914: Militarism, Myth, and Mobilization in Germany (2000) pp 17–20.
German goals Historian Fritz Fischer unleashed an intense worldwide debate in the 1960s on Germany's long-term goals. American historian Paul Schroeder agrees with the critics that Fischer exaggerated and misinterpreted many points. However, Schroeder endorses Fischer's basic conclusion: From 1890 on, Germany did pursue world power. This bid arose from deep roots within Germany's economic, political, and social structures. Once the war broke out, world power became Germany's essential goal.Paul W. Schroeder, "World War I as Galloping Gertie: A Reply to Joachim Remak," Journal of Modern History 44#3 (1972), pp. 319–45, at p/ 320 online
However, Schroeder argues, all that was not the main cause of the war in 1914—indeed, the search for a single main cause is not a helpful approach to history. Instead, there are multiple causes any one or two of which could have launched the war. He argues, "The fact that so many plausible explanations for the outbreak of the war have been advanced over the years indicates on the one hand that it was massively overdetermined, and on the other that no effort to analyze the causal factors involved can ever fully succeed."Schroeder p 320