France entered World War I when Germany declared war on 3 August 1914.
World War I largely arose from a conflict between two alliances: the Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy) and the Triple Entente (France, Russia, and Britain). France had had a military alliance with Russia since 1894, designed primarily to neutralize the German threat to both countries. Germany had a military alliance with .
In June 1914, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, was assassinated. The government of Austria-Hungary entered into a conflict with Serbia due to the increasing unrest among ethnic Slavs. Germany secretly gave Austria-Hungary a "blank check", promising to support it militarily no matter what it decided. Both countries wanted a localized war.
Russia decided to intervene to protect Serbia due to its interest in the Balkan region and its desire to gain an advantage over Austria-Hungary. The Tsar had the support of the President of France, who otherwise was hardly involved. Russia mobilized its army against Austria-Hungary. France mobilized its army. Germany declared war on Russia and France, and invaded France through Belgium. Britain had an understanding and military and naval planning agreements with France, but no formal treaty obligations. London felt British interest required a defence of France. Britain did have a treaty obligation toward Belgium, and that was used as the official reason Britain declared war on Germany. Japan, allied with Britain, was not obligated to go to war but did so to gain spoils. Turkey joined the Central Powers. Italy, instead of joining Germany and Austria-Hungary with whom it had treaties, entered the war on the side of the Allies in 1915. The United States tried unsuccessfully to broker peace negotiations, and entered the war on the Allied side in April 1917. After very heavy losses on both sides, the Allies were decisively victorious, and divided assets, such as the German colonies and much of the territory of the Ottoman Empire. The Austro-Hungarian, German, Russian and Ottoman Empires disintegrated.For a short overview see David Fromkin, Europe's Last Summer: Who Started the Great War in 1914? (2004).
Diplomatic background By the late 1880s, Bismarck's League of the Three Emperors was in disarray; although Germany remained closely allied to Austria-Hungary, there was growing friction between Russia and Austria-Hungary over the Balkans. Angered by Austria's role in the Treaty of Berlin (1878), which forced Russia to withdraw from Bulgaria, Tsar Alexander III refused to renew the treaty in 1887. Bismarck, in the hope of making the Tsar more amenable to his wishes, had forbidden German banks to lend money to Russia. French bankers quickly replaced the Germans in financing Russia, and helped to speed Russian industrialization. The Russians had borrowed around 500 million francs by 1888. Bismarck signed a Reinsurance Treaty with Russia in 1887, but after Bismarck's fall from power in 1890 Kaiser Wilhelm II refused Russia's request to renew it.
The advantage of a Franco-Russian alliance was clear to all Frenchmen: France would not be alone against Germany, for it promised a two-front war. Formal visits were exchanged between the two powers in 1890 and 1891, and the Russian Tsar saluted the French national anthem, La Marseillaise. The Franco-Russian alliance was announced in 1894. This diplomatic coup was followed by a secret agreement with Italy, allowing the Italians a free hand to expand in Tripoli (modern Libya, then still under Turkish rule). In return, Italy promised she would remain non-belligerent against France in any future war. Meanwhile, as Britain became increasingly anxious over the German naval buildup and industrial rivalry, agreement with France became increasingly attractive.
France competed with Britain, and to a lesser extent with Italy, for control of Africa. There was constant friction between Britain and France over borders between their respective African colonies (see the Fashoda Incident). The French Foreign Minister Théophile Delcassé was aware that France could not progress if she was in conflict with Germany in Europe and Britain in Africa, and so recalled Captain Marchand's expeditionary force from Fashoda, despite popular protests. This paved the way for Britain joining France in World War I.
Edward VII's visit to Paris in 1903 stilled anti-British feeling in France, and prepared the way for the Entente Cordiale. Initially however, a colonial agreement against the Kaiser's aggressive foreign policy deepened rather than destroyed the bond between the two countries. The Moroccan Crises of 1905 and 1911 encouraged both countries to embark on a series of secret military negotiations in the case of war with Germany. However, British Foreign Minister Edward Grey realized the risk that small conflicts between Paris and Berlin could escalate out of control. Working with little supervision from the British Prime Minister or Cabinet, Grey deliberately played a mediating role, trying to calm both sides and thereby maintain a peaceful balance of power. He refused to make permanent commitments to France. He approved military staff talks with France in 1905, thereby suggesting, but not promising, that if war broke out Britain would favor France over Germany. In 1911, when there was a second Franco-German clash over Morocco, Grey tried to moderate the French while supporting Germany in its demand for compensation. There was little risk that Britain would have conflicts with anyone leading to war. The Royal Navy remained dominant in world affairs, and remained a high spending priority for the British government. The British Army was small, although plans to send an expeditionary force to France had been developed since the Haldane Reforms. From 1907 through 1914, the French and British armies collaborated on highly detailed plans for mobilizing a British Expeditionary Force of 100,000 combat troops to be very quickly moved to France, and sent to the front in less than two weeks.Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., The Politics of Grand Strategy: France and Britain Prepare for War, 1904–1914. (1969) pp 313–17. Grey insisted that world peace was in the best interests of Britain and the British Empire.Thomas G. Otte, "'Almost a law of nature'? Sir Edward Grey, the foreign office, and the balance of power in Europe, 1905–12." Diplomacy and Statecraft 14.2 (2003): 77–118.
France could strengthen its position in the event of war by forming new alliances or by enlisting more young men. It used both methods.James D. Morrow, "Arms versus Allies: Trade-offs in the Search for Security." International Organization 47.2 (1993): 207–233. online Russia was firmly in the same camp, and Britain was almost ready to join. In 1913 the controversial "three year law" extended the term of conscription for French draftees from two to three years. Previously young men were in training at ages 21 and 22 then joined the reserves; now they were in training at ages 20, 21, and 22.Gerd Krumeich, Armaments and Politics in France on the Eve of the First World War: The Introduction of Three-Year Conscription, 1913–1914 (1985). This was later lowered even more.
When the war began in 1914, France could only win if Britain joined with France and Russia to stop Germany. There was no binding treaty between Britain and France, and no moral commitment on the British part to go to war on France's behalf. The Liberal government of Britain was pacifistic, and also extremely legalistic, so that German violation of Belgium neutrality – treating it like a scrap of paper – helped mobilize party members to support the war effort. The decisive factors were twofold, Britain felt a sense of obligation to defend France, and the Liberal Government realized that unless it did so, it would collapse either into a coalition, or yield control to the more militaristic Conservative Party. Either option would likely ruin the Liberal Party. When the German army invaded Belgium, not only was neutrality violated, but France was threatened with defeat, so the British government went to war.Trevor Wilson, "Britain's ‘Moral Commitment’ to France in August 1914." History 64.212 (1979): 380–390. online
Mounting international tensions and the arms race led to the need to increase conscription from two to three years. Socialists, led by Jean Jaurès, deeply believed that war was a capitalist plot and could never be beneficial to the working man. They worked hard to defeat the conscription proposal, often in cooperation with middle-class pacifists and women's groups, but were outvoted.David M. Rowe, "Globalization, conscription, and anti-militarism in pre-World War I Europe." in Lars Mjoset and Stephen Van Holde, eds. The Comparative Study of Conscription in the Armed Forces (Emerald Group, 2002) pp. 145–170.
Attitudes toward Germany
The critical issue for France was its relationship with Germany. Paris had relatively little involvement in the Balkan crisis that launched the war, paying little attention to Serbia, Austria or the Ottoman Empire. However, a series of unpleasant diplomatic confrontations with Germany soured relationships. The defeat in 1870–71 rankled France, especially the loss of Alsace and Lorraine. French revanchism was not a major cause of war in 1914 because it faded after 1880. J.F.V. Keiger says, "By the 1880s Franco-German relations were relatively good."J.F.V. Keiger, France and the World since 1870 (2001) pp 112–120, quoting p 113. Although the issue of Alsace-Lorraine faded in importance after 1880, the rapid growth in the population and economy of Germany left France increasingly far behind. It was obvious that Germany could field more soldiers and build more heavy weapons.
In the 1890s relationships remained good since Germany supported France during its difficulties with Britain over African colonies. Any lingering harmony, however, collapsed in 1905 by Germany taking an aggressively hostile position on French claims to Morocco. There was talk of war, and France strengthened its ties with Britain and Russia.J.F.V. Keiger, France and the World since 1870 (2001) pp 112–17. Even critics of French imperialism, such as Georges Clemenceau, had become impatient with Berlin. Raymond Poincaré's speeches as Prime Minister in 1912, and then as president in 1913–14, were similarly firm and drew widespread support across the political spectrum.
Only the socialists were holdouts, warning that war was a capitalist ploy and should be avoided by the working class. In July 1914, socialist leader Jean Jaurès obtained a vote against war from the French Socialist Party Congress. 1,690 delegates supported a general strike against the war if the German socialists followed suit, with 1,174 opposed. However Jaurès was assassinated on 31 July, and the socialist parties in both France and Germany – as well as most other countries – strongly supported their national war effort in the first year.Barbara W. Tuchman, "The Death of Jaurès", chapter 8 of The Proud Tower – A portrait of the world before the War: 1890–1914 (1966) pp. 451–515.
Main players
As in all the major powers, a handful of men made the critical decisions in the summer of 1914.T.G. Otte, July Crisis: The world's descent into war, summer 1914 (2014) pp xvii–xxii. As the French ambassador to Germany from 1907 to 1914, Jules Cambon worked hard to secure a friendly détente. He was frustrated by French leaders such as Raymond Poincaré, who decided Berlin was trying to weaken the Triple Entente of France, Russia and Britain, and was not sincere in seeking peace. Apart from Cambron the French leadership believed that war was inevitable.John Keiger, "Jules Cambon and Franco-German Détente, 1907–1914." The Historical Journal 26.3 (1983): 641–659.